Where might one find a refutation of Vasubandhu and Yogacara, as devastating as Betty and others papers on Nagarjuna?

Ceisiwr · October 14, 2022, 7:10pm

Apology accepted. On my position, I haven’t done a 180. I considered myself to be a Classical Theravādin when I joined this site and started posting. I don’t really want to get into Phenomenalism here, but what I will say is that I saw Classical Theravāda as saying the same things as Phenomenalism. How it could be a Phenomenalism and a Realism at the same time is what intrigued me. I think though that perhaps the similarities are only skin deep, and the Abhidhamma itself doesn’t have to perfectly match Western philosophical ideas. It can stand on its own right. How Phenomenalism and Classical Theravāda are similar but also different does intrigue me, but I’m not going to get into those kinds of discussions here. I’d rather just discuss the tradition as it stands. On Mahāyāna, whilst there was a brief period where I flirted with the Prajñāpāramitā in the end it was not for me. I couldn’t really reconcile it with what we find in the suttas (and other early texts). It seems quite clear to me that the Buddha accepted the reality of the external world, and indeed he said that the 4NT (which would include dhammas such as the body and mind) were real, not otherwise. I also think the Bodhisattva idea is absurd, contradictory and isn’t substantiated by the body of early material. This led me to an EBT view, but on such a method it’s very hard to work out the Dhamma conceptually. It’s hard to do so because suttas are more guidelines or outlines, the bare bones of the practice as it were, rather than anything like the detailed Dhamma instruction the Buddha would have given in his day to day. To actually understand the Dhamma in depth then, we need tradition. We need the detailed map of the Abhidhamma and the commentaries to guide us. Having studied what I could of the various early and non-Mahāyāna traditions, Theravāda looks like the best. There we do not find the subtle atta view of Pudgalavāda. We do not find the substance metaphysics of the Sarvāstivādins, nor the god-like cosmic Buddha of the Mahāsāṃghikas with their 9 (yes, 9!) unconditioned dhammas (including nibbāna). I should point out here that whilst I do follow the Mahavihāravāsin tradition and accept its Abhidhamma and the guidance of its commentaries, I do so from a different route than the traditional explanation of the Abhidhamma being taught by the Buddha. I have to be honest and say that whilst I don’t say such a thing never happened, I find it hard to believe. With that said, I fully respect those who do accept such things and I won’t be looking to argue against it here.

On final thing on the EBT approach. I do find it ironic that those who reject the Abhidhamma then go on to create an Abhidhamma of their own, and usually of a poorer quality. We see this all the time on SuttaCentral and on DhammaWheel. That’s not to say that a comparative approach can’t be useful. I think one of the benefits of the EBT approach is that it has given even further assurance that the teachings of the suttas go back to the Buddha himself. However, even so we still need the Abhidhamma and commentaries to guide us through to awakening.

ekocare · October 14, 2022, 10:32pm

It is a wise observation I think.

Another wise observation which I have seen in open-minded seekers when they getting matured.

If one can come up to this position, I would think they are not average persons.

As long as one believe Abhidhamma as correct and don’t believe in risky opinions like “it was definitely not from the Buddha”, he has the chance to learn and practice Abhidhamma.

And he has the chance even to accept it was from the Buddha, in a future day, if his trust about the ancient tradition getting developed little by little.

Any sensible mature person infers that there should be a Philosophical part (like Abhidhamma) and Explanation of meanings (like Atthakata).

When the EBT quest realize that mere Text-criticism is not enough, they tend to create a new Abhidhamma in order to fill the lack of their philosophy.

Though they try it, they are not Intellectual/Philosophical Characters like Nagarjuna or Vasubandhu. They are largely Radical/Emotional Characters. So the new Abhidhamma they create will be of Poor Quality.

Zans · October 28, 2022, 5:07pm

Thanks for clearing that up. I’m truly happy for you that you got over prajnaparamita! I was stuck on that stuff for 15 years! It’s truly heartening to see someone else break free.

