Where might one find a refutation of Vasubandhu and Yogacara, as devastating as Betty and others papers on Nagarjuna?

36

here for some time. Replace the # with a point .(sorry I cannot include links by some reason):

easyupload#io/m/ooxild

There is a very interesting paper in this issue: "THERAVADA VERSION OF THE TWO TRUTHS· by Karunadasa: (replace # with points)

skb#or#kr/down/papers/094#pdf

"As shown here, the distinction between the two truths depend on the distinction between
saṅketa and paramattha . Now, saṅketa includes things which depend for their being on
mental interpretations superimposed on the category of the real. For instance, the validity of
the term ‘table’ is based, not on an objective existent corresponding to the term, but on
mental interpretation superimposed on a congeries of material elements that enter into its
composition. Nevertheless the table is said to exist because in common parlance it is accepted
as a separate reality. On the other hand, the term paramattha denotes the category of real
existents (dhammas ), which have their own objective nature (sabhāva ). Their difference may
be set out thus: When a particular situation is explained on the basis of terms indicative of the
real elements of existence (dhammas ), that explanation is paramattha-sacc a. When the
self-same situation is explained on the basis of terms indicative of things which have their
being dependent on the mind’s synthesizing function (i.e. paññatti ), that explanation is
sammuti-sacca. The validity of the former is based on its correspondence to the ultimate data
of empirical reality. The validity of the latter is based on its correspondence to things
established by conventions."

37

From the commentary to MN 1

Here the word occurs in the sense of things endowed with a specific nature. This is the word-meaning: “They bear their own characteristics, thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkhaóaí dhárentì ti dhammá).

Sub. Cy. “They bear their own characteristics”: although there are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics, this is still said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributions as that of a “being,” etc. Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasurableness, and permanence, etc., or nature (pakati), substance (dabba), soul (jìva), body, etc., which are mere misconstructions (parikappitákáramatta) due to craving and views, or such entities as “sky-flowers,” etc., which are mere expressions of conventional discourse (lokavoháramatta), cannot be discovered as ultimately real actualities (saccikaþþhaparamatthato), these dhammas (i.e., those endowed with a specific nature) can. These dhammas are discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still, in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a mere metaphorical device (upacáramatta).14 Or else they are borne, they are discerned, known, according to their specific nature, thus they are dhammas (dhárìyanti vá yathásabhávato avadháriyanti ñáyantì ti dhammá).

Apart from the characteristic then of “hardness” there is no earth element. There is no earth element substance which bears the characteristic. All that can be directly known is the characteristic.

1 Like
38

This still limits one to an epistemological view of things. All that can be directly known, what we actually experience, is “hardness” or “redness” or “hotness”. How then does this become also ontological, that say “hardness” exists “out there” and acts upon “hotness” to create material things?

1 Like
39

I believe it is an issue to think with a big teapot in the table, and I’m not sure if there is an universal agreement about where should be located the ontological character of something. Our immediate knowledge about something existent, the experience, it will arise because the mind endow of an space (“out there” = “out from me”). Despite the space is not contained in the experience itself (hardness) but it is something arising in the mind, in order we can know hardness or whatever.

I understand when the paramatha-dhammas are said to have an objective nature, this is said because its consideration previous to any other thing including space. Like “things in itself”. This is like a surgery into the empirical experience to separate them from the worldly knowledge, the further common situation, the “convention”.

No idea how to elaborate well this issue, it can be more complicated of what it seems. Nagarjuna remained at one level, to end with the conceptual thought, although it seems without special intention to disentangle in depth the nature of the knowledge, and therefore some people is not satisfied.

1 Like
40

Unfortunately, Nagarjuna self refuted and his work is incoherent.

See:

Nagarjuna’s Masterpiece: Logical, Mystical, Both or Neither? by Stafford L. Betty.

Is Nagarjuna a Philosopher? by Stafford L. Betty

Nagarjuna: Master of Paradox, Mystic or Perpetrator of Fallacies? by Richard Hayes

Did Nagarjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views? by Richard Robinson

41

To understand Dhammas, Classical Theravada Texts recommends a way called “lakkhana-rasa-paccupatthana-padatthana”. Using this way, one can understand dhammas properly.

  1. Lakkhana/ sabhava = Characteristic/ Nature
  2. Rasa = Function ( kicca rasa = function; sampatti rasa = result of function)
  3. Paccupatthana/ upathana akara = The way the wisdom understands the dhamma/ The way the dhamma attends to mind
  4. Padatthana/ asanna karana = Base/ Immediate cause

The dhammas have other capabilities that are not described by it’s characteristic.

