Review of Anālayo's (Analayo) book on the Perfection of Wisdom (sabhava, intrinsic nature )

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review of The Perfection of Wisdom in First Bloom
Relating Early Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to Āgama Literature
by Bhikkhu Anālayo

I saw this book mentioned here and there and bought it to give a critique from an orthodox Theravada perspective. I am probably not the best person to review it as my knowledge of the Mahayana and schismatic schools is limited. Still this can be a starting point.
I copied bits and pieces from stuff on the web about schismatic schools like the Sarvastivadins.
To a reader with confidence in the Theravada (Theravāda) it comes across at times like a misunderstanding of the tradition to say the least. Parts are written in such a dense manner that the actual point is hard to discern; almost a rhetorical style to obscure whether he is referring to “Abhidharma” or Abhidhamma.
There are many points to disagree with but I stick to only the term sabahava for now.

Analayo seems (I say seems, as he hedges often) to be against ‘Sabhava’. However his book
mostly treats “svabhava” in a way that fits Sarvastivādin ideas, and then his critique spills over in subtle ways onto the explanations of sabhava in Theravada.

This sutta sets out the Theravada teaching:
Puppha sutta exists

And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists

A note on terms. He often uses the word “Agamas” or “Āgama literature”, even in the title.

Introduction: > For the purpose of exploring relevant early Buddhist ideas and developments, I rely on Āgama literature as my source material, that is, on texts stemming for the most part from the Pāli Nikāyas and their Āgama parallels, extant mainly in Chinese but also at times in Gāndhārī, Sanskrit, and Tibetan.

This causes issues for the reader as we are sometimes not sure whether he is referring to Theravada or a Chinese based sect or what. (A careful study of endnotes can usually discern which of these he means).
He uses Sanskrit rather than pali most of the time - even when referring to Theravada texts.
Example:

The Pāli tradition, which attributes the delivery of the Abhidharma texts to the Buddha himself, nevertheless also accords a central role to Śāriputra in this respect.

And the Sanskrit svabhāva is preferred by him over sabhava.

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Around page 50 ( I bought an online version which doesn’t have page numbering).
Analayo:

This assessment can be explored further with the help of a detailed study of the evolution of ideas related to the nature of dharmas in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma thought by Cox (2004). Already an early canonical Abhidharma work, the Saṅgītiparyāya, appears to testify to a usage of the related term bhāva to attribute separate existence to the three periods of time, that is, the past, the present, and the future.162 Cox (2004, 568) notes that in such usage the term “bhāva conveyed both an abstract sense as ‘nature’ and an ontological sense as ‘mode of existence,’” reflecting an early period when “the more technical sense of bhāva was beginning to develop, but the clear distinction between bhāva and svabhāva typical of the later Sarvāstivāda materials had not yet solidified.”
Cox (2004, 559, 562, 569, and 563) explains that the notion of svabhāva in turn appears to have developed mainly in “the context of categorization, where invariable criteria are demanded as the basis for unambiguous classification.” In this role, “to be a dharma is to be determined by a distinctive intrinsic nature, which is never abandoned.” Recognition of this svabhāva nature is in turn a crucial requirement for clear discrimination and the avoidance of confusion among dharmas. This then leads to the notion that “determination by intrinsic nature undergoes no variation or modification, and hence, dharmas, which are in effect types or categories of intrinsic nature, are established as stable and immutable.” The point is that “determining individual dharmas through unique intrinsic nature also entails affirming their existence, as a natural function both of the etymological sense of the term svabhāva and of the role of dharmas as the fundamental constituents of experience.” In sum, “dharmas as svabhāvas or as abstract categories are invariable and denote an atemporal, that is, inalterable existence.”

And

Already an early canonical Abhidharma work, the Saṅgītiparyāya, appears to testify to a usage of the related term bhāva to attribute separate existence to the three periods of time, that is, the past, the present, and the future

Apparently some heretical sect believed that dhammas exist in the past, the present and future!

