Hello, Venerable. I can share some quotes which help me with this issue:
after the last consciousness of the Arahant, who has
abandoned arousing [future aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving
result in a future [existence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence,
and those already arisen have disappeared.
Consciousness that is permanent, stable, eternal, not subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as not existing, and I too say that it does not exist.
"At Savatthi. Seated to one side, that mendicant said to the Buddha: “Sir, is there any form at all that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever? Is there any feeling … perception … choices … consciousness at all that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever?” “Mendicant, there is no form at all that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever. There’s no feeling … perception … choices … consciousness at all that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever.”
Then the Buddha, picking up a little bit of dirt under his fingernail, addressed that mendicant: “There’s not even this much of any form that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever. If there were, this living of the spiritual life for the complete ending of suffering would not be found. But since there isn’t, this living of the spiritual life for the complete ending of suffering is found.
There’s not even this much of any feeling …
perception … choices …
consciousness that’s permanent, everlasting, eternal, imperishable, and will last forever and ever. If there were, this living of the spiritual life for the complete ending of suffering would not be found. But since there isn’t, this living of the spiritual life for the complete ending of suffering is found.
What do you think, mendicant? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “So you should truly see … Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is no return to any state of existence.’”-SN 22.97
The body broke up,perception ceased,feelings went cold— all —fabrications were stilled,consciousness has come to an end.-Ud 8.9
“Now what, bhikkhus, is the Nibbāna-element with no residue left? Here a bhikkhu is an arahant … completely released through final knowledge. For him, here in this very life, all that is experienced, not being delighted in, will be extinguished. That, bhikkhus, is called the Nibbāna-element with no residue left.“These, bhikkhus, are the two Nibbāna-elements.”These two Nibbāna-elements were made knownBy the Seeing One, stable and unattached:One is the element seen here and nowWith residue, but with the cord of being destroyed;The other, having no residue for the future,Is that wherein all modes of being utterly cease.Having understood the unconditioned state,Released in mind with the cord of being destroyed,They have attained to the Dhamma-essence.Delighting in the destruction (of craving),Those stable ones have abandoned all being.
This thread on dhammawheel also has a HUGE amount of info that disproves the position that nibbana is some kind of existence. https://www.dhammawheel.com/viewtopic.php?t=33668&hilit=post+sutta+quotes
Also, Mahasi Sayadaw’s work “On the Nature of Nibbana,” in full is amazing, and contains logic and explanation as to how Ud 8.1 and other points completely rule out this heretical view of nibbana. I’ve shared a very small selection here, but the whole article is excellent, but too long to share much more here.
Absence of Mind and Matter in Nibbāna
In nibbāna there are no such things as mind or mental concomitants, which can be met with in the sense-sphere or form-sphere. It naturally follows that mind and matter that belong to the thirty-one planes of existence are totally absent in nibbāna. However, some would like to propose that after the parinibbāna of the Buddha and the Arahants, they acquire a special kind of mind and matter in nibbāna. Such an extraordinary way of thinking may appeal to those who cannot do away with self or ego.
With regard to this proposition a learned Sayādaw reasoned that if there is a special kind of mind and matter in nibbāna, there must also be a special kind of rebirth which gives rise to a special kind of old age, disease, and death, which in turn bring about a special kind of sorrow, lamentation, suffering, distress, and despair. When the teachings explicitly say cessation, it will be improper to go beyond it and formulate an idea of a special kind of existence. Extinction points to nothing other than Nothingness. Nibbāna, which is not involved in mind and matter, cannot be made to get involved either in this world or in other worlds.
Nibbāna Offers No Sense-objects
In the absence of mind, matter, consciousness, concomitants, etc., There can be no sense-objects, and in the absence of sense-objects no opportunities arise for mental formations to play their part. Nibbāna means the end of suffering. Since there are no primary elements and no mind and matter, everything ceases, and this cessation means eternal peace. All sufferings end.
-Venerable Mahasi Sayadaw, On the Nature of Nibbana
Bhikkhu Sujato wrote three articles refuting the idea that nibbana is eternal consciousness that are great, too. The most compelling argument, in my opinion, is that all arguments that some suttas support this idea rely on suttas that do not say that they are talking about parinibbana, and so do not prove that consciousness exists after the death of an arahant at all. They are clearly talking about nibbana while alive. Here are some relevant quotes, and I’ve linked the articles below.
When passages such as the ‘anidassana vinnana’ or the ‘pabhassara citta’ are invoked to lend support for the notion that Nibbana is an eternal cosmic awareness that survives the death of an arahant, the first question we should ask is, ‘Do these phrases actually refer clearly to the state of an arahant after death?’ If they don’t, they are irrelevant to the problem. We all agree that an arahant is conscious before their death.