Sounds like the only thing you’re stuck on is phenomenalism. I’d give the friendly suggestion to read the quotes from abhidhamma works on what the four elements are, that I provided on your dhamma theory thread, and see if those square with the phenomenalist position that, for example, the earth element is strictly the sensation of hardness, while it is described in the abhidhamma works as things that go far and beyond sense quality descriptors like “hardness,” and even go so far as to declare one element intangible, and that another can generate matter without assistance from mind, nor kamma, which, of course, would be impossible if all elements were purely sensory qualities, as the phenomenalist position holds. For example:

Pañhavi means the element of extension, the substratum of matter. Without it objects cannot occupy space. The
qualities of hardness and softness which are purely relative
are two conditions of this particular element. It may be
stated that this element is present in earth, water, fire and
air. For instance, the water above is supported by water
below. It is this element of extension in conjunction with the
element of motion that produces the upward pressure. Heat
or cold is the tejo element, while fluidity is the àpo element.
âpo is the element of cohesion. Unlike pañhavi it is
intangible. It is this element that makes scattered particles
of matter cohere and gives rise to the idea of ‘body’. When
solid bodies are melted this element becomes more prominent in the resulting fluid. This element is found even in
minute particles when solid bodies are reduced to powder.
The element of extension and cohesion are so closely interrelated that when cohesion ceases extension disappears. Tejo is the element of heat. Cold is also a form of tejo.
Both heat and cold are included in tejo because they possess the power of maturing bodies. Tejo, in other words, is
the vitalizing energy. Preservation and decay are also due
to this element. Unlike the other three essentials of matter,
this element has the power to regenerate matter by itself.
Inseparably connected with heat is vàyo, the element
of motion. Movements are caused by this element. Motion
is regarded as the force or the generator of heat. “Motion and heat in the material realm correspond respectively to
consciousness and Kamma in the mental.”
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, p 319-320

Ceisiwr · October 30, 2022, 8:12pm

I do sometimes find that hard to understand. For example, from Ledi Sayadaw’s “Manual of Light”

The earth element (paṭhavī-dhātu), in the ultimate sense, is the mere property of hardness. By earth is not meant any substance— not even a hundred-thousandth part of an atom. It lacks shape, mass, form, core, or solidity. Therefore, this element exists in very clear spring water or river water; in all forms of light, including sunlight, moonlight, and even the lustre of gems; in all sounds, including the vibrant sounds of gongs or pagoda bells; in moving air, from the softest breeze to a gale ; and in smells, good or bad, that spread near and far…In the case of light and smell, however, although the element of extension is definitely there, this element is too subtle to notice. No empirical data can be drawn from them. We simply have to rely on the authority of the scriptures…

When hundreds of thousands of crores of the earth element— by themselves the mere property of hardness—happen to be held together by the element of cohesion or the water element (āpodhātu), a form appears, which is given the name “atom.” When thousands of crores of such atoms come together, certain forms of life come into being, beginning with tiny insects.

01VD-Main.book (bps.lk)

Here Bhante states that there is no substance which bears the quality of “hardness”. There is only “hardness” which has no form, shape nor mass. This really does make it sound either as phenomenal or as a “force” like the strong and weak nuclear forces. Both of course create issues, since a phenomenon is a quality experienced in the mind whilst natural forces are never directly experienced. They are conceptual ideas. I also struggle to understand how a simple quality of “hardness” with the simple quality of “cohesion” can accumulate to create insects, trees etc which do not really exist. I also struggle to understand how, say the fire element which is just “heat” can destroy “hardness”. We would all agree that there is no substance in reality. When we eat an apple, there is no “apple” which bears the characteristics. There are only the characteristics of “redness, hardness, sweetness” etc. That I can accept, but I find it much harder to conceptually understand how “hardness, hotness, cohesion and distension” can cause each other much less cause “redness”, since this does look all very phenomenal to me (when dhammas are said to be nothing but their characteristics, which is their sabhāva). Does it really matter though if they are phenomenal or not, as long as we understand there is no substance and even these qualities, which barely have any existence, are too impermanent, dukkha and not-self?

asahi · October 31, 2022, 4:41pm

You are trying to pin point the thing whereas the Buddha saids dependent arising means the thing cant be traced .

