Review of Anālayo's (Analayo) book on the Perfection of Wisdom (sabhava, intrinsic nature )

review of The Perfection of Wisdom in First Bloom
Relating Early Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to Āgama Literature
by Bhikkhu Anālayo

I saw this book mentioned here and there and bought it to give a critique from an orthodox Theravada perspective. I am probably not the best person to review it as my knowledge of the Mahayana and schismatic schools is limited. Still this can be a starting point.
I found bits and pieces from stuff on the web about schools like the Sarvastivadins.
To a reader with confidence in the Theravada (Theravāda) it comes across at times like a misunderstanding of the tradition to say the least. Parts are written in such a dense manner that the actual point is hard to discern; almost a rhetorical style to obscure whether he is referring to “Abhidharma” (i.e. the versions of later sects ) or Abhidhamma (the 3rd basket of the Tipitaka).
There are many points to disagree with but I stick to only the term sabhava for now.

Analayo seems (I say seems, as he hedges often) to be against ‘Sabhava’. However his book
mostly treats “svabhava” in a way that fits Sarvastivādin ideas, and then his critique spills over in subtle ways onto the explanations of sabhava in Theravada.

This sutta sets out the Theravada teaching:
Puppha sutta exists

And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists

A note on terms. He often uses the word “Agamas” or “Āgama literature”, even in the title.

Introduction: > For the purpose of exploring relevant early Buddhist ideas and developments, I rely on Āgama literature as my source material, that is, on texts stemming for the most part from the Pāli Nikāyas and their Āgama parallels, extant mainly in Chinese but also at times in Gāndhārī, Sanskrit, and Tibetan.

This causes issues for the reader as we are sometimes not sure whether he is referring to Theravada or a Chinese based sect or what. (A careful study of endnotes can usually discern which of these he means).
He uses Sanskrit rather than pali most of the time - even when referring to Theravada texts.
Example:

The Pāli tradition, which attributes the delivery of the Abhidharma texts to the Buddha himself, nevertheless also accords a central role to Śāriputra in this respect.

And the Sanskrit svabhāva is preferred by him over sabhava.

1 Like

Around page 50 ( I bought an online version which doesn’t have page numbering).
Analayo:

This assessment can be explored further with the help of a detailed study of the evolution of ideas related to the nature of dharmas in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma thought by Cox (2004). Already an early canonical Abhidharma work, the Saṅgītiparyāya, appears to testify to a usage of the related term bhāva to attribute separate existence to the three periods of time, that is, the past, the present, and the future.162 Cox (2004, 568) notes that in such usage the term “bhāva conveyed both an abstract sense as ‘nature’ and an ontological sense as ‘mode of existence,’” reflecting an early period when “the more technical sense of bhāva was beginning to develop, but the clear distinction between bhāva and svabhāva typical of the later Sarvāstivāda materials had not yet solidified.”
Cox (2004, 559, 562, 569, and 563) explains that the notion of svabhāva in turn appears to have developed mainly in “the context of categorization, where invariable criteria are demanded as the basis for unambiguous classification.” In this role, “to be a dharma is to be determined by a distinctive intrinsic nature, which is never abandoned.” Recognition of this svabhāva nature is in turn a crucial requirement for clear discrimination and the avoidance of confusion among dharmas. This then leads to the notion that “determination by intrinsic nature undergoes no variation or modification, and hence, dharmas, which are in effect types or categories of intrinsic nature, are established as stable and immutable.” The point is that “determining individual dharmas through unique intrinsic nature also entails affirming their existence, as a natural function both of the etymological sense of the term svabhāva and of the role of dharmas as the fundamental constituents of experience.” In sum, “dharmas as svabhāvas or as abstract categories are invariable and denote an atemporal, that is, inalterable existence.”

And

Already an early canonical Abhidharma work, the Saṅgītiparyāya, appears to testify to a usage of the related term bhāva to attribute separate existence to the three periods of time, that is, the past, the present, and the future

Apparently this heretical sect believed that dhammas exist in the past, the present and future!