Here are some Theravada quotes:

Sammohavinodanī (The dispeller of Delusion part 1)

CHAPTER THREE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ELEMENTS (Dhätu vibhanga)

  1. As regards pathavldhätu (“earth element”) and so on, the meaning of element has the meaning of “nature” (sabhäva); and the meaning of nature has the meaning of “voidness” (sunna)\ and the meaning of voidness has the meaning of “not a being” (nissatta). Thus it is the element that is only earth in the sense of nature, voidness and not a being that is the earth element. And likewise with regard to the water element, etc. Here the meaning should thus be understood by knowing the composition of the phrases in this way.

Analayo is right to argue against a permanently existing svabhāva. However it sometimes seems that this is wrongly aimed at orthodox Theravada. Theravada does not teach some eternal essence hidden inside dhammas. It teaches that each paramattha dhamma has a distinguishable own characteristic, and that all are anicca, dukkha and anatta.

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some Theravada quotes

vism VIII note 69. In the Piþakas the word sabháva seems to appear only once (Paþis II 178). It next appears in the Netti (p.79), the Milindapañhá (pp. 90, 164, 212, 360). It is extensively used for exegetical purposes in the Visuddhimagga and main commentaries and likewise in the subcommentaries. As has just been shown, it is narrower than dhamma (see also Ch. XXIII. n. 18). It often roughly corresponds to dhátu (element—see e.g. Dhs-a 263) and to lakkhaóa (characteristic—see below), but less nearly to the vaguer and (in Pali) untechnical pakati (nature), or to rasa (function—see I.21). The Atthasálinì observes: “It is the individual essence, or the generality, of such and such dhammas that is called their characteristic” (Dhs-a 63); on which the Múla tìká comments: “The individual essence consisting in, say, hardness as that of earth, or touching as that of contact, is not common to all dhammas**. The generality is the individual essence common to all consisting in impermanence,** etc.; also in this context (i.e. Dhs §1) the characteristic of being profitable may be regarded as general because it is the individual essence common to all that is profitable; or alternatively it is their individual essence because it is not common to the unprofitable and indeterminate [kinds of consciousness]” (Dhs- a 63). The individual essence of any formed dhamma is manifested in the three instants of its existence (atthitá, vijjamánatá), namely, arising, presence (= aging) and dissolution. It comes from nowhere and goes nowhere (XV.15

page 38 of Bodhi translation Root of existence
*Commentary"

“They bear their*
own characteristics, thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkhaóaí
dhárentì ti dhammá).
Sub. Cy. “They bear their own characteristics”: although there
are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics, this is still
said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas
endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributions as
that of a “being,” etc. Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasurableness,
and permanence, etc., or nature (pakati), substance
(dabba), soul (jìva), body, etc., which are mere misconstructions
(parikappitákáramatta) due to craving and views, or such entities
as “sky-flowers,” etc., which are mere expressions of conventional
discourse (lokavoháramatta), cannot be discovered as ultimately
real actualities (saccikaþþhaparamatthato), these dhammas (i.e., those
endowed with a specific nature) can. These dhammas are discovered
as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real
distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still,
in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction
as a mere metaphorical device (upacáramatta).

related about dhammas and reality
dhammas

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That is usually the progression. It is like a disease.
They reject the commentaries, and go suttanta only (Sautrāntika sect), then they look at other heretical sects and somehow like that stuff better under the guise of Comparative Study.

I have yet to read anything of his in full and hopefully won’t need to. I know who he is and what he represents. I’m not surprised with a Theravādin reviewing any of his works.

I also found that Bh. Sujato’s Bhikkhunī vinaya book was confusing. If there was a thing called “Lost in Translation”, the EBT scholars seem to get “Lost in various translations.”

They tend to list so many variants that you wonder what the point of it is? Besides that, it is an easy way to add pages.