(References: Abhidhamma commentaries, Abhidhammavatara and its tika, Visuddhimgga and its tika, Ledi sayadaw’s manuals)

If we consider the first two points of the above classification of the Earth element (if my memory and English are correct):

  1. Nature: Hardness (kakkhalatta)
  2. Function: Being the ground or refuge to other bhutas (Patitthana)
  3. Way of attending: Accepting (Sampaticchana) other bhutas
  4. Base: Remaining three bhutas (avasesa bhutattaya)

somewhere I found “Bearing (sandharana)” has used interchangeably for the Lakkhana and Rasa both.

So, Pathavi can be taken as “bearing” or “containing” or “accepting” as well. (bearer, container, accepter)

If we take Pathavi as something like “Hardness that bears and accepts other rupas”, I think, we can understand it well.

Why do we need a substance? In the sense of Paramattha, we talk about pentads(of khandas) and octads (of rupas) etc.

In Paramattha language, we can say “Certain setting of octads went off and surrounding octads were destroyed” or “Certain setting of rupas went off and surrounding rupas were destroyed”.

:smiley:

Those are not taken as merely sensory qualities. They have other capabilities as shown above.
eg:

  1. Characteristic of Heat: Hotness (unhatta)
  2. Function of Heat: Ripening (paripacana), burning (paridahana) …
  3. Way of attending of Heat: Softening other bhutas (maddavanuppadana)
  4. Base of Heat: Remaining three bhutas (avasesa bhutattaya)

Tejo can be called “Ripening” or “Burning” or “Heat that ripens and burns” …etc.
In other words Tejo is ripener or burner.

“Anything which is made of parts” is not taken as unreal. (Paramattha collections are considered close to paramattha)
The perception of Oneness/ compactness (ghana) is considered unreal.

I heard one Abhidhamma master insisting “A collection/group of realities are not unreal (it is close to real)”.
eg: FiveKhadhas, PureOctad etc.

It is like saying "Do we need to accept such things really exist externally in order to understand the impermanence of conditioned realities?

The definition of Dhammas is Realities.

I think this Ledi Sayadaws quote is about the people who try to see the actual speed of impermanence.

I remember Ven. Maggavihari discussed the following points.

  • "One doesn’t need to see the actual rupa kalapas. The requirement is understanding characteristics of dhammas."
  • "One doesn’t need to see the actual speed of impermanence. The requirement is understanding impermanence."
  • "One doesn’t need to see the actual present moment. No mind-moment can see itself. When we see the present moment, it has already been past. There are 3 types of present moments mentioned in Patisambhidamagga and last 2 are long present-moments."

Yes, it is a good proof I think.

“Cakkhunca paticca rupeca uppajjati cakkhuvinnanam”.

Here the Cakkhu, Rupa and Cakkhuvinnana are shown as 3 distinct dhammas.
Experience is Cakkhuvinnana.
If one takes there are only experiences, then there is only Cakkhuvinnana.

Do you believe that the Buddha said not to bother thinking about if there are objective dhammas or not?

I think this is about Rupas. What about the existence of Nama dhammas?

One Abhidhamma master said,

  • Rupas are seen along with Avakasa-pannatti (concept of space)
  • Namas are seen along with Kala-pannatti (concept of time)

(In one sense Rupas also seen along with Kala-pannatti.)

42

To be honest, this page isn’t the place to discuss this in depth since as it goes against the spirit of the forum. If though you wish to discuss it further over on DhammaWheel, I will reply there. One thing however. You said the following

“Anything which is made of parts” is not taken as unreal.
The perception of Oneness/ compactness of them is considered unreal.

I heard one Abhidhamma master insisting “A collection/group of dhammas are not unreal”.
eg: FiveKhadhas, PureOctad etc.

I’m not sure this is right. From the introduction to the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha

From the standpoint of ultimate reality (paramatthato): According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kinds of realities — the conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (paññatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohāra). They include such entities as living beings, persons, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate validity, for the objects which they signify do not exist in their own right as irreducible realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental construction (parikappanā), not realities existing by reason of their own nature. Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic nature (sabhāva). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves the final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of experience. Hence the word paramattha is applied to them, which is derived from parama = ultimate, highest, final, and attha = reality, thing.