Zans · October 31, 2022, 6:33pm

You make some really excellent points. They are difficult. I would like to challenge an abhidhamma expert with this question: How is it said that abhidhamma is realist, and teaches the four ultimate realities, when the fundamental ultimate realities are merely subjective delineations such as “hardness,” and subjective delineations are not ultimate realities by any measure?

If it is merely subjective, and thus, phenomenalism, then there is truly no division between Theravada and Yogacara. In which case, there is no reason whatsoever to practice Buddhism, as it is purely imaginary. Or, in other words, no one has ever read a single sutta, as such things are purely subjective, having zero existence in any way. The ultimate reality taught by the abhidhamma, if the ultimate realities be strictly subjective things, would be nothing but confirmation that you’ve never experienced anything beyond your own imagination, and the Buddha himself never declared knowledge of anything beyond his own imagination, nothing real, nothing ultimate, and thus nothing true. This is a question that has nettled me for five years or so now. Ever since I came to the conclusion that Yogacara openly admits that it is not a true teaching, because every single thing in it is imaginary, I’ve been applying the same treatment to all forms of Buddhism, and the only one to hold up is Theravada.

Now, here is where this will end, I know, because I’ve been down this road before: Anyone who addresses this issue will probably just declare that these things are not conducive to ending suffering. In other words, the question will be dodged in this way, or some other way, and we will never get a truly conclusive answer on whether or not the paramattha dhammas are ultimately real, or just imaginary. The question will be set aside as unimportant.

I personally think it is a very important question, not to be merely dodged, because for a teaching to have weight, and importance, it must be real! If it is merely subjective ideas, and teaches an ultimate reality, the one that makes up rupa no less, as the Buddha declared rupa to be made of the four great elements, and it teaches that ultimate reality is merely subjective, then it has nothing over any other form of subjective idealism, nor its cousins like phenomenalism, etc. Also, perhaps more importantly, it then contains every fatal flaw of these other philosophies, which have been conclusively disproven, and shown to be utterly self contradictory and paradoxical by many philosophers, ancient and modern. Sure, some have defended them, but, even then, if nothing else, the consensus is that these philosophies have some serious flaws, and issues that are entirely unresolved, and incompatible with pretty much everything else. People quickly see through subjective idealism, because it is asking them to accept flight of fancy as fact, while admitting that it is flight of fancy.

Mahavihara · October 31, 2022, 7:23pm

The mere hardness our body feels is pathavi. It is not a mental construct according to Abhidhamma. Five senses sense only realities.

Hardness can be sensed only by the body (kayappasada) out of five senses. It can not be seen. The body can sense only 3 mahbhutas i.e. pathavi, tejo and vayo.

Late Abhidhamma master venerable Rerukane Chandavimala has explained these qualities/characteristics as “Actions” and not solid entities. Abhidhamma master venerable Maggavihari prefers the definition “Characteristic natures or Natural characteristics” .

When a bomb blasts in a city, 10000 people feel the heat of bomb at the exact same time. All the 10000 hear the sound at the exact same time. All the 10000 see the light at the exact same time. The possibility/probability of “all the 10000 people’s minds create/illude the heat/sound/light of the bomb at the exact same time without an objective explosion” is extremely low. The phenomenologists have hard times in explaining such incidents. [venerable Maggavihari]

Any kind of rupa we find (even photons, electrons) is considered to have all the rupas of the Octad (4mahabhutas + color + smell + taste + nutriment). The Octad is considered inseparable from any physical entity. All the 8 exist in each and every physical thing. No one can find 1 of them alone or 2 or …7 alone.

The 4 mahabhutas are considered to be completely mixed with each other in an “unthinkable way”. The ingredients of a cup of tea (tea, sugar, milk and water) are completely mixed, yet we can separate the particles in microscopic level. But the 4 mahabhuthas are considered to be fully mixed in a way that is beyond human imagination. The 4 are said to have “swallowed each other”.

The 4 mahabhutas (with color etc) of a tree exist. What doesn’t exist is the idea/concept of compactness/oneness of the tree.

Upadaya-rupas like color etc. are considered to be created by (/ born depended on) 4 mahabhutas. Upadaya rupas depend on 4 mahabhutas but not vice versa. Any single mahabhuta (out of 4) depends on the other 3 mahabhutas but not on upadaya rupas.

I think it matters if one needs to proceed Classical Vipassana, since the Abhidhamma and Ditthi-visuddhi demand the acceptance of realities beforehand.

In classical theravada, “impermanence” is not applied to concepts (phenomenal things) but only to realities.

Ceisiwr · October 31, 2022, 7:57pm

The mere hardness our body feels is pathavi. It is not a mental construct according to Abhidhamma. Five senses sense only realities.

Hardness can be sensed only by the body (kayappasada) out of five senses. It can not be seen. The body can sense only 3 mahbhutas i.e. pathavi, tejo and vayo.

Late Abhidhamma master venerable Rerukane Chandavimala has explained these qualities/characteristics as “Actions” and not solid entities. Abhidhamma master venerable Maggavihari prefers the definition “Characteristic natures or Natural characteristics”

I understand that. If though the earth element is only “hardness” then it is merely a quality of experience. How then can a quality of experience cause other qualities to rise? How can a number of different qualities come together to produce objects? If the earth element has no mass, no substance, no form and no shape and is merely the experience of “hardness” then how is it matter? Certainly, we can say that in eating the apple, all we directly experience is “hardness, redness” and “sweetness” and from this raw sensual data we fashion the concept “apple”, but this is an epistemological argument not an ontological one. Essentially, I struggle to see how you go from the direct experience to “the earth element truly exists independent of mind” and I struggle to see how mere qualities of experience, which the dhammas are reduced to in Theravāda, can be objective and how they can act causally on each other through sustaining each other, destroying each other etc. I should say I think its right to reduce physical objects to mere qualities, to remove substance from our experience, but it seems without substance we can’t really talk about a truly existing anything.

When a bomb blasts in a city, 10000 people feel the heat of bomb at the exact same time. All the 10000 hear the sound at the exact same time. All the 10000 see the light at the exact same time. The possibility/probability of “all the 10000 people’s minds create/illude the heat/sound/light of the bomb at the exact same time without an objective explosion” is extremely low. The phenomenologists have hard times in explaining such incidents. [venerable Maggavihari]

Yes, there is a consensus on x happening. That said, in Theravāda when people think a bomb went off and houses were destroyed, they aren’t truly seeing reality. In reality there is only “hardness, heat, sound, colour” etc. The question then remains as to how sensory qualities can cause explosions?

Any kind of rupa we find (even photons, electrons) is considered to have all the rupas of the Octad (4mahabhutas + color + smell + taste + nutriment). The Octad is considered inseparable from any physical entity. All the 8 exist in each and every physical thing. No one can find 1 of them alone or 2 or …7 alone.

The 4 mahabhutas are considered to be completely mixed with each other in an “unthinkable way”. The ingredients of a cup of tea (tea, sugar, milk and water) are completely mixed, yet we can separate the particles in microscopic level. But the 4 mahabhuthas are considered to be fully mixed in a way that is beyond human imagination. The 4 are said to have “swallowed each other”.

See above. Another thing that I wonder about rupa-kalapas is if anything which is made of parts is unreal, how are they real since they are made of parts?

I think it matters if one needs to proceed Classical Vipassana, since the Abhidhamma and Ditthi-visuddhi demand the acceptance of realities beforehand.

In classical theravada, “impermanence” is not applied to concepts (phenomenal things) but only to realities.

