Yamaka sutta with notes by Bodhi

This is a commonly misunderstood sutta, so I give ven. Bodhi`s translation along with his notes.
Saṁyutta Nikāya
Connected Discourses on the Aggregates

22.85.

85 (3) Yamaka

On one occasion the Venerable Sāriputta was dwelling at Sāvatthī in Jeta’s
Grove, Anāthapiṇḍika’s Park. Now on that occasion the following pernicious
view had arisen in a bhikkhu named Yamaka: “As I understand the Dhamma
taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated
and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death.”
151
A number of bhikkhus heard that such a pernicious view had arisen in the
bhikkhu Yamaka. Then they approached the Venerable Yamaka and exchanged
greetings with him, after which they sat down to one side and said to him: “Is it
true, friend Yamaka, that such a pernicious view as this has arisen in you: [110]
‘As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints
are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does
not exist after death’?”
“Exactly so, friends. As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One,
a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the
breakup of the body and does not exist after death.”
“Friend Yamaka, do not speak thus. Do not misrepresent the Blessed One. It is
not good to misrepresent the Blessed One. The Blessed One would not speak
thus: ‘A bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the
breakup of the body and does not exist after death.’”
Yet, although he was admonished by the bhikkhus in this way, the Venerable
Yamaka still obstinately grasped that pernicious view, adhered to it, and
declared: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu
whose taints are destroyed is annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the
body and does not exist after death.”
Since those bhikkhus were unable to detach the Venerable Yamaka from that
pernicious view, they rose from their seats, approached the Venerable Sāriputta,
and told him all that had occurred, adding: “It would be good if the Venerable
Sāriputta would approach the bhikkhu Yamaka out of compassion for him.” The
Venerable Sāriputta consented by silence.
Then, in the evening, the Venerable Sāriputta emerged from seclusion. He
approached the Venerable Yamaka and exchanged greetings with him, after
which he sat down to one side and said to him: “Is it true, friend Yamaka, that
such a pernicious view as this has arisen in you: ‘As I understand the Dhamma
taught by the Blessed One, [111] a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is
annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after
death’?”
“Exactly so, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, is form permanent or impermanent?” -
“Impermanent, friend.”… - “Therefore … Seeing thus … He understands: ‘…
there is no more for this state of being.’
152
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form as the Tathāgata?” -
“No, friend.” - “Do you regard feeling … perception … volitional formations …
consciousness as the Tathāgata?” - “No, friend.”
“What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as in form?”