That then which cannot be reduced further, under analysis, is real whilst that which is made up of parts (and so is reducible) is only conventionally true, and so ultimately unreal. Rupa-kalapas are made up of parts. They are reducible to their components, and so it should stand that ultimately they don’t exist. Only hardness, hotness, nutritive essence etc do. Rupa-kalapas have no sabhāva, only the earth element or odour does. If something has no sabhāva, then its not real.

43

If my memory is correct, I heard following points from that scholar.

  • “A collection of ultimate realities” is not a sheer product of mental construction like in direct non-real concepts that have no intrinsic nature (atta, puggala, flower etc).
  • Though it is a collection (samuha-pannatti), the parts of it are irreducible ultimate realities.
  • The literal ultimate reality is the irreducible one, but a collection of them is also close to the reality.
  • There are “levels of closeness” in references to realities.

I think, we have seen even the collections like “rupa-khanda”, “sankhara-khanda” …etc. are considered Paramattha. Yet they are not irreducible khandas.

44

yes, it is. From where you get that quote?
Time arise when knowing nama objects at the mind-door level.

Perhaps a similarity could be when we look to a classical clock. :clock4:
We know the clock’s spaces divisions like an inherent association to the same object. While the knowledge of the time will arise in a subsequent way of knowing the image of the clock. Both the arising space and time are products of our mind although they arise in our relation with the object from its different ambits nama and rupa.
We cannot know the space in itself neither the time in itself. We cannot imagine 3 minutes neither 3 centimetres without related objects working like references and causing its arising.

Coherence of the Buddhist philosophy is really amazing, because it is the only system of Reality in the world able to offer a coherent explanation to the nature of knowledge, to link consciousness and Reality in a succesful way.

We should note how in the worldly knowledge by means Science, there is a endless loop in the knowledge of matter. Without solution:

  • matter is defined like “any substance that has mass”
  • while mass is defined like “the quantity of matter”

(Read just the first line in these articles:)

Logically, It could be shorted to say: “matter is any substance that has a quantity of matter” :crazy_face:
This is a non-sense despite the world expend billions pursuing final particles.

In Dhamma there is no that loop because the substantial reality only arise in the atta experience. Anatta lacks of it. So we have a conditional reality with final realities and an unconditioned reality which don’t deny the sources of the experience but its delusive nature in our common knowledge.

This type of discussion, which was normal 2.500 year ago, today is censored and labeled like “conspiracionist” in some Western Buddhist places in internet devoted to help the promotion of stupid wars and the criminal genocidal deliriums of a fake-elite of human beings.

Thanks for keeping this Dhamma space of human freedom :pray:

1 Like
45

Well said. Even if one doesn’t have full faith, he has to give the highest weight to it, since it is the only Option in this world.

Yes. I think this kind of loops or self-contradictions are good measures to recognize a false doctrine.

1 Like
46

First, let me say, thank you @ekocare for working with me on this. I, as you surely know, am a realist, and find that all forms of idealism, extreme nihilism, and so on are entirely self refuting and invalid. I lean heavily on Classical Theravada as the foundation for my realism. Hence, my deep discomfort with the realization that Ledi Sayadaw, unparalleled expert on abhidhamma, explained that the fundamental building blocks of reality have zero substance, and are nothing but subjective qualities, like “hardness.” My goal is to get to an understanding of how such a thing could be objective, external, and exist from its own side.

This is a problem, because logically, and linguistically, we run into problems without a substance. It is like if I say “Ekocare is learned.” But then, when someone asks, “What is Ekocare at the level of foundation, what parts of him are mind independent, and exist from their own side, what are the fundamental building blocks that make him up?” And I reply, “learned.”

This is nonsense. “learned” is a quality that describes something else, it cannot exist alone, as that is linguistically and logically impossible. If there is no substance to be denoted “learned,” then there is no “learned.” Then, I explain “The other building blocks of ekocare are articulate, friendly, and helpful. There is zero substance, there is just learned, articulate, friendly, and helpful.” This, is nonsense, and linguistically and logically impossible.

This is not helped if I say, “Well, along with learned is also the qualities of smart, happy, interesting, and speeding up.” Again, we have the same problem, I added more qualities, and “speeding up” is an action, but, the issue, still, is that none of these have meanings unless they are applied to something. They cannot stand alone.

I hope this illustrates my difficulty. If you have a solution, I’d greatly appreciate you sharing it, as I would like to ease my discomfort with the fundamental building blocks explained by my religion.

47

I’m not sure that I can solve it. But I will at least understand your situation by seeing your next reply to this post.