Well I think you can accept that when we eat an apple, all we directly experience is “hardness” etc. Do we need to accept such things really exist externally in order to understand the impermanence of conditioned dhammas? I recently read something interesting, again from Ledi Sayadaw. He argues that you do not really need to see the momentariness of mental dhammas, and that it’s actually impossible to do so (apart for Buddhas, of course)

The fleeting nature of phenomena is, therefore, aptly compared in the scriptures to a flash of lightning. However, the rapidity of the occurrence of mental phenomena is far greater than that. Their arising and vanishing may even be reckoned in hundreds of thousands of times within a flash of lightning. The rapidity is beyond human comprehension. Therefore, it is not advisable to make such subtle phenomena the object of one’s contemplation. Try as one might, these phenomena will not be comprehended even after contemplating for a hundred or a thousand years. The meditator who tries this will not gain a single ray of insight, but will be beset by more befuddlement and despair. The scriptures say that mental phenomena take place billions and trillions of times within the blink of an eye, a flash of lightning, or the snap of your fingers. Now, the duration of the blink of an eye itself is so fleeting that attempting to contemplate the occurrence of mental phenomena to the billionth or trillionth part of that duration becomes sheer folly. Therefore, one should be satisfied with comprehending the unreliable and transient characteristic of all phenomena, which, after all, is the main purpose.

As for the exact nature, i.e., the swiftness, of mental phenomena, the understanding of which is the domain of the wisdom of the All-knowing Buddha, one has to accept the authority of the scriptures. Any talk about contemplating the three characteristics of mental phenomena is mere humbug. It is never based on practice, but only on hearsay from the scriptures. If someone were to try it, it would be a far cry from insight.

Zans · October 31, 2022, 8:30pm

Thank you. I think it might help if some quote from the Classical Theravada texts, like the abhidhamma or commentaries could be provided where the paramattha dhammas are described in some way other than subjective descriptors that denote perceptual sensations like “hardness.” Do such texts exist? Or is it completely uniform, that the elements are always, and only sensory qualities? If they are strictly sensory qualities, then how could that possibly be objective? Is it not like, when we touch something, we say “I feel something there. That something is matter.” This seems like if, instead of clarifying a difference between sensation and sensed, we said, “I feel something there. That something is feeling.” Seems like a circular logic that leads back to mind. Ultimate reality cannot be just the sensation, there must be something to sense. As of right now, it sounds like the sensed is being called the sense, which makes no sense at all. The sensation of hardness cannot be what is ultimately being sensed, that is circular.

Now that I really think about it, that doesn’t even add up to subjective idealism, but rather to some kind of fragmented position that doesn’t even make sense. The idea that when we sense things, the ultimate reality that we sense is sense is not rational, and is really a bizarre self referential statement that makes no sense at all. The earth element is strictly a sensation, so when we sense the earth element, really we sense sense. It doesn’t work. Awareness must be of something. Like, for example, we cannot see seeing, because that is nonsense. likewise, we cannot feel the sensation of hardness if all that there is ultimately is the sensation, because that is feeling feeling, with nothing to feel.

Further, the Buddha declared that consciousness depends on a dyad. The sense must make contact with a physical object before consciousness can arise. Thus, the physical object must exist, and cannot be some kind of subjective event. In other words, when we touch rupa, there must be rupa there before we can have the conscious subjective experience of hardness. Hence, rupa cannot be the sensation “hardness” alone, because that would violate this law. That would mean that the consciousness of touch could arise before contacting anything at all, because touching hardness is just the sensation of hardness, and sensations are internal events, not external. Thus, this would put all events as internal only, with no contact with external rupa to create the consciousness in the first place. This would be consciousness arising without the dyad, without contact, and that is impossible.

A given instance of perceptual consciousness is said to arise only in dependence upon two conditions: the sense organ and its corresponding object-field. This implies that perceptual consciousness arises only in conjunction with an appropriate and existent object; perceptual consciousness of a nonexistent object or without an object is, therefore, impossible.
-Disputed Dharmas
Early Buddhist Theories on Existence
An Annotated Translation
of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought
from Sanghabhadra’s Nyayanusara
Collett Cox
p 136-137

Bhikkhus, consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad. And how, bhikkhus, does consciousness come to be in dependence on a dyad? In dependence on the eye and forms there arises eye-consciousness.

-SN 35.93

Ceisiwr · October 31, 2022, 9:12pm

If you think about it in terms of what can be ultimately known, and so epistemologically rather than ontologically, then it does make more sense. As to what is outside of this All, well, the Buddha said not to bother thinking about if there even is such a thing.

Further, the Buddha declared that consciousness depends on a dyad. The sense must make contact with a physical object before consciousness can arise. Thus, the physical object must exist, and cannot be some kind of subjective event. In other words, when we touch rupa, there must be rupa there before we can have the conscious subjective experience of hardness. Hence, rupa cannot be the sensation “hardness” alone, because that would violate this law. That would mean that the consciousness of touch could arise before contacting anything at all, because touching hardness is just the sensation of hardness, and sensations are internal events, not external. Thus, this would put all events as internal only, with no contact with external rupa to create the consciousness in the first place. This would be consciousness arising without the dyad, without contact, and that is impossible.

The problem there is that you are introducing the idea of a substance which bears the characteristics. Substances are permanent realities. The atta, for example, is a substance. That is how the atta was taught by all of the Buddhas contemporaries. The Sangha seemed aware of this trap, which is why they declared that there is nothing more to a dhamma than its quality. In comparison the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika succumbed and argued that dhammas are substances, and so gave into acknowledging the existence of permanent realities in sense experience. That was the only way they could see dhammas as being real and external, but the problem is that it goes against what the Buddha taught. The Buddha doesn’t acknowledge substances of any kind. No bearer of the characteristics, no “apple” which is red and no atta which feels, and so we do have to start from there.

Zans · October 31, 2022, 9:35pm

Indeed, I’m with you now. This is the crux of the issue: How could the dhammas be mind independent entities that exist “from their own side,” yet are strictly delineated as sensations like “hardness,” in order to avoid affirming a substance. It cannot be both. They cannot be mind independent entities that exist from their own side, and strictly sensations like “hardness.” As you keep astutely pointing out, “hardness” does not exist from its own side. No more than “being in a good mood” exists from its own side, independent of mind, because is a feature of mind. This would be like saying “How do we experience the ultimate reality of the element of earth when seeing? We are seeing seeing. Seeing is the ultimate reality that is the earth element”

In other words, we may talk about sensations, and avoid discussing and labeling what is sensed, but we may not say that the fundamental building blocks of reality, which are mind independent, and exist from their own side, are strictly subjective sensations.

Ceisiwr · October 31, 2022, 9:39pm

We can of course say that dhammas have sabhāva, in the Theravādin sense of dhammas having distinct qualities. In other words, there are distinct qualities of experience. That use of sabhāva though is still epistemological. Moving from “there is a distinct quality of hardness in this experience” to “hardness exists externally, as a building block of things” seems to be much harder to establish without adopting substance theories (which we should avoid).

RobertK · October 31, 2022, 10:27pm

They are not “merely subjective delineations”.

Zans · October 31, 2022, 10:36pm

I agree! I am a realist, and see Buddhism as a realist philosophy. I don’t even think non realist philosophies can survive their own logic, but collapse on their own ideas and systems. Hence, this has long been my position, and I’ve stuck to it, and demonstrated it by pointing to quotes by Bhikkhu Bodhi, and others, that show that the dhammas are not merely subjective delineations, but rather that they denote mind independent, external realities that exist from their own side.

That said, seeing this quote from Ledi Sayadaw, stating, firmly, that there is no substance, there is only hardness, creates some serious difficulties. Could you please elaborate? How can the subjective delineation “hardness” be all that there is to the earth element, and yet it also exist externally, mind independently, and from it’s own side? Subjective delineations simply don’t work that way. It seems almost like a phenomenalist idealist system was merged with a realist one, and we ended up with a firm position that is paradoxical: A subjective delineation is the foundational, mind independent building block of reality, and exists from its own side.

