continued
Section 6
The two main-types of a positive-metaphysical interpretation of Nibbāna can be easily included in a considerable number of false views mentioned, classified and rejected by the Buddha. A selection of applicable classifications will be presented in what follows. This material, additional to the fundamental remarks in the preceding section, will furnish an abundance of documentation for the fact that not a single eternalistic conception of self and Nibbāna, of any conceivable form, is reconcilable with the teachings of the Buddha as found in their oldest available presentation in the Pali Canon.
(a) In the Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN 22:86) we read: “Do you think, Anurādha, that the Perfect One (tathāgata) is apart from corporeality (aññatra rūpā) • apart from consciousness?” [10] — “Certainly not, O Lord.” — “Do you think that the Perfect One is someone without corporeality (arūpī) • someone without consciousness?” [11] — “Certainly not, O Lord.” — “Since the Perfect One, Anurādha, cannot, truly and really, be found by you even during lifetime, is it befitting to declare: ’He who is the Perfect One, the highest being • that Perfect One can be made known outside of these four possibilities: The Perfect One exists after death • does not exist • exists in some way and in another way not • can neither be said to exist nor not to exist’?” — “Certainly not, O Lord.”
This text applies to both main-types of view which assume a self beyond the aggregates. It should be mentioned here that the commentary paraphrases the words “the Perfect One” (tathāgata) by “living being” (satta). That is probably meant to show that the statements in the text are valid not only for the conventional term “the Perfect One” but also for any other terms designating an individuality.
(b) Since the concept of a self is necessarily linked with that of an ownership of qualities and possessions (see 5b), both main-types come under the following heading of the twenty kinds of individuality-belief (sakkāya-diṭṭhi; see 5a).
He regards the self as possessing corporeality • as possessing feeling • perception • formations • consciousness.
This applies, in particular, to the second main-type advocated by Georg Grimm, who expressly speaks of the five aggregates as “attributions” (“Beilegungen”) of the self. It does not make any difference here that these “attributions” are regarded by Grimm as “incommensurate” to the self and as capable of being discarded. What matters is the fact that such a relationship between the self and the aggregates is assumed, and this justifies the inclusion of that view in the aforementioned type of individuality belief.
(c) From the “Discourse on the Root Cause” (Mūlapariyāya Sutta; MN 1) the following categories apply to both types: “He thinks (himself) different from (or beyond) the four material elements, the heavenly worlds, the uncorporeal spheres; from anything seen, heard, (differently) sensed and cognized; from the whole universe (sabbato).” To the second type are applicable the views: “He thinks (himself) in Nibbāna (nibbānasmiṃ maññati) or as different from nibbāna (nibbānato maññati).” That is, he believes the liberated self which is supposed to enter the Nibbāna element to be different from it.
(d) In the sutta “All Cankers” (Sabbāsava Sutta; MN 2) the following instances of unwise and superficial thinking (ayoniso manasikāra) are mentioned and rejected:
Six theories about the self from which the following are applicable here: “I have a self” and “By the self I know the self.” [12]
Sixteen kinds of doubt about the existence and nature of the self, with reference to the past, present and future, e.g., “Am I or am I not?”, “What am I?”, “Shall I be or not?”, “What shall I be?”
Hereby any type of speculation about an alleged self is rejected.
(e) In the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN 1) the theories about a self are specified as to their details. Those, however, who advocate the two main-types of the positive-metaphysical extreme, with which we are here concerned, generally avoid or reject detailed statements on the nature of Nibbāna and the self. But if they assume an eternal and transcendental self, it must be conceived as being passive, motionless and immutable. For any active relationship to the world would involve an abandonment of the transcendental state assumed. Therefore both main-types fall under the eternalist view, characterized and rejected in the Brahmajāla Sutta as follows: “Eternal are self and world, barren, motionless like a mountain peak, steadfast like a pillar.”