What lead you to consider them as “subjective qualities”? What is the ground for it? I think Ledi Sayadaw has not mentioned the word “subjective”.

Not everything is external. Some are internal.

According to the commentaries, “exist from its own side” does not mean that they are independent. All the Sankhata paramatthas are depended on other paramatthas. The only independent reality is considered to be Asankhata.

Actually the Paramatthas cannot exist alone. They exist always in groups while depending on each other.

I think what you feel is the need of a Container/ Owner to bear/reside the Characteristic.

I guess, this is the very point that the Classical Texts insist saying “There is no Container/ Owner apart from the Characteristics”.

It is explained in commentaries and by modern classical masters that the people have innate idea of a “Core” that bears or handles the Body and Mind. Therefore the Classical texts advise us to investigate the Intrinsic natures of existents in order to defeat this innate weakness.

If one want to refer to where the characteristic depends while in existence, then it can be shown as "A group of inter-dependent Paramatthas including the mentioned characteristic itself ".

eg: Pathavi is depend on Octad. (while Pathavi is a part of Octad itself)

Have you found difficulties with the classical simile of the vehicle?

Example in modern terms:
Let’s say all the building blocks of a Car are only Wheels, Engine and Body.
Let’s say Wheels, Engine and Body are Paramatthas, and Car is a Pannatti.
If we define the Car using Paramatthas, then,
Car = Wheels + Engine + Body. (= W+E+B = WEB)
The Complete Car can be shown by WEB.
These 3 building blocks can work as the Car. It is complete.
Wheels are of whom? Of WEB.

Texts say that one will not find any bearer or owner of the Characteristics, if he take one by one.

Another modern simile heard from somewhere:
One person wanted to see a university and ask his friend to take him to show a university. The friend took him to the university where he learns and showed him the Art-faculty first saying “This is the Art-faculty”. Then the friend showed him the “Science-faculty”, then “Main-auditorium”, then “Canteen”, … so on. After showing him all the parts of the university, the friend asked him “Are you happy now?”. “You have shown many wonderful places, but I came here to see a University. Where is the University?”

Likewise the Pannatti is like a Mirage which disappears when we get closer to it.

“Mere repeated investigation (of intrinsic natures) is enough to understand that there is nothing apart from Natures. We don’t need to do anything forceful to see the Anatta.” Venerable Maggavihari said.

48

Thank you. I will respond to your other points, but first I’d like to address this very pertinent issue you touched on:

“Exist from its own side” usually means that it exists as objective, and not mind, and could exist even with no mind whatsoever, like a corpse after consciousness and kamma stop generating it, and it is generated purely by tejo, for example.

This is typically a firm, stark delineator between realism and idealism.

Realism: I see a tree, it exists from its own side. Even if I ceased to exist, the tree is still there. This is because it exists from its own side.

Idealism: I see a tree, it does not exist from its own side. If I ceased to exist, so does the tree. This is because it only existed from my side.

Would you affirm that it is true that all paramattha dhammas are dependent on mind?

Or do at least some of them exist from their own side, and can exist without mind?

If it turns out Classical Theravada teaches that all paramattha dhammas are dependent on mind, and cease when mind ceases, and that’s what “exist from its own side means,” and thus, Classical Theravada is a form of idealism, then by the end of today I might not even be a Buddhist any longer.

This is because:

Idealism = by its own definition, this teaching is not real. There are variations of intensity, but if the teaching is that things are imaginary, or dependent on mind in fundamental ways, with nothing ever existing outside of mind, this leads to Mahayana ideas like “If you see the Buddha on the road, kill him!” Because we are supposed to see through the fact that all is imaginary, including Buddha and dharma. We are to nevermind the fact that this means the teaching that everything is imaginary is also imaginary, and so cannot be true. But I can’t nevermind that, so I cannot abide idealism.

Realism = by its own definition, this teaching is real. If you see the Buddha, touch your forehead to the ground and ask him to teach you. He was real, his teachings are real. Nothing else to say, but that we should practice the dhamma, because it is real and true.

Classical Theravada is the only realist branch of Buddhism that survives today. Hence, if you’re intending to demonstrate that what seems realist in Classical Theravada is actually idealism hiding under realist terminology, and even the definitive realist phrase “exist from its own side,” denotes idealism somehow within this tradition, then that’s that, I guess, and there are zero realist Buddhist schools surviving today.