Here are some Theravada quotes:

Sammohavinodanī (The dispeller of Delusion part 1)

CHAPTER THREE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ELEMENTS (Dhätu vibhanga)

  1. As regards pathavldhätu (“earth element”) and so on, the meaning of element has the meaning of “nature” (sabhäva); and the meaning of nature has the meaning of “voidness” (sunna)\ and the meaning of voidness has the meaning of “not a being” (nissatta). Thus it is the element that is only earth in the sense of nature, voidness and not a being that is the earth element. And likewise with regard to the water element, etc. Here the meaning should thus be understood by knowing the composition of the phrases in this way.

Analayo is right to argue against a permanently existing svabhāva. However it sometimes seems that this is wrongly aimed at orthodox Theravada. Theravada does not teach some eternal essence hidden inside dhammas. It teaches that each paramattha dhamma has a distinguishable own characteristic, and that all are anicca, dukkha and anatta.

some Theravada quotes

vism VIII note 69. In the Piþakas the word sabháva seems to appear only once (Paþis II 178). It next appears in the Netti (p.79), the Milindapañhá (pp. 90, 164, 212, 360). It is extensively used for exegetical purposes in the Visuddhimagga and main commentaries and likewise in the subcommentaries. As has just been shown, it is narrower than dhamma (see also Ch. XXIII. n. 18). It often roughly corresponds to dhátu (element—see e.g. Dhs-a 263) and to lakkhaóa (characteristic—see below), but less nearly to the vaguer and (in Pali) untechnical pakati (nature), or to rasa (function—see I.21). The Atthasálinì observes: “It is the individual essence, or the generality, of such and such dhammas that is called their characteristic” (Dhs-a 63); on which the Múla tìká comments: “The individual essence consisting in, say, hardness as that of earth, or touching as that of contact, is not common to all dhammas**. The generality is the individual essence common to all consisting in impermanence,** etc.; also in this context (i.e. Dhs §1) the characteristic of being profitable may be regarded as general because it is the individual essence common to all that is profitable; or alternatively it is their individual essence because it is not common to the unprofitable and indeterminate [kinds of consciousness]” (Dhs- a 63). The individual essence of any formed dhamma is manifested in the three instants of its existence (atthitá, vijjamánatá), namely, arising, presence (= aging) and dissolution. It comes from nowhere and goes nowhere (XV.15

page 38 of Bodhi translation Root of existence
*Commentary"

“They bear their*
own characteristics, thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkhaóaí
dhárentì ti dhammá).
Sub. Cy. “They bear their own characteristics”: although there
are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics, this is still
said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas
endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributions as
that of a “being,” etc. Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasurableness,
and permanence, etc., or nature (pakati), substance
(dabba), soul (jìva), body, etc., which are mere misconstructions
(parikappitákáramatta) due to craving and views, or such entities
as “sky-flowers,” etc., which are mere expressions of conventional
discourse (lokavoháramatta), cannot be discovered as ultimately
real actualities (saccikaþþhaparamatthato), these dhammas (i.e., those
endowed with a specific nature) can. These dhammas are discovered
as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real
distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still,
in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction
as a mere metaphorical device (upacáramatta).

related about dhammas and reality
dhammas

That is usually the progression. It is like a disease.
They reject the commentaries, and go suttanta only (Sautrāntika sect), then they look at other heretical sects and somehow like that stuff better under the guise of Comparative Study.

I have yet to read anything of his in full and hopefully won’t need to. I know who he is and what he represents. I’m not surprised with a Theravādin reviewing any of his works.

I also found that Bh. Sujato’s Bhikkhunī vinaya book was confusing. If there was a thing called “Lost in Translation”, the EBT scholars seem to get “Lost in various translations.”

They tend to list so many variants that you wonder what the point of it is? Besides that, it is an easy way to add pages.

Over the years I have occasionally seen this quote from the Patisambhidhimagga ( Paṭisambhidāmaggapāḷi) suggested as evidence that the Theravada teaching on Sabhava as individual essence or own essence is wrong.

Jātaṃ rūpaṃ sabhāvena suññaṃ.

Form that has arisen is empty of its own nature.

The Commentary, the Saddhammappakāsinī by Mahanama explains.