(f) The rejection of any belief in a self (as abiding or temporarily identical), and of the extremes of existence and not-existence, cannot be better concluded than by quoting the continuation of the saying that forms the motto of this treatise:
For him, Kaccāna, who considers, according to reality and with true wisdom, the origination of (and in) the world, there is not what in the world (is called) “non-existence” (natthitā). For him, Kaccāna, who considers, according to reality and with true wisdom, the cessation of (and in) the world, there is not what in the world (is called) “existence” (atthitā). This world, Kaccāna, is generally fettered by propensities, clingings, and biases. But concerning these propensities, clingings, fixed mental attitudes, biases and deep-rooted inclinations, he (the man of right understanding) does not come near, does not cling, does not have the mental attitude: “I have a self” (n’adhiṭṭhāti attā me’ti). He has no doubt or uncertainty that it is suffering, indeed, that arises, and suffering that ceases. Herein his knowledge does not rely on others. In so far, Kaccāna, is one a man of right understanding. (SN 12:15)
III Transcending the Extremes
If we examine the utterances on Nibbāna in the Pali Canon, we find that it is described (or better: paraphrased) in both positive and negative terms. Statements of a positive nature include designations like “the profound, the true, the pure, the permanent, the marvellous,” etc. (SN 43); and such texts as those quoted above (see Section 2), “There is that sphere •”; “There is an unborn •,” etc. Statements in the form of negative terms include such definitions of Nibbāna as “the destruction of greed, hate and delusion” and as “cessation of existence” (bhava-nirodha). If the Buddhist conception of Nibbāna is to be understood correctly, one will have to give full weight to the significance of both types of utterance. If one were to quote only one type as a vindication of one’s own one-sided opinion, the result would be a lop-sided view.
To the utterances of positive character we may ascribe the following purposes: (1) to exclude the nihilistic extreme; (2) to allay the fears of those who are still without an adequate grasp of the truths of suffering and anattā, and thus shrink back from the final cessation of suffering, i.e., of rebirth, as if recoiling from a fall into a bottomless abyss; (3) to show Nibbāna as a goal capable of attainment and truly desirable.
The emphatic “There is” that opens the two well-known texts on Nibbāna in the Udāna, leaves no doubt that Nibbāna is not conceived as bare extinction or as a camouflage for an absolute zero. But, on the other hand, as a precaution against a metaphysical misinterpretation of that solemn enunciation “There is • (atthi),” we have that likewise emphatic rejection of the extremes of existence (atthitā) and non-existence (natthitā).
But even those utterances on Nibbāna which are phrased positively, include mostly negative terms too:
“There is that sphere where there is neither earth • neither this world nor the next, neither coming nor going.”
“There is an unborn, an unbecome •.”
“I shall teach you the unformed • the profound • and the way to it. What now is the unformed • the profound? It is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hatred, the destruction of delusion.”
These texts, combining positive and negative statements, illustrate our earlier remark that both the positive and the negative utterances on Nibbāna require mutual qualification, as a precaution against sliding into an extremist position.
Negative utterances are meant to emphasize the supramundane and ineffable nature of Nibbāna, which eludes adequate description in positive terms. Our language is basically unsuited for such description, since it is necessarily related to the world of our experience from which its structure and terms are derived. Therefore the positive statements in the suttas cannot be more than allusions or metaphors (pariyāya desanā). They make use of emotional values intelligible to us to characterize experiences and reactions known to those who have trodden the path to the Pathless. Though for the reasons mentioned above they have great practical value, they are evocative rather than truly descriptive. Negative statements, however, are quite sound and legitimate in themselves. They relate Nibbāna to the world of experience only by negations. The negating method of approach consists in a process of eliminating what is inapplicable to Nibbāna and incommensurate with it. It enables us to make much more definite and useful statements about the supramundane state of Nibbāna than by the use of abstract terms, the positive character of which can be only metaphorical. Negative statements are also the most appropriate and reverential way to speak of that which has been called “the marvellous” (acchariya) and “the extraordinary” (abbhuta).
Negative ways of expression have another important advantage. Statements like those defining Nibbāna as “the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion” indicate the direction to be taken, and the work to be done to actually reach Nibbāna. And it is this which matters most. These words on the overcoming of greed, hatred and delusion set a clear and convincing task which can be taken up here and now. Further, they not only point to a way that is practicable and worthwhile for its own sake, but they also speak of the lofty goal itself which likewise can be experienced here and now, and not only in an unknown beyond. For it has been said:
If greed, hatred and delusion have been completely destroyed, insofar is Nibbāna visible here and now, not delayed, inviting inspection, and directly experienceable by the wise. (AN 3:55)
That visible Nibbāna has been lauded by those who attained to it as an unalloyed and inalienable happiness, as the highest solace, as the unspeakable relief of being freed from burden and bondage. A faint foretaste of it may be experienced in each act of joyful renunciation and in moments of serene detachment. To know oneself, if but temporarily and partially, to be free from the slavery of passions and the blindness of self-deception; to be master of oneself and to live and think in the light of knowledge, if but for a time and to a limited extent—these are truly not “mere negative facts,” but the most positive and elevating experiences for those who know more than the fleeting and deceptive happiness of the senses.
“There are two kinds of happiness, O monks: the happiness of sense-pleasures and the happiness of renunciation. But the greater of them is the happiness of renunciation” (AN 2:64).
Thus these seemingly negative words of the destruction of greed, hatred and delusion will convey to the thoughtful and energetic a stirring positive message: of a way that can here be trodden, of a goal that can here be reached, of a happiness that can here be experienced.
That aspect of a lofty happiness attainable here and now should, however, not be allowed to cover for us the fact that the attainment of Nibbāna is the end of rebirth, the cessation of becoming. But this end or cessation in no way involves the destruction or annihilation of anything substantial. What actually takes place is the ending of new origination owing to the stopping of its root-causes: ignorance and craving.
He who sees deeply and thoroughly the truth of suffering is “no longer carried away by the unreal, and no longer shrinks back from the real.” He knows: “It is suffering, indeed, that arises, it is suffering that ceases.” With a mind unswerving he strives after the deathless, the final cessation of suffering—Nibbāna.
The Holy Ones know it as bliss:
the personality’s cessation;
Repugnant to the worldly folk,
but not to those who clearly see.
What others count as highest bliss,
the Holy Ones regard as pain;
What those regard as only pain
is for the Holy Ones sheer bliss.
(Sn vv. 761–62)
Notes
1.The extracts from both works have mainly been taken, with a few alterations, from Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli’s translation (see Note on Sources). Explanatory additions by this writer are in brackets, those by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli in parentheses.
2.Comy.: This is to show that, for Arahants, Nibbāna is established by their own experience.
3.Comy.: For others it is established by inference based on the words of the Master.
4.The paragraphs beginning with * are translated by the author of this essay; those without, by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli (taken from the notes to his translation of the Visuddhimagga).
5.These are some of the altogether 33 designations of Nibbāna in SN 43:12-44.
6.This refers to Abhidhammic classifications in which Nibbāna is included, occurring, for instance, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī.
7.The theosophical variant, is, e.g., represented by neo-Buddhist groups in Britain and elsewhere which otherwise have done good work in introducing Westerners to Buddhist or to their conception of it. The Vedantic influence is conspicuous, e.g., in the utterances of well-meaning Indians, among them men of eminence, maintaining the basic identiey or similarity, of the Vedantic and Buddhist position concerning ātman. This is, by the way, quite in contrast to opinion on that subject, expressed by the great classical exponents of Vedanta. See Vedanta and Buddhism by H. v. Glasenapp (Wheel No. 2)
Mahayanistic influence may be noticeable in some representatives of the former two variants. But also in the Mahāyāna literature iteslef, the positive-metaphysical extreme is met with in varying degrees. Ranging from the Madhyamika scriptures where it is comparatively negligible, up to the Yogāvacara school where Asaṅga uses even the terms mahātma and paramātma in an approving sense (see Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra-śāstra and Asaṅga’s own commentary.).
8.These are the twenty kinds of individuality-belief (sakkāya-diṭṭhi).
9.See The Discourse on the Snake Simile, tr. by Nyanaponika Thera (Wheel No. 47/48).
10.I.e., outside the aggregates taken singly.
11.I.e., outside the aggregates as a whole.
12.Pali: attanā’va attānaṃ sañjānāmi. This refers to Vedantic conceptions. Quite similar formulations are found already in the Saṃhitās, the pre-Buddhist Upanishads, and later in the Bhagavadgītā.