Edit: after rereading a lot of scholarly works on the abdhidhamma and Theravada by Karunadasa and Bhikkhu Bodhi, I can firmly say that Theravada is a realist school, and “exist from their own side” does mean that some dhammas exist independently of mind, even thought they don’t exist independent of other dhammas. If you disagree, and can demonstrate that the abhidhamma holds that no dhammas are ever outside of mind, please do so, but you’ll need to refute, and disprove Karunadasa and Bhikkhu Bodhi, which I only imagine being possible if you have access to Theravada texts that they did not. Until that time, I will maintain that Theravada is decisively a realist school.

49

the solution is going one step beyond of that classical division from the western thought.
I would suggest the reading of these works from Y. Karunadasa, they are quite clarifying :

“Buddhism avoids the dualistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are strictly separate entities. It also avoids the monistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are finally reducible to one, either to mind (idealism) or to matter (materialism). Setting itself equally aloof from these two positions, Buddhism explains the mind-body relationship as one of reciprocal dependence.”

  • “The Theravada Abhidhamma”. Y Karunadasa*

"What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognizes the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that owe their being to the act of cognition itself. How does this doctrine interpret the common-sense view of the world, a kind of naive realism in the sense that it tends to recognize realities more or less corresponding to all linguistic terms? In other words, what relation is there between the dhammas, the ultimate elements of existence, and the objects of commonsense realism? What degree of reality, if any, could be bestowed on the latter?

It is in their answers to these questions that the abhidhammikas formulated the theory of paññatti concepts or designations together with a distinction drawn between two kinds of truth, conventional (sammuti) and absolute (paramattha). This theory assumes significance in another context. In most of the Indian philosophies which were associated with the atma-tradition and subscribed to a substantialist view of existence, such categories as time and space came to be defined in absolute terms. The problem for the abhidhammikas was how to explain such categories without committing themselves to the same metaphysical assumptions. The theory of paññatti was the answer to this."

  • “The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma”. Y. Karunadasa*

the Abhidhamma was the best Buddhist development after Buddha himself. It sealed the founaments of the Buddhist philosophy in the intellectual scope for the later times.

50

Thanks, I wish it were that simple.

However, this problem cannot be escaped simply by brushing it away as “Western thought”. For examples to demonstrate why this isn’t strictly a “Western” problem, please see Ramanuja, Madhvacharya, The Mimamsa, etc. arguing realism against Shankara, Yogacara, etc. who were arguing idealism in ancient India.

Also, Karunadasa confirms that Theravada is realism over and over again, in several different works, and using different phrases and explanations. So, I fail to see how he is an example of how to evade the issue, even if he claimed to be, since he also very firmly, clearly, and repeatedly confirmed the school does take one side on the issue.

Here are several examples, and one of Bhikkhi Bodhi doing similar. If none of these confirm the Theravada is a realist school, then we must give up on making sense of language, and put Theravada with the riddling language games that are Zen koans and other Mahayana things, where nothing means what it should and all becomes paradoxical nonsense.

What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Karunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38

dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2

This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.

Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, page 146

"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 14, 172

Here is Bhikkhu Bodhi summarizing the abhidhamma position on dhammas:

It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
…
Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…

…

…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).
…
…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.
…
Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260

This following quote is contradicted several times by his statements that Buddhism is realist in other works, as can be seen above.

“Buddhism avoids the dualistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are strictly separate entities. It also avoids the monistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are finally reducible to one, either to mind (idealism) or to matter (materialism). Setting itself equally aloof from these two positions, Buddhism explains the mind-body relationship as one of reciprocal dependence.”

“The Theravada Abhidhamma”. Y Karunadasa

I am loathe to believe that Theravada is the same self contradicting type of teaching as Zen and other similar schools, so I’m going to assume we must conclude that Theravada is realist, and that Karunadasa must be understood in some specific context on that quote, to avoid self contradiction. Especially because we’ve got five quotes where he affirms realism. In some of these he even specifies that some dhammas are mind independent. This destroys any confusion or argument that he could have been meaning some kind of “realism” where mind and matter are not separate (not to mention that would be ridiculous). And we have only one quote where he seems to say Theravada is neither realist nor idealist.

Edit:

There is no contradiction whatsoever. Karunadasa clearly held that Theravada is a realist school. The quote in question becomes clear, when we look at a fuller version of it, that he was speaking about nama-rupa, individual beings, not all of reality. In other words, he affirmed, as anyone who understands Buddhism would, that the human organism is not quite mind alone, nor matter alone. He clearly considered things like rocks and trees to be objective, not mind, and, in fact, independent of mind, as anyone discussing realism would understand them. Broadly speaking, there is no deep gulf between so called “Western” realism, and Indian realism. Both confirm mind independent reality, and both deny that all is merely mind.

Only schools that self refute, and redefine words in bizarre ways would have any issues between each other here, on these main points, and there is zero evidence that Theravada Buddhism plays such word games. It is also abundantly, and undeniably clear that Karunadasa played no such games, but wrote in standard English, and used these words as they are normally understood. When a word needed to be clarified to be outside of normal understanding, he was very clear on this. He did not do this for “realism,” and related terms, which he used in their usual meanings.

Since rupa in nama rupa means the material components of a living being, the reciprocal dependence of consciousness and nama-rupa shows how Buddhism understands the nature of the mind body relationship.
“Buddhism avoids the dualistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are strictly separate entities. It also avoids the monistic theory that maintains that mind and matter are finally reducible to one, either to mind (idealism) or to matter (materialism). Setting itself equally aloof from these two positions, Buddhism explains the mind-body relationship as one of reciprocal dependence.”

“The Theravada Abhidhamma”. Y Karunadasa, chapter 4, page 74

To sum up, with all of the above in mind: We may conclude that Karunadasa held that Theravada was realism in the usual sense, common to both India and “The West,” with the only differences being on minute points, rather than on the broad, crucial points of realism.

Considering the same is true of Bhikkhu Bodhi, in that I’ve never seen him step so far out of regular speech, and to use such a well known philosophical phrase as “from their own side” to mean something totally different. Thus, we may also conclude that the dhammas do exist from their own side in the usual sense; which is that some dhammas exist independent of mind.

And, so, I disagree with your suggestion that “the solution is going one step beyond of that classical division from the western thought.” I side with Karunadasa, in that Theravada is within that division of Western thought, and is unarguably a realist system. I have demonstrated this beyond all doubt above.

Finally, thanks for giving me that quote which was missing context so it sounded like Karunadasa denied that Buddhism was realist. It pushed me to reread a lot of that work, in order to solve the riddle created by the clipping of the quote, and it’s always nice to read Karunadasa. I learn the most when users on Buddhist forums challenge something I already know, using texts I’ve already read, because I really go back through them with a fine tooth comb, and learn much more than I did on my initial reading, because sometimes the initial reading is a skimming. I look forward to more of this from you in the future, since you seem like you hold the common view that Theravada is not a realist school, and people with this view challenge me the most, and therefore are frequently a reason I learn the most :slightly_smiling_face:

51

Okay, I have resolved this issue via Y. Karunadasa’s work “A Buddhist Analysis of Matter”. He explains that originally, in the suttas, the elements didn’t make a radical departure from the traditional Indian understanding of the elements as substances:

Most of the schools of Indian thought, notably the Sāṃkhya, the Vedānta, and the Medical Tradition as represented by Caraka and Suśruta, recognize five mahābhūtas, or elemental substances… In the Nikāyas they are defined in simple and general terms and are illustrated mostly with reference to the constituents of the human body. Earth-element is that which is hard (kakkhaḷa) and rigid (kharigata) —for example, hair of the head or body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, etc. Water-element is water (āpo), or that which is watery (āpogataṃ) —for example, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, tears, etc. Fire-element is fire or heat (tejo), or that which is fiery (tejogataṃ) —for example, the heat in the body that transmutes food and drink in digestion. Air-element is air (vāyo), or that which is airy (vāyogataṃ) —for example, “wind discharged upward or downward, wind in the abdomen or belly, vapors that traverse the several members, inhaling and exhaling of breath.” These definitions seem to suggest that from its very beginning Buddhism did not make a radical departure from the popular conception of the mahābhūtas.

Then, the abdhidhamma began saying that the earth element is hardness itself, rather than the earth element being what is hard, or rigid, as it is in the Nikayas. A slight difference, but it brought on Ceisiwr and my confusion. This is because there is no conflict to say “Things that are hard are the earth element.” because the attribute of “hard” is applied to things, and these things would then be the earth element. In other words, when you touch something hard, you are experiencing the earth element. This is nearly identical to how many ancient people described the elements. It is no different than saying “Things that are wet contain water, so when we feel wetness, we feel the water element.” Perfectly logically, and linguistically sound.