Sabhāvena suññanti ettha sayaṃ bhāvo sabhāvo, sayameva uppādoti attho.

In " sabhāvena suññaṃ", sabhāva means its own nature, that is, arising by itself.

Sato vā bhāvo sabhāvo, attatoyeva uppādoti attho.

Or, sabhāva means being from itself, that is, arising solely from itself.

Paccayāyattavuttittā paccayaṃ vinā sayameva bhāvo, attato eva vā bhāvo etasmiṃ natthīti sabhāvena suññaṃ, sayameva bhāvena, attato eva vā bhāvena suññanti vuttaṃ hoti.

Because its existence is dependent on conditions, there is no inherent existence by itself without a condition, nor is there existence solely from itself. Thus, it is said to be void of its own nature, or void of existence solely from itself.

Atha vā sakassa bhāvo sabhāvo.

Alternatively, sabhāva means its own specific nature.

Pathavīdhātuādīsu hi anekesu rūpārūpadhammesu ekeko dhammo paraṃ upādāya sako nāma.

Indeed, among the many rūpa and arūpa phenomena, such as the earth element, each phenomenon is called ‘its own’ in relation to another.

Bhāvoti ca dhammapariyāyavacanametaṃ.

And " bhāvo" is a synonym for dhamma.

Ekassa ca dhammassa añño bhāvasaṅkhāto dhammo natthi, tasmā sakassa aññena bhāvena suññaṃ, sako aññena bhāvena suññoti attho.

And there is no other dhamma, called bhāva, for a single dhamma. Therefore, it is void of its own specific nature by another, meaning its own specific nature is void of another specific nature.

Tena ekassa dhammassa ekasabhāvatā vuttā hoti.

Thereby, the singularity of the specific nature of a single dhamma is stated.

Atha vā sabhāvena suññanti suññasabhāveneva suññaṃ.

Alternatively, " sabhāvena suññaṃ" means void by the very nature of voidness.

Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti?

What is meant?

Suññasuññatāya eva suññaṃ, na aññāhi pariyāyasuññatāhi suññanti vuttaṃ hoti.

It means it is void by the voidness of voidness itself, and not void by other kinds of voidness.

2245

Sace pana keci vadeyyuṃ ‘‘sako bhāvo sabhāvo, tena sabhāvena suñña’’nti.

If some were to say, “Its own nature is sabhāva, and it is void by that sabhāva,”

Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti?

What would be meant?

Bhāvoti dhammo, so paraṃ upādāya sapadena visesito sabhāvo nāma hoti.

It means bhāva is dhamma, and when that is qualified by the word ‘its own’ in relation to another, it is called sabhāva.

Dhammassa kassaci avijjamānattā ‘‘jātaṃ rūpaṃ sabhāvena suñña’’nti rūpassa avijjamānatā vuttā hotīti.

Since no dhamma exists, by the statement “generated rūpa is void by its own nature,” the non-existence of rūpa is stated.

Evaṃ sati ‘‘jātaṃ rūpa’’ntivacanena virujjhati.

If that were the case, it would contradict the statement “generated rūpa.”

Na hi uppādarahitaṃ jātaṃ nāma hoti.

For that which is devoid of arising is not called ‘generated’.

Nibbānañhi uppādarahitaṃ, taṃ jātaṃ nāma na hoti, jātijarāmaraṇāni ca uppādarahitāni jātāni nāma na honti.

Nibbāna is devoid of arising; it is not called ‘generated’. And birth, aging, and death, being devoid of arising, are not called ‘generated’.

Tenevettha ‘‘jātā jāti sabhāvena suññā, jātaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ sabhāvena suñña’’nti evaṃ anuddharitvā bhavameva avasānaṃ katvā niddiṭṭhaṃ.

For this very reason, here, it is not stated as “generated birth is void by its own nature, generated aging and death are void by their own nature,” but rather, it is designated by making bhava (existence) the conclusion.

Yadi uppādarahitassāpi ‘‘jāta’’ntivacanaṃ yujjeyya, ‘‘jātā jāti, jātaṃ jarāmaraṇa’’nti vattabbaṃ bhaveyya.

If the term “generated” could apply even to that which is devoid of arising, then it should be said “generated birth, generated aging and death.”