  • “No, friend.” - “Do you regard the Tathāgata as apart from form?” - “No,
    friend.” - “Do you regard the Tathāgata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As
    in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart
    from volitional formations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”
  • “No, friend.”
    “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard form, feeling, perception,
    volitional formations, and consciousness [taken together] as the Tathāgata?” -
    “No, friend.” [112]
    “What do you think, friend Yamaka, do you regard the Tathāgata as one who
    is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional
    formations, without consciousness?” - “No, friend.”
    153
    “But, friend, when the Tathāgata is not apprehended by you as real and actual
    here in this very life,
    154
    is it fitting for you to declare: ‘As I understand the
    Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed is
    annihilated and perishes with the breakup of the body and does not exist after
    death’?”
    “Formerly, friend Sāriputta, when I was ignorant, I did hold that pernicious
    view, but now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable Sāriputta
    I have abandoned that pernicious view and have made the breakthrough to the
    Dhamma.”
    155
    “If, friend Yamaka, they were to ask you: ‘Friend Yamaka, when a bhikkhu is
    an arahant, one whose taints are destroyed, what happens to him with the
    breakup of the body, after death?’—being asked thus, what would you answer?”
    “If they were to ask me this, friend, I would answer thus: ‘Friends, form is
    impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased and
    passed away. Feeling … Perception … Volitional formations … Consciousness
    is impermanent; what is impermanent is suffering; what is suffering has ceased
    and passed away.’ Being asked thus, friend, I would answer in such a way.”
    156
    “Good, good, friend Yamaka! Now, friend Yamaka, I will make up a simile for
    you in order to convey this same meaning even more clearly. Suppose, friend
    Yamaka, there was a householder or a householder’s son, a rich man, with much
    wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. Then some man would appear
    who wanted to ruin him, to harm him, to endanger him, to take his life. [113] It
    would occur to that man: ‘This householder or householder’s son is a rich man,
    with much wealth and property, protected by a bodyguard. It won’t be easy to
    take his life by force. Let me get close to him and then take his life.’
    “Then he would approach that householder or householder’s son and say to
    him: ‘I would serve you, sir.’ Then the householder or householder’s son would
    appoint him as a servant. The man would serve him, rising up before him,
    retiring after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct, endearing
    in his speech. The householder or householder’s son would consider him a
    friend,
    157 a bosom friend, and he would place trust in him. But when the man
    becomes aware that the householder or householder’s son has placed trust in
    him, then, finding him alone, he would take his life with a sharp knife.
    “What do you think, friend Yamaka, when that man had approached that
    householder or householder’s son and said to him: ‘I would serve you, sir,’
    wasn’t he a murderer even then, though the other did not recognize him as ‘my
    murderer’? And when the man was serving him, rising up before him, retiring
    after him, doing whatever he wants, agreeable in his conduct, endearing in his
    speech, wasn’t he a murderer then too, though the other did not recognize him as
    ‘my murderer’? And when the man came upon him while he was alone and took
    his life with a sharp knife, wasn’t he a murderer then too, though the other did
    not recognize him as ‘my murderer’?”
    “Yes, friend.”
    “So too, friend Yamaka,
    158
    the uninstructed worldling, who is not a seer of the
    noble ones and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, who is not a seer
    of superior persons and is unskilled and undisciplined in their Dhamma, regards
    form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self as in form.
    “He regards feeling as self … perception as self … volitional formations as
    self … consciousness as self, [114] or self as possessing consciousness, or
    consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness.
    “He does not understand as it really is impermanent form as ‘impermanent
    form’
    159 … impermanent feeling as ‘impermanent feeling’ … impermanent
    perception as ‘impermanent perception’ … impermanent volitional formations as
    ‘impermanent volitional formations’ … impermanent consciousness as
    ‘impermanent consciousness.’
    “He does not understand as it really is painful form as ‘painful form’ …
    painful feeling as ‘painful feeling’ … painful perception as ‘painful perception’
    … painful volitional formations as ‘painful volitional formations’ … painful
    consciousness as ‘painful consciousness.’
    “He does not understand as it really is selfless form as ‘selfless form’ …
    selfless feeling as ‘selfless feeling’ … selfless perception as ‘selfless perception’
    … selfless volitional formations as ‘selfless volitional formations’ … selfless
    consciousness as ‘selfless consciousness.’
    “He does not understand as it really is conditioned form as ‘conditioned form’
    … conditioned feeling as ‘conditioned feeling’ … conditioned perception as
    ‘conditioned perception’ … conditioned volitional formations as ‘conditioned
    volitional formations’ … conditioned consciousness as ‘conditioned
    consciousness.’
    “He does not understand as it really is murderous form as ‘murderous form’
    … murderous feeling as ‘murderous feeling’ … murderous perception as
    ‘murderous perception’ … murderous volitional formations as ‘murderous
    volitional formations’ … murderous consciousness as ‘murderous
    consciousness.’
    “He becomes engaged with form, clings to it, and takes a stand upon it as ‘my
    self.’
    160 He becomes engaged with feeling … with perception … with volitional
    formations … with consciousness, clings to it, and takes a stand upon it as ‘my
    self.’ These same five aggregates of clinging, to which he becomes engaged and
    to which he clings, lead to his harm and suffering for a long time.
    “But, friend, the instructed noble disciple, who is a seer of the noble ones …
    does not regard form as self, or self as possessing form, or form as in self, or self
    as in form.
    “He does not regard feeling as self … perception as self … volitional
    formations as self … consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness,
    or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. [115]
    “He understands as it really is impermanent form as ‘impermanent form’ …
    impermanent consciousness as ‘impermanent consciousness.’
    “He understands as it really is painful form as ‘painful form’ … painful
    consciousness as ‘painful consciousness.’
    “He understands as it really is selfless form as ‘selfless form’ … selfless
    consciousness as ‘selfless consciousness.’
    “He understands as it really is conditioned form as ‘conditioned form’ …
    conditioned consciousness as ‘conditioned consciousness. ’
    “He understands as it really is murderous form as ‘murderous form’ …
    murderous consciousness as ‘murderous consciousness.’
    “He does not become engaged with form, cling to it, and take a stand upon it
    as ‘my self.’ He does not become engaged with feeling … with perception …
    with volitional formations … with consciousness, cling to it, and take a stand
    upon it as ‘my self.’ These same five aggregates of clinging, to which he does
    not become engaged and to which he does not cling, lead to his welfare and
    happiness for a long time.”
    “So it is, friend Sāriputta, for those venerable ones who have such
    compassionate and benevolent brothers in the holy life to admonish and instruct
    them. And now that I have heard this Dhamma teaching of the Venerable
    Sāriputta, my mind is liberated from the taints by nonclinging.” [116]
    This is what the Venerable Sāriputta said. Elated, the Venerable Yamaka
    delighted in the Venerable Sāriputta’s statement.161

Bodhi`s notes

151 His position is not quite the same as that of the common annihilationist,
since he does not hold that all beings are annihilated at death. He seems to hold
an eternalist view in regard to unenlightened beings (since they have a lasting
self which transmigrates) and annihilationism in regard to the arahant (since he
utterly perishes at death).
Spk: If he had thought, “Formations arise and cease; a simple process of
formations reaches nonoccurrence, this would not be a view (diṭṭhigata) but

> knowledge in accordance with the Teaching.But since he thought, A being is
annihilated and destroyed,” this becomes a view. What follows is paralleled by
MN I 130-31 and I 256-57.
152 Spk: At the end of this teaching on the three characteristics Yamaka became
a stream-enterer. Sāriputta asks the following questions to examine him and to
get him to show that he has given up his wrong view.
Spk glosses tathāgata here as “a being” (satta), which I think does not quite
hit the mark. I take the subject of the discussion to be, not a being in general, but
the arahant conceived as a being, as a substantial self. Thus the catechism will
show that Yamaka has abandoned his identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) regarding the
arahant, and therewith his view of the arahant as a self that undergoes
annihilation. We find a similar transition from the arahant (vimuttacitta bhikkhu)
to the Tathāgata at MN I 140,3-7 and I 486-88.
153 The first three alternatives—conceiving the aggregates individually as the
Tathāgata, the Tathāgata as within the aggregates, and the Tathāgata as apart
from the aggregates—correspond to the first three modes of conceiving in the
Mūlapariyāya Sutta (MN I 1), which are set in relation to the sense bases at
35:30, 31. The fourth position conceives the aggregates collectively as the
Tathāgata (perhaps a view of supervenience); the fifth conceives the Tathāgata as
entirely transcendent, without any essential relation to the aggregates. These
modes of conceiving can also be correlated with the twenty types of identity
view.
154 Diṭṭh’ eva dhamme saccato thetato tathāgato anupalabbhiyamāno. Cp. MN
I 138,5-6: Attani ca bhikkhave attaniye ca saccato thetato anupalabbhamāne.
MN I 140,6-7: Diṭṭh’ evāhaṃ bhikkhave dhamme tathāgataṃ ananuvejjo ti
vadāmi.
155 See n. 147.
156 This passage can be read as a gloss on the Buddha’s famous dictum, “I make
known just suffering and the cessation of suffering” (see end of 22:86).
157 Ee daheyya may be better than saddaheyya, in Be and Se.
158 Spk: The uninstructed worldling attached to the round is like the gullible
householder, the five fragile aggregates like the murderous enemy. When the
enemy comes up to the householder and offers to serve him, that is like the time
the aggregates are acquired at the moment of rebirth. When the householder
takes the enemy to be his friend, that is like the time the worldling grasps the
aggregates, thinking, “They are mine.” The honour the householder bestows on
the enemy, thinking, “He is my friend,” is like the honour the worldling bestows
on the aggregates by bathing them, feeding them, etc. The murder of the
householder by the enemy is like the destruction of the worldling’s life when the
aggregates break up.

Note from Bodhi above;

Spk glosses tathāgata here as “a being” (satta), which I think does not quite
hit the mark. I take the subject of the discussion to be, not a being in general, but
the arahant conceived as a being, as a substantial self. Thus the catechism will
show that Yamaka has abandoned his identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi) regarding the
arahant, and therewith his view of the arahant as a self that undergoes
annihilation. We find a similar transition from the arahant (vimuttacitta bhikkhu)
to the Tathāgata at MN I 140,3-7 and I 486-88.

Here I prefer the Commentary. There are no beings in the truest sense and SPK is making that clear(IMHO).

Visuddhimagga XIX19
“There is no doer of a deed, or one who reaps the result. Phenomena alone flow on, no other view than this right.
XVIII24
“This is mere mentality-materiality, there is no being, no person

XVII31
“The mental and material (nama rupa) are really here
But here is no human being to be found, for it is void and merely fashioned like a doll.

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The whole world is meaningless, there was no ‘I’ to begin with. So, I am happy to know how nibbana might be like and it’s amazing, I have to say. You feel nothing at all, how liberating.

Can nibbana be said as ‘non-existence’? Would it be right to say so?

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