This cannot be. Something cannot be both of these at the same time. Either the earth element, for example, is a substance that exists as something, or it is strictly the subjective sensation “hardness.” We cannot say there is strictly no substance, and the earth element is nothing but the sensation “hardness,” and say that it exists externally, mind independently, and from its own side. This violates all logic and language rules, and simply doesn’t work. Qualities are always of something, and qualities with nothing to describe are incoherent.

You’re very knowledgeable, @RobertK , perhaps I’m missing something and you can educate me please?

zerotime · October 31, 2022, 10:51pm

here for some time. Replace the # with a point .(sorry I cannot include links by some reason):

easyupload#io/m/ooxild

There is a very interesting paper in this issue: "THERAVADA VERSION OF THE TWO TRUTHS· by Karunadasa: (replace # with points)

skb#or#kr/down/papers/094#pdf

"As shown here, the distinction between the two truths depend on the distinction between
saṅketa and paramattha . Now, saṅketa includes things which depend for their being on
mental interpretations superimposed on the category of the real. For instance, the validity of
the term ‘table’ is based, not on an objective existent corresponding to the term, but on
mental interpretation superimposed on a congeries of material elements that enter into its
composition. Nevertheless the table is said to exist because in common parlance it is accepted
as a separate reality. On the other hand, the term paramattha denotes the category of real
existents (dhammas ), which have their own objective nature (sabhāva ). Their difference may
be set out thus: When a particular situation is explained on the basis of terms indicative of the
real elements of existence (dhammas ), that explanation is paramattha-sacc a. When the
self-same situation is explained on the basis of terms indicative of things which have their
being dependent on the mind’s synthesizing function (i.e. paññatti ), that explanation is
sammuti-sacca. The validity of the former is based on its correspondence to the ultimate data
of empirical reality. The validity of the latter is based on its correspondence to things
established by conventions."

Ceisiwr · October 31, 2022, 11:02pm

From the commentary to MN 1

Here the word occurs in the sense of things endowed with a specific nature. This is the word-meaning: “They bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkhaóaí dhárentì ti dhammá).

Sub. Cy. “They bear their own characteristics”: although there are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics, this is still said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributions as that of a “being,” etc. Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasurableness, and permanence, etc., or nature (pakati), substance (dabba), soul (jìva), body, etc., which are mere misconstructions (parikappitákáramatta) due to craving and views, or such entities as “sky-flowers,” etc., which are mere expressions of conventional discourse (lokavoháramatta), cannot be discovered as ultimately real actualities (saccikaþþhaparamatthato), these dhammas (i.e., those endowed with a specific nature) can. These dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device (upacáramatta).14 Or else they are borne, they are discerned, known, according to their specific nature, thus they are dhammas (dhárìyanti vá yathásabhávato avadháriyanti ñáyantì ti dhammá).

Apart from the characteristic then of “hardness” there is no earth element. There is no earth element substance which bears the characteristic. All that can be directly known is the characteristic.

Ceisiwr · October 31, 2022, 11:07pm

This still limits one to an epistemological view of things. All that can be directly known, what we actually experience, is “hardness” or “redness” or “hotness”. How then does this become also ontological, that say “hardness” exists “out there” and acts upon “hotness” to create material things?

zerotime · October 31, 2022, 11:51pm

I believe it is an issue to think with a big teapot in the table, and I’m not sure if there is an universal agreement about where should be located the ontological character of something. Our immediate knowledge about something existent, the experience, it will arise because the mind endow of an space (“out there” = “out from me”). Despite the space is not contained in the experience itself (hardness) but it is something arising in the mind, in order we can know hardness or whatever.

I understand when the paramatha-dhammas are said to have an objective nature, this is said because its consideration previous to any other thing including space. Like “things in itself”. This is like a surgery into the empirical experience to separate them from the worldly knowledge, the further common situation, the “convention”.

No idea how to elaborate well this issue, it can be more complicated of what it seems. Nagarjuna remained at one level, to end with the conceptual thought, although it seems without special intention to disentangle in depth the nature of the knowledge, and therefore some people is not satisfied.

Zans · November 1, 2022, 5:16pm

Unfortunately, Nagarjuna self refuted and his work is incoherent.