But there is difficulty in saying, “Things that are the earth element are strictly hardness, and nothing else.” The difference being that things can have the attribute of being hard, and be the earth element, but things cannot be the attribute of hardness alone, because that is linguistically, and logically unsound. You would be experiencing an experience, with no underlying thing to hold that attribute, yet the attribute is said to stand independent of mind, and only experienced when contacted by the senses. It makes no sense. This is like saying “Things that are wet are the water element, which is nothing but wetness.” it doesn’t work linguistically. “Wetness” and “hardness” are sensations, and reducing a physical object to only a sensation is impossible, and incoherent.

Things that are hard can be the earth element, because, linguistically, things exist that are the earth element, which bears the attribute of being hard. But if we say those things are strictly the attribute or hardness, which is a sensation, we run into problems. There is nothing to be sensed in the first place, which violates the fact that consciousness depends on a dyad. The finger must touch a physical object before consciousness of hardness can arise. Hence, the conscious experience of hardness cannot be all that exists, as it cannot exist without a physical object. The finger cannot touch a sensation, and then experience a sensation. That’s circular logic. The finger must touch the earth element, a physical object, which bears the attribute of being hard, and is thus experienced in consciousness as hardness.

It will be seen that according to the Nikāyan definition what is comparatively hard or rigid (kakkhaḷa, kharigata) is the earth-element, whereas according to the Abhidhammic definition the fact of hardness or rigidity (kakkhaḷatta) is itself the earth-element.

However, what brings us back home again, and resolves the whole thing, is the earth element is also the element of extension, which bears other elements. This means that the earth element is not strictly the attribute of “hardness” with nothing to be attributed to. It is a lot like a force of nature that allows other elements to be borne on it, and it is the reason objects can occupy space.

Thus there is general agreement among the Buddhist schools in maintaining that what is called earth-element stands for the phenomenon of hardness, rigidity, solidity, or compactness in matter. The earth-element is also defined as that which extends or spreads out, pattharatī ti paṭhavī. 63 Extension is occupation in space. “Tri-dimensional extension gives rise to our idea of a solid body. As no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, Buddhists derive their idea of hardness (kakkhaḷatta-lakkhana) from paṭhavī.”64 Thus the interpretation of earth-element as the element of extension brings into relief a different method of approach. In the commentaries we get futher discussions on the peculiar function of this element. Venerable Buddhaghosa observes that it acts as a foundation, a sort of fulcrum, and that it manifests itself as receiving (sampaṭicchana-paccupaṭṭhānā). 65 This has been further explained to mean that the other three primary elements are established on it (paṭhavī-patiṭṭhitā) and that therefore it serves as a support, a basis (patiṭṭhānaṃ) for them. That this view is shared by the Vaibhāsikas, is shown by their contention that the “bearing up”or supporting (saṃdhārana) of ships by water ( = ocean) is a sufficient ground for the inference that that the earth-element is present in water. 67 A Pali sub-commentary observes that what we conventionally call earth is the support of trees, mountains, etc., even so the earth-element is a support for the other material

And, so, the conflict is resolved. There is more to the earth element than strictly “hardness,” and, if we simply relax on the word itself, and allow the Nikaya usage to guide our understanding of abhidhamma, we end up with a perfectly sound understanding. The earth element is hardness and extension which can bear other elements and qualities. An elemental force that allows other elements to occupy space can surely bear the attribute of hardness. Just like a magnetic field can bear the attribute of strength, but saying that there is nothing whatsoever to a magnetic field but “strongness” would be nonsense, because “strongness” is an attribute borne by something else, not alone.

52

Paramatthas are independent of the mind in the sense that they are not illusions of cognitive act. They exist from their own side.

What I meant was that Sankhata dhammas are not independent in the sense that they are dependently arisen.

Meanings of Sabhava:

  1. In the general sense: “nature”
  2. In Abhidhamma: “intrinsic/own nature” (sabhava-lakkhana)
  3. But in the following Patisambhidamagga passage: “exist/arise from its own”, “exist/arise from itself”

This 3rd meaning is refuted as false (suññaṃ) by the passage itself.

Paṭisambhidāmaggapāḷi » Yuganaddhavagga
Katamaṃ vipariṇāmasuññaṃ? jātaṃ rūpaṃ sabhāvena suññaṃ. vigataṃ rūpaṃ vipariṇatañceva suññañca. Jātā vedanā sabhāvena suññā. Vigatā vedanā vipariṇatā ceva suññā ca …pe… jātā saññā… jātā saṅkhārā… jātaṃ viññāṇaṃ… jātaṃ cakkhu…pe… jāto bhavo sabhāvena suñño. Vigato bhavo vipariṇato ceva suñño ca. Idaṃ vipariṇāmasuññaṃ.

Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā » Yuganaddhavagga
sabhāvena suññanti ettha sayaṃ bhāvo sabhāvo, sayameva uppādoti attho. Sato vā bhāvo sabhāvo, attatoyeva uppādoti attho. Paccayāyattavuttittā paccayaṃ vinā sayameva bhāvo, attato eva vā bhāvo etasmiṃ natthīti sabhāvena suññaṃ, sayameva bhāvena, attato eva vā bhāvena suññanti vuttaṃ hoti. Atha vā sakassa bhāvo sabhāvo. Pathavīdhātuādīsu hi anekesu rūpārūpadhammesu ekeko dhammo paraṃ upādāya sako nāma. bhāvo ti ca dhammapariyāyavacanametaṃ. Ekassa ca dhammassa añño bhāvasaṅkhāto dhammo natthi, tasmā sakassa aññena bhāvena suññaṃ, sako aññena bhāvena suññoti attho. Tena ekassa dhammassa ekasabhāvatā vuttā hoti. Atha vā sabhāvena suñña nti suññasabhāveneva suññaṃ. Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti? Suññasuññatāya eva suññaṃ, na aññāhi pariyāyasuññatāhi suññanti vuttaṃ hoti.

It is not a wise practice to make decisions in a hurry, specially this kind of serious decisions.

Whenever an unclear point comes, we have to refer Tipitaka and Commentaries directly, and also discuss with scholars and monks, for a long period of time, in order to clarify it.

If it is still unclear, we can keep it for later investigation and continue to practice, because the other majority Dhammas are clear.

Wish you to be confident in Theravada even in the case we argue against it!

1 Like
53

We are in agreement. Thank you for clarifying.

I’ve said it before, but it bears repeating: I know I’m stubborn, and very all or nothing on this topic, but I studied Yogacara-Madhyamka for over a decade, even trained formally at a temple, but I eventually realized it is entirely self refuting, untenable, and incoherent. I realized I was wasting my life chasing shadows and hare’s horns, and I will never do that again. Many people try to turn Theravada into a Yogacara-Madhyamaka compatible system, so much so that I’m always prepared to have someone try again, or even successfully demonstrate that it is (though that is incredibly unlikely), and so I’m always ready to walk away if such a thing happened. I will never go back to Yogacara-Madhyamaka. That idealist/extreme nihilist/relativist practice did more damage to my life than any other philosophy or religion I’ve ever studied. And the realist Classical Theravada did more good for my life than any other philosophy or religion I’ve ever studied.

Anyway, thank you, as always, for your patience and careful explanations.

1 Like
54

maybe I don’t explain myself enough. I think is no realist neither idealist. Anyway that’s not important. Glad to see your doubts are pacified with the Ekocare answers :pray:

1 Like
55

I respect your opinion, but I side with the erudite Y Karunadasa who has declared, and demonstrated, repeatedly, that Theravada is a realist system, the nikayas are realist, and so is the Abhidhamma system (as I demonstrated above). I personally do not believe there is any such thing as “in between.” Nor “neither idealist nor realist.” There’s realism, and then degrees of skepticism and quietism, many masquerading as idealism, nihilism, etc.

This is because if your position is that things are other than real, your position is then not real. Hence, any amount you are in between is merely that amount of skepticism/quietism, or simply refusing to take position, like the Ajnana.

In other words, if I ask you “Are the Buddha’s teachings real?” You cannot say “Neither real nor not real.” And maintain the authority of the teachings. They are reduced to an indeterminate position. Further, this goes against the suttas, which declare the dhamma to be true and real.

Mendicants, these four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
“Cattārimāni, bhikkhave, tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.

What four?
Katamāni cattāri?

This is suffering’ …
‘Idaṃ dukkhan’ti, bhikkhave, tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the origin of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhasamudayo’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ;

‘This is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering’ …
‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti tathametaṃ avitathametaṃ anaññathametaṃ—

These four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
imāni kho, bhikkhave, cattāri tathāni avitathāni anaññathāni.
-SN 56.20

And the dhamma is so real, in fact, that even if there is no Buddha to break through to it, it is still there.

whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality. A Tathagata awakens to this and breaks through to it. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: ‘See! With ignorance as condition, bhikkhus, volitional formations.’
-SN 12.20