Yasmā uppādarahitesu jātijarāmaraṇesu ‘‘jāta’’ntivacanaṃ na vuttaṃ, tasmā ‘‘sabhāvena suññaṃ avijjamāna’’nti vacanaṃ avijjamānassa uppādarahitattā ‘‘jāta’’ntivacanena virujjhati.

Since the term “generated” is not used for birth, aging, and death, which are devoid of arising, the statement “void by its own nature, non-existent” contradicts the term “generated” due to the non-existent being devoid of arising.

Avijjamānassa ca ‘‘suñña’’ntivacanaṃ heṭṭhā vuttena lokavacanena ca bhagavato vacanena ca ñāyasaddaganthavacanena ca virujjhati, anekāhi ca yuttīhi virujjhati, tasmā taṃ vacanaṃ kacavaramiva chaḍḍitabbaṃ.

And the statement “empty” regarding that which does not exist contradicts the worldly saying mentioned below, the Buddha’s saying, and the sayings in the treatises on logic and grammar; it also contradicts many logical reasons. Therefore, that statement should be discarded like rubbish.

‘‘Yaṃ, bhikkhave, atthisammataṃ loke paṇḍitānaṃ, ahampi taṃ atthīti vadāmi.

“Bhikkhus, what is regarded by the wise in the world as existing, that too I say exists.

Yaṃ, bhikkhave, natthisammataṃ loke paṇḍitānaṃ, ahampi taṃ natthīti vadāmi.

Bhikkhus, what is regarded by the wise in the world as not existing, that too I say does not exist.

Kiñca, bhikkhave, atthisammataṃ loke paṇḍitānaṃ, yamahaṃ atthīti vadāmi?

And what, bhikkhus, is regarded by the wise in the world as existing, which I say exists?

Rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ atthisammataṃ loke paṇḍitānaṃ, ahampi taṃ atthīti vadāmī’’tiādīhi (saṃ. ni. 3.94) anekehi buddhavacanappamāṇehi anekāhi ca yuttīhi dhammā sakakkhaṇe vijjamānā evāti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ.

With these and many other authoritative words of the Buddha, and many logical reasons, such as, “Form, bhikkhus, is impermanent, suffering, subject to change; that is regarded by the wise in the world as existing, and that too I say exists,” it must be concluded that phenomena exist in their own specific characteristics.

2246

Vigataṃ rūpanti uppajjitvā bhaṅgaṃ patvā niruddhaṃ atītaṃ rūpaṃ.

Vigataṃ rūpaṃ (past form) means form that has arisen, reached dissolution, and ceased.

Vipariṇatañceva suññañcāti jarābhaṅgavasena virūpaṃ pariṇāmaṃ pattañca vattamānasseva vipariṇāmasabbhāvato atītassa vipariṇāmābhāvato tena vipariṇāmena suññañcāti attho.

Vipariṇatañceva suññañcā (both changed and empty) means that it has reached a changed, altered state through decay and dissolution, and it is empty of that change because change exists only for existing phenomena, not for past phenomena.

Jātā vedanā tiādīsupi eseva nayo.

The same method applies to jātā vedanā (arisen feeling), and so on.

Jātijarāmaraṇaṃ pana anipphannattā sakabhāvena anupalabbhanīyato idha na yujjati, tasmā ‘‘jātā jāti, jātaṃ jarāmaraṇa’’ntiādike dve naye pahāya bhavādikameva nayaṃ pariyosānaṃ katvā ṭhapitaṃ.

However, birth, old age, and death are not produced and cannot be apprehended by their own nature, so they are not included here. Therefore, the two methods beginning with “arisen birth, arisen old age and death” are omitted, and only the method beginning with existence (bhava) is concluded and presented.

In summary Mahānāma explains that if something had a “self-nature” in the sense of being its own cause, it would be independent of the law of conditionality (Paticcasamuppada). Since all 199 dhammas listed in the Paṭisambhidāmagga are conditioned, they are “empty” of this specific type of unconditioned self-origination. He affirms that sabhava in the sense that each paramattha dhamma has a distinguishable own characteristic is of course correct.

Here is another translation by Dhammanando of the section from the Mahanama commentary:

Mananama on sabhava

MAHANAMA ON “MATERIALITY IS EMPTY WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL ESSENCE”
(from the Saddhammappakaasinii, Su––akathaa-va.n.nanaa)

Tattha ‘jaata.m ruupan’ ti paccuppanna.m ruupa.m.

Here [i.e. in the passage he is commenting on] ‘born [or ‘arisen’] materiality’ is the materiality [existing in] the present.

[elsewhere he explains that it refers to materiality at the moment of stasis – thiti – in between arising and dissolution]

FIRST GLOSS

‘Sabhaavena su––an’ ti ettha saya.m bhaavo sabhaavo, sayameva uppaado’ ti attho.

‘Empty regarding individual essence’: here individual essence is ‘essence by itself’; arising just of itself is the meaning.

[Here Mahanama appears to take ‘empty regarding sabhaava’ as being denial of a false conception of sabhaava, namely a sabhaava which is its own cause. The 199 dhammas lack such a sabhaava]

SECOND GLOSS

Sato vaa bhaavo sabhaavo, attatoyeva uppaado’ ti attho. Paccayaayattavuttittaa paccaya.m vinaa sayameva bhaavo, attato eva vaa bhaavo etasmi.m natthiiti sabhaavena su––a.m, sayameva bhaavena, attato eva vaa bhaavena su––anti vutta.m hoti.

Or, individual essence is own essence; arising solely by itself. Because of existence in dependence on conditions there is in it no essence by itself or essence of its own, thus it is ‘empty regarding individual essence’. What is meant is that it is empty of essence by itself or of its own essence.

[This is simply the corollary to the first gloss, being the denial of a sabhaava that is not dependent on other conditions]

THIRD GLOSS

Atha vaa sakassa bhaavo sabhaavo. Pathaviidhaatuaadiisu hi anekesu ruupaaruupadhammesu ekeko dhammo para.m upaadaaya sako naama. ‘bhaavo’ ti ca dhammapariyaayavacanameta.m. Ekassa ca dhammassa a––o bhaavasan.khaato dhammo natthi, tasmaa sakassa a––ena bhaavena su––a.m, sako a––ena bhaavena su––oti attho. Tena ekassa dhammassa ekasabhaavataa vuttaa hoti.

Or else it is the essence that it itself has; for each single dhamma among the various dhammas beginning with the earth principle is itself, and ‘essence’ is a figurative term for dhamma; and each single dhamma does not have any other dhamma called an ‘essence’, therefore it is empty of any essence other than itself: the meaning is that it itself is empty of another essence. Hence what is meant is that a single dhamma has a single individual essence.

[If I understand this correctly, any given dhamma is empty of the sabhaavas that would characterize other dhammas, but is not empty of whatever makes it what it is. Karuna, for example, is empty of the quality of promoting cruelty but is not empty of the quality of allaying suffering]

FOURTH GLOSS

Atha vaa ‘sabhaavena su––an’ ti su––asabhaaveneva su––a.m. Ki.m vutta.m hoti? Su––asu––ataaya eva su––a.m, na a––aahi pariyaayasu––ataahi su–– anti vutta.m hoti.

Or alternatively ‘empty regarding individual essence’ is to be taken as empty through having emptiness as its individual essence. What is meant? What is meant is empty owing to emptiness-as-emptiness and not empty according to some other implicated emptiness.

[‘Emptiness-as-emptiness’ is the first of the 25 emptinesses, described thus: “Eye is empty of self or what belongs to self, or of what is permanent or stable or eternal or not subject to change. Ear…nose…tongue…body…mind is empty of self or what belongs to self, or of what is permanent or stable or eternal or not subject to change.” The reference is to the nature common to all dhammas, as opposed to the specific nature that makes a dhamma whatever it is. ‘Implicated emptiness’ refers to the fact that every dhamma is by its nature empty of any characteristic that would make it something other than what it is. E.g. “Past formations are empty of future and presently arisen formations. Future formations are empty of past formations…etc.”]

WRONG UNDERSTANDING OF “MATERIALITY IS EMPTY WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL
ESSENCE”

Sace pana keci vadeyyu.m “sako bhaavo sabhaavo, tena sabhaavena su–– an” ti. Ki.m vutta.m hoti? Bhaavoti dhammo, so para.m upaadaaya sapadena visesito sabhaavo naama hoti. Dhammassa kassaci avijjamaanattaa “jaata.m ruupa.m sabhaavena su––an” ti ruupassa avijjamaanataa vuttaa hotiiti.

But if someone should say: “Own essence is individual essence; it is empty of that individual essence. What is meant? A dhamma is called an ‘essence’; that [essence] is distinguished by the prefix ‘individual’ in comparison with any other and is thus called ‘individual essence’. Because of the non-existence of any dhamma whatever it is the non-existence of materiality that is expressed by the words ‘born materiality is empty regarding individual essence’.”

[Mahanama does not specify whom he has in mind who might say such a thing. The claim as it stands is not clearly attributable to any Buddhist school that I know of. However, the anonymous author of the ‘Clarifier of the Meanings of Knotty Terms in the Path of Discrimination’ (Patisambhidaamaggamuulaganthipadatthavannanaa) expands on the above, adding the words ‘in the highest sense’ (paramatthato). So if he is right, then the wrong interpretation would appear to be a Mahayanic one, namely, that owing to emptiness of sabhaava, in the highest sense dhammas do not exist]

FIRST REFUTATION

Eva.m sati “jaata.m ruupan” tivacanena virujjhati. Na hi uppaadarahita.m jaata.m naama hoti. Nibbaana–hi uppaadarahita.m, ta.m jaata.m naama na hoti, jaatijaraamara.naani ca uppaadarahitaani jaataani naama na honti. Tenevettha “jaataa jaati sabhaavena su––aa, jaata.m jaraamara.na.m sabhaavena su––an” ti eva.m anuddharitvaa bhavameva avasaana.m katvaa niddi.t.tha.m.

[snip Nyanamoli’s trans. as it doesn’t seem to make any sense. I’ll post a new translation when I have time. Or perhaps someone else would like to have a go at it]

SECOND REFUTATION

Yadi uppaadarahitassaapi “jaatan” tivacana.m yujjeyya, “jaataa jaati, jaata.m jaraamara.nan” ti vattabba.m bhaveyya. Yasmaa uppaadarahitesu jaatijaraamara.nesu “jaatan” tivacana.m na vutta.m, tasmaa “sabhaavena su––a.m avijjamaanan” ti vacana.m avijjamaanassa uppaadarahitattaa “jaatan” tivacanena virujjhati.

[ditto]

THIRD REFUTATION

Avijjamaanassa ca “su––an” tivacana.m he.t.thaa vuttena lokavacanena ca bhagavato vacanena ca –aayasaddaganthavacanena ca virujjhati, anekaahi ca yuttiihi virujjhati, tasmaa ta.m vacana.m kacavaramiva cha.d.ditabba.m.

And the word ‘empty’ for what is non-existent contradicts both worldly usage and the Blessed One’s usage above, and also the words of the books of logic and linguistics; and it contradicts many logical arguments. Therefore that assertion should be discarded like rubbish.

“Ya.m, bhikkhave, atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m atthiiti vadaami. Ya.m, bhikkhave, natthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m natthiiti vadaami. Ki–ca, bhikkhave, atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, yamaha.m atthiiti vadaami? Ruupa.m, bhikkhave, anicca.m dukkha.m vipari.naamadhamma.m atthisammata.m loke pa.n.ditaana.m, ahampi ta.m atthiiti vadaamii” tiaadiihi anekehi buddhavacanappamaa.nehi.

In many passages in the Buddha-word such as this: “Bhikkhus, what sages in the world say is not, of that too I say that it is not; what sages in the world say is, of that too I say that it is…Sages in the world say of impermanent, painful and changeable materiality that it is, and I too say of it that it is.”

Anekaahi ca yuttiihi dhammaa sakakkha.ne vijjamaanaa evaati ni.t.thamettha gantabba.m.

And in many logical arguments [it is demonstrable that] dhammas exist in their own moments. Thus should this [abovementioned assertion] be refuted.