See:

Nagarjuna’s Masterpiece: Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither? by Stafford L. Betty.

Is Nagarjuna a Philosopher? by Stafford L. Betty

Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox, Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? by Richard Hayes

Did Nagarjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views? by Richard Robinson

ekocare · November 1, 2022, 10:47pm

To understand Dhammas, Classical Theravada Texts recommends a way called “lakkhana-rasa-paccupatthana-padatthana”. Using this way, one can understand dhammas properly.

Lakkhana/ sabhava = Characteristic/ Nature
Rasa = Function ( kicca rasa = function; sampatti rasa = result of function)
Paccupatthana/ upathana akara = The way the wisdom understands the dhamma/ The way the dhamma attends to mind
Padatthana/ asanna karana = Base/ Immediate cause

The dhammas have other capabilities that are not described by it’s characteristic.

(References: Abhidhamma commentaries, Abhidhammavatara and its tika, Visuddhimgga and its tika, Ledi sayadaw’s manuals)

If we consider the first two points of the above classification of the Earth element (if my memory and English are correct):

Nature: Hardness (kakkhalatta)
Function: Being the ground or refuge to other bhutas (Patitthana)
Way of attending: Accepting (Sampaticchana) other bhutas
Base: Remaining three bhutas (avasesa bhutattaya)

somewhere I found “Bearing (sandharana)” has used interchangeably for the Lakkhana and Rasa both.

So, Pathavi can be taken as “bearing” or “containing” or “accepting” as well. (bearer, container, accepter)

If we take Pathavi as something like “Hardness that bears and accepts other rupas”, I think, we can understand it well.

Why do we need a substance? In the sense of Paramattha, we talk about pentads(of khandas) and octads (of rupas) etc.

In Paramattha language, we can say “Certain setting of octads went off and surrounding octads were destroyed” or “Certain setting of rupas went off and surrounding rupas were destroyed”.

Those are not taken as merely sensory qualities. They have other capabilities as shown above.
eg:

Characteristic of Heat: Hotness (unhatta)
Function of Heat: Ripening (paripacana), burning (paridahana) …
Way of attending of Heat: Softening other bhutas (maddavanuppadana)
Base of Heat: Remaining three bhutas (avasesa bhutattaya)

Tejo can be called “Ripening” or “Burning” or “Heat that ripens and burns” …etc.
In other words Tejo is ripener or burner.

“Anything which is made of parts” is not taken as unreal. (Paramattha collections are considered close to paramattha)
The perception of Oneness/ compactness (ghana) is considered unreal.

I heard one Abhidhamma master insisting “A collection/group of realities are not unreal (it is close to real)”.
eg: FiveKhadhas, PureOctad etc.

It is like saying "Do we need to accept such things really exist externally in order to understand the impermanence of conditioned realities?

The definition of Dhammas is Realities.

I think this Ledi Sayadaws quote is about the people who try to see the actual speed of impermanence.

I remember Ven. Maggavihari discussed the following points.

"One doesn’t need to see the actual rupa kalapas. The requirement is understanding characteristics of dhammas."
"One doesn’t need to see the actual speed of impermanence. The requirement is understanding impermanence."
"One doesn’t need to see the actual present moment. No mind-moment can see itself. When we see the present moment, it has already been past. There are 3 types of present moments mentioned in Patisambhidamagga and last 2 are long present-moments."

Yes, it is a good proof I think.

“Cakkhunca paticca rupeca uppajjati cakkhuvinnanam”.

Here the Cakkhu, Rupa and Cakkhuvinnana are shown as 3 distinct dhammas.
Experience is Cakkhuvinnana.
If one takes there are only experiences, then there is only Cakkhuvinnana.

Do you believe that the Buddha said not to bother thinking about if there are objective dhammas or not?

I think this is about Rupas. What about the existence of Nama dhammas?

One Abhidhamma master said,

Rupas are seen along with Avakasa-pannatti (concept of space)
Namas are seen along with Kala-pannatti (concept of time)

(In one sense Rupas also seen along with Kala-pannatti.)