Arguments for the ‘eternal-consciousness Nibbana’ almost invariably tend to slip from talking about the citta or vinnana in this life to the state after death. It is a subtle sleight of hand, which pivots on the ambiguity of the term Nibbana, and is hidden by the conceptual fog that mere mention of the term evokes.
-Bhikkhu Sujato “Nibbana Remains Not Vinnana”
…i believe that the Buddha actually said what he meant, and don’t feel the need to rely on later teachers to correct him. To expand or clarify things, sure; but not to propound something that is manifestly different.
What I am talking about is not, in fact, identical with the annihilation of the materialists, and I would ask you to respect the fact that, while you may see no difference, I do. That the Buddha’s view was similar to that of annihilation, and was liable to be mistaken for it, is acknowledged in the Suttas themselves. However, the fallacy is that of reductionism: because the Buddha’s teaching of Nibbana as the “cessation of existence” (bhavanirodho nibbanam) shares some things in common with the annihilationist teaching of the destruction of a physical (or immaterial, for that matter) Self, it is assumed to be the same.
This is why, as I emphasized in a previous comment, the Buddha’s position will be always misunderstood as long as one or other aspect is emphasized exclusively. To repeat: when speaking of the ontology of Nibbana–what actually exists after the death of an arahant–the Buddha always spoke in negative terms: the cessation of consciousness, the ending of the five aggregates, and so on. However, when he spoke of our subjective attitudes towards Nibbana, he always spoke in positive terms: the peaceful, the sublime, the refuge, and so on.
-Bhikkhu Sujato, comment to Nibbana is not vinnana. Really, it just isn’t.
The Suttas emphatically, repeatedly, and unambiguously (sabbena sabbam sabbattha sabbam kassaci kimhici) deny the possibility of any “Nibbanic sentience”, and this is, in fact, one of their principle doctrines, stated in direct opposition to the Upanishadic notion of the transcendent consciousness. In addition to this ontological position, the Suttas also express an unreserved and equally unambiguous positive sense of how we should feel about Nibbana. Beyond this, one is proliferating the unproliferated….
-Bhikkhu Sujato, comment to Nibbana is not vinnana. Really, it just isn’t.
The Buddha was so very very emphatic that the end of dependent origination was the end of all forms of consciousness. Making distinctions between “consciousness” and “awareness” and the like is no use, since these do not apply in the suttas.
Unfortunately, most Buddhist commentators on this point are not familiar with the relevant pre-Buddhist Upanishads; for in those texts, it is precisely vijnana (= Pali vinnana) that is the “Universal Awareness” that survives all. If you read what the Upanishads say about vijnana, side by side with what the Buddha says, it becomes perfectly clear that the Buddha was specifically adopting the Upanishadic terminology in order to refute it.
If what the Buddha taught is really in essence the same as the Upanishads–and the ideas that you good gentlemen are talking about are, indeed, Upanishadic–then why was he so chronically unable to say so clearly? Why did he not repeat, as part of the basic definition of Nibbana, that it meant “an eternally lasting radiant omniscient transcendent consciousness”. It’s not so hard; I can do it, and the Upanishadic teachers could. Why did the Buddha, so extraordinarily clear and analytical in all things that matter, fail to say what he meant? Why, in all the dozens of epithets and descriptions of Nibbana, did he so scrupulously avoid anything that implies an existent state? Why, then, do those who search to validate such ideas in the Suttas constantly bringing up the same few, obscure passages of poetic or dubious interpretation? Passages which, moreover, have been shown time and time again to not mean what they are supposed to. The pabhassara citta in the canon, for example, clearly refers to the mind that is developed through samadhi; and if it can be developed it cannot be unconditioned. If actually you consider the passages that supposedly support the idea of Nibbana as a transcendental consciousness, they invariably undermine any such tendency by phrasing themselves in the negative: “There is the unborn…” It’s an emphatic assertion of a negative, not of a positive.
Nibbana is supposed to be threatening. It’s supposed to be disturbing. That’s why, when the Devas or others of limited ability here of it, they are terrified and traumatized. Who gets traumatized by the idea that they will live forever as a transcendent consciousness? Nibbana poses the ultimate existential question, which is why the Buddha always described in ontologically in the negative. At the same time, however, he described it psychologically in the positive: the peaceful, the shelter, the cool, the ultimate bliss. But we can’t realize that state of peace as long as we still attach to refined forms of suffering such as a transcendent consciousness.
-Bhikkhu Sujato’s comment on “Vinnana is not nibbana really it just isn’t”