What is wrong with the book "Anatta and Nibbana" and the view of nibbana in it

General Theravada topics
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Continuing the discussion from Help for responding to people who say: Buddha never said there's nothing after parinibbana:

From the perspective of the complete cessation of consciousness at parinibbāna — considering that the nibbāna-dhamma realized by the arahant is not a form of his continued existence, preservation, or awareness — the presence or absence of some abstract “dhamma,” “āyatana,” “dhātu,” or, generally, a nibbānic reality changes absolutely nothing. For the arahant, the moment of physical death is the end — the cessation of all subjective experience.

Therefore, the author here seems to be subtly and mystically suggesting that final nibbāna is not actually the cessation of consciousness and existence. That implies some form of conscious existence for the arahant — though said to be inexpressible and not reducible to conditioned aggregates. In other words, what is being proposed is a mode of being and awareness in the form of an unconditioned element.

But unconditioned, eternal, blissful existence and consciousness — this is nothing other than the good old ātman of the Indian systems.

If the author denies that nibbāna is cessation, and at the same time fails to see the classical nibbāna-dhamma as simply the designation for cessation (with the presence of a “truth” or “principle” of cessation, not a metaphysical entity), then he is effectively affirming a form of inexpressible, transcendent existence for the arahant after parinibbāna. I stress: inexpressible and transcendent, beyond formations, yet nevertheless some kind of being (as opposed to cessation).

The author seems to be saying that:
• (I) It is one extreme to see nibbāna as mere cessation of formations;
• (II) It is another extreme to see it as the continuation of purified, joyful formations;
• (III) And the supposed “middle” is to posit an unconditioned reality — essentially, a transcendent post-mortem state or mode of being for the arahant.

In effect, then, what is being proposed as a “middle way” here is the postulation of an unconditioned ātman — one that avoids the flaws of continued formations and the dread of total cessation without remainder.

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I really wish the Buddha spoke up on this when he was asked. But the situation didn’t call for it due to the mindset of the listener. It is too bad.

However, the Buddha would have needed to explain the whole process of what is a “being” and 5 khandas and digital mind moments and digital rupa. After that he could have explained how no new kamma is generated and no new causes to re-arise. I guess there was not a situation to explain all of that.

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@bksubhuti

My impression from studying the suttas is that the Buddha actually explained everything. And his explanation tends toward the view that nibbāna is simply the cessation of dukkha — but that cessation is a fact, a truth, a reality, not merely a concept or someone’s invention. Of course, it is dhamma — a dhamma of cessation that is permanent and requires no sustaining conditions.

But for some reason, this idea is criticized in the book I mentioned — as well as in other similar works — as “nihilism.” And this supposed “nihilism” is contrasted with the traditional view that nibbāna is some kind of “reality.” But then one must ask: in what way is this view, where nibbāna is granted a stronger ontological status, actually different from the idea of simple cessation? In both cases, the arahant’s subjective experience ceases at the moment of death, and effectively, there is no difference.

Therefore, the authors of such views, in reality, do not affirm the cessation of subjective experience after death — rather, they imagine it in the form of this very unconditioned nibbāna-dhamma-reality, which, in their view, is indescribable, not reducible to conditioned formations, and at the same time “not non-being.”

Which means this dhamma is simply some sort of inexplicable, transcendent state of existence for the arahant after death — according to the view of such critics of cessation. Bhikkhu Bodhi also seems to hold a very similar view.

I would like this perspective on the element of nibbāna to receive more attention. Eternaly-blissful existence and awareness — this is nothing other than the good old Ātman.

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I did not read the mentioned book.

Nibbana is not a satta-santāna-pariyāpanna dhamma. In fact there cannot be any sort of samodhāna between sankhata and asankhata dhamma.

Whatever the ontological status(whatever that means) of Nibbana, it has no bearing whatsoever on any sort of sassata or uccheda vāda.

1 Like
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The author is quoting scripture. Scripture has two types of Nibbana. Itivuttaka: The Group of Twos

The author in the quote never implied this. Also, the suttas never refer to “death” (“marana”) of an Arahant.

The Buddha explained what “a being” is. Satta Sutta: A Being

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The Commentaries do:
The Dispeller of Delusion (pali text society) trans. Bhikku Nanamoli:
page 121, volume1:

"this division too should be known, namely momentary death (khanika-
marana), conventional death (samutti marana) and death as cutting
off (samuccheda-marana).

Samuccheda- marana is the final death of an arahat.