What do you think of those who say there's nothing after the end of namarupa?

From Abhidhamma: SuttaCentral

Definition of Pain
Herein, what is ‘pain?’

That which is bodily pain, bodily disagreeableness, pain arising from contact with the body, disagreeable feeling, pain and painful feeling that is born in the body.

This is said to be ‘pain’.

Pain is the translation for dukkha here. The word dukkha has many meanings from all suffering including mental and physical suffering to just only physical suffering. Mental suffering ends at attainment of arahanthood while alive.

There’s 2 kinds of nibbāna, with remainder and without remainder.

Your claim for this means arahants has no more mind consciousness is untenable. The Abhidhamma analysis specifically has the just functional citta for arahants. If arahants do not have mind consciousness, there would be no need for abhidhamma to assign this functional thing to arahants. The other 3 possibilities for consciousness are: wholesome, unwholesome and resultant.

Five aggregates which is clung to is 5 clinging aggregates. When clinging ceases, gone, no more, eradicated, destroyed by the arahant, their 5 aggregate are still there, functional for them, but unclung to. The rest of your unquoted paragraph here is a gross misunderstanding which I have no idea how you can even get to.

No. Dependent origination is many lives. That’s why after ignorance ends for the arahants, their consciousness until feelings are still there. The final cessation of consciousness is only at death, parinibbāna of an arahant. If it’s one life model, then it makes more sense to say from cessation of ignorance, consciousness ceases as well in this life. But consciousness for many life model refers to rebirth relinking consciousness. That’s why only future rebirth relinking consciousness is totally ceased while arahant is still alive and not all consciousness.

If you still think in terms of self, you woulf naturally think of cessation of 5 aggregates, 6 sense bases with nothing leftover as annihilation, but when there’s no self, there’s only suffering which arises and ceases, nothing worth clung onto. Annihilation doesn’t apply to cessation. Although to an atheist it looks like the same thing.

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It looks to me like he is being careful with words.
Remember the Udana -

There is, monks, an unborn[1] — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated. If there were not that unborn — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated

I don’t see him suggesting the arahat exists after death?

,

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Perhaps it’s clearer near the end of the talk, from the end, 14:40 mins left to 6:30 mins left.

In it, the interviewer keeps on asking for a method to eternally “experience” (pari)nibbāna. B. Bodhi supported that. Consciousness nirvanaed.

It seems that he is searching for something other than totally blank, to make sense of the highest peace.

Whereas we would already accept that cessation of perception and feeling, having nothing felt is the highest peace itself.

Thanks for pointing that section out.

Yes, the interviewer clearly believes in some continuing experience after khandha parinibbana . Ven Bodhi starts well be refuting that.
Bodhi: > all five aggregates fall away and cease. So there isn’t a mind or consciousness continuing into nibbana.

But he does seem to become ambivalent later on…

Recording (2)

Interviewer: Okay, cool, very cool. So when someone who’s achieved enlightenment and then passes… Passes away. Yeah, and they achieve, again, nibbana, it seems that the mental consciousness, bodhi must continue.> Is that true or not?

Bodhi: **Well, from the perspective of the early suttas, all five aggregates fall away and cease. So there isn’t a mind or consciousness continuing into nibbana.

Interviewer: This seems different to what we just described. The moment of nibbana, it’s important that the subjective side is consciousness, the ambience, there. But then it seems like there’s this nibbana, ongoing nibbana, where there’s no consciousness, but there’s nibbana. This seems to be getting awfully close to an idea of cessation, is what I would say, which is what we wanted to avoid at the start of the conversation.

Yeah, I know that this seems a bit paradoxical, but certainly I would say that the suttas make it very clear that nibbana is, as I said, an unconditioned element, a reality, a state, whatever. And also they speak, without any qualification, about the five aggregates, as coming to an end with the attainment of nibbana. But the way I sometimes try to resolve that paradox, or maybe contradiction to myself, is to think that what happens is that it’s not that consciousness is sort of continuing in nibbana.

Yeah. Because if it’s continuing, it would have to have some thoughts. Yeah.

So what is it thinking? The way I formulate this to myself is that consciousness becomes… Can we create a verb? Nirvanized? Nirvanized, yeah. I like this way of thinking, because normally the consciousness has a base, the mana of ayatana, yeah? Yeah. And so at this point, when the great practitioner passes, this base is no longer there, just like the I sense of consciousness base.

And so I was wondering if nibbana itself could act as a base, and indeed, earlier you said it’s described as a… It’s described as a base, but not in the sense of a base for consciousness. When ayatana is used in that other sense, where we speak about the 12 bases, then those are the bases for consciousness. But it’s an interesting point, I’ve just never thought of it quite… Yeah, because we want there to be… We don’t want there to be consciousness, as in the abacus.

Yeah. We want nibbana to be ongoingly experienced, because it’s not just… Yeah, I say so, definitely. Yeah.

And so then, there’s a subjective element to this nibbana, as we… Yeah, and of course, there are passages and suttas which speak about, describe nibbana as paramasukham, supreme bliss. Yeah. And what is the other one? I think it’s paramasanti, the perfect peace.

Yeah. So it seems like nibbana is a different type of experience. Yeah.

Completely different to the level we’ve experienced the world. Yeah, like in early Buddhism, what experience is formulated and sort of dissected and analyzed, it’s always analyzed in terms of the five aggregates. And then, the suttas are pretty clear that the five aggregates within conditioned experience cease with the attainment of nibbāda element without residue remaining.

Yeah. In fact, there’s a distinction made in some suttas between nibbāda element with a residue remaining, and that is nibbāda as experienced by the arahant, the liberated one, during life, as long as the body continues, so like faculty functions. And then there’s the anupādiśeṣa-nibbāna-dhatu, the element of nibbana without any residue remaining.

But it would seem that there would have to be some experiential element, it’s difficult to formulate this, in order for the idea of Haramāsuka, supreme bliss, and Haramāsanti, supreme peace, to have any meaning. So even this nibbāna without residue remaining is described as blissful. Is that also described as blissful? Yeah, what’s interesting, I’m trying to think whether there’s any statement, actually what is said about the nibbāna element without residue remaining is only, it’s very, very terse, that all that is felt becomes cool right here.

Interviewer: All that is felt becomes cool, right?

Yeah, cool in the sense of like a fire going out. Uh-huh, interesting. So what do you make of that? Well, it’s referring to what we think of as regular feeling, because it is contrasted with the nibbāna element with residue remaining.

That’s when the residue, the residue that remains is this body with its sense faculties and the mental activity. So in the course of life, the way the explanation goes, the liberated one continues to experience pleasure and pain, what is agreeable and disagreeable, dependent on these six sense faculties. And so with the attainment of nibbāna without residue, the six sense faculties come to an end, and so there’s no more experiencing of pleasure, pain, the agreeable and disagreeable.

There’s no contact anymore, so they cannot be feeling, right? Yeah. So I wouldn’t say that that experience of supreme bliss, supreme peace, is a feeling in the way that feeling is understood as an ordinary conditioned phenomenon. So would then you say that the bliss, associated with nibbāna, or even the experiencing of it, is that conditioned or unconditioned? Like nibbāna is conditioned, that is unconditioned.

Nibbāna is unconditioned. But this description, this adjective describing nibbāna, Yeah. So this is a bliss that is the bliss of something unconditioned.

It would have to be unconditioned, yeah. And therefore also the experience of it would have to be an unconditioned experience. It would be an unconditioned state, yeah.

An unconditioned bliss. Yeah, which is completely different to the experience that we have. Exactly, yeah.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And nibbāna is right here, right now, yeah? Is it or not? Well, nibbāna is always existing. It’s a little tricky if you say that it’s right here, right now.

Where is it? You get the idea. If I, you know, I can put the direction into my… Yeah, where’s the GPS for nibbāna? If I turn the corner, am I going to run into it? Yeah. But it’s always present in the sense that because it’s unconditioned, it doesn’t have any arising, and it doesn’t undergo any kind of transformation, and you have to you have to realize it individually for yourself.

So you could say it’s almost sort of, maybe you could say it’s always present internally, and when you develop your samādhi and paññā, your wisdom and concentration of wisdom to a certain point, then maybe the inner barriers that are separating the mind from nibbāna break down, and then you see…

Interviewer: That’s beautiful. That’s a beautiful description. But it makes me wonder if the adjective blissful and also the experience side of it is also internally present right now.

Perhaps. But that would be quite different even from, you know, there are very more resulted types of bliss that are present within the jhānic experience, the stages of meditative absorption. So that’s pīti and sukha, elation and bliss.

But nibbāna is, but those are still conditioned phenomena. Same words, it’s a completely different category. Yeah.

You can’t compare a conditioned thing and an unconditioned thing. Exactly. Even if they have the same name.

Yeah. And we can talk like this, but we don’t really know what this is, right? Yeah. And it seems like the other thing is that, you know, for conditioned thing, Buddha would eloquently spoke about dependent origination.

Exactly. And this seems to be how conditioned things operate. Actually, you make some interesting points in the book on dependent origination and how it’s been misunderstood.

Yeah. Can you just maybe touch on that about the difference between dependent origination and say simultaneous, mutually… You know, you can talk about these two points. Do you remember? Dependent origination is not a mutual dependence necessarily.

Yeah. You don’t have to go there. You don’t have to go there.

Sorry. I could take it off. I think I know what you’re talking about.

Okay, so there’s a common explanation or a way of interpreting dependent origination as interdependence.

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6 posts were split to a new topic: Arahat and dukkha

Dear All
Venerable Bodhi very kindly replied to a note I sent him about this thread:

Dear Robert,

Thank you for your message. Rather than respond to each point in the discussion, I prepared a “Note on Nibbana” which explains, in brief, my understanding of nibbana according to the Nikayas and the commentaries (which I take to be consistent with each other on this point). I attach it here.

With metta,
Bhikkhu Bodhi

Note on Nibbāna (Bhikkhu Bodhi)

I understand nibbāna to be, in its own nature, an unconditioned reality. This is certainly the position of the mainstream Theravāda tradition as represented by the Abhidhamma, the aṭṭhakathā, and the ṭīkās. I think it is also the position that best conforms with the Nikāyas. The suttas speak of nibbāna as a dhamma, dhātu, āyatana, and pada—all terms that entail some kind of existence. As such, this element is apprehended by the noble ones in a specific type of experience, which in the Abhidhamma is identified as the magga and phala cittas.

I take as testimony from the Nikāyas two familiar suttas from the Udāna chapter 8. One is Udāna 8.1, which says, “There is that base (āyatana) where there is no earth, water, fire, and air, etc…” The other is 8.3, which says “There is an unborn, unmade, unbecome, unconditioned … without which there could be no escape from what is born, made, come to be and conditioned.” I know that some interpreters take “unconditioned” to mean merely the absence of conditioned phenomena, but grammatically this negation points to a subject that it qualifies, something that is not conditioned. Similarly, these interpreters take ajāta and amata to mean simply “the absence of birth” and “the absence of death,” But again, grammatically, the terms signify something that has not been born and that does not die.

Based on this, I understand the nibbāna element without residue to be, not just the ceasing of the five aggregates, but the attainment of that unconditioned state, which had already been realized by the arahant while alive. As for my statement in the Wisdom interview that, with the passing away of the arahants, consciousness becomes “nirvanized,” I meant by this that consciousness “goes out,” the literal meaning of the verbs nibbāti or nibbāyati, not that consciousness continues in nibbāna or that consciousness literally becomes nibbāna.

However, I don’t agree with those who understand the nibbāna attained with the passing of the arahant to be complete and absolute nonexistence, a position that would correspond to the stance that a materialist takes about the post-mortem fate of all beings. To my knowledge, the only school of early Buddhism which held that the nibbāna attained with the passing of an arahant is total and unqualified extinction was the Sautrantikas, and their position was contested by the Pali commentators. Ven. Nyanaponika summarized the arguments in his tract, “Anattā and Nibbāna.”

In my view, what remains with the nirvānizing of consciousness—with the going out of consciousness—is the unconditioned, world-transcendent nibbana element, which is described elsewhere as everlasting (dhuva), not-disintegrating (apalokita), imperishable (accuta), transcendent (accanta), immeasurable (appameyya), and even in somewhat later canonical texts (see below) as sassata, “eternal.”

The passages that speak of the goal as the extinction of craving, the cessation of dependent origination, the abandoning of the five aggregates, the cessation of becoming, etc., may be more numerous than those that hold up the goal as “the unborn … unconditioned,” but the two modes of description have to be taken in balance, and I regard the texts that point to the goal as the unconditioned to be the more authoritative.

Apart from the familiar suttas from the Udāna, there are several other suttas which, in my opinion, show that nibbāna is an actual entity and, as such, a direct object of cognition and realization. One is MN 64, the Mahāmalunkya Sutta (with a part-parallel at AN 9:36). Here is the essential passage:

"When it is said: ‘the destruction of the taints [occurs] in dependence on the first jhāna,’ for what reason is this said? Here, … a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna. He considers whatever is present there pertaining to form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as impermanent, suffering, an illness, a boil, a dart, misery, affliction, alien, disintegrating, empty, and non-self. He turns his mind away from those dhammas and directs it to the deathless element (so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpetvā amatāya dhātuyā cittaṃ upasaṃharati ) thus: ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna’. If he is firm in this, he attains the destruction of the taints. But if he does not attain the destruction of the taints because of his passion for the Dhamma, his delight in the Dhamma, then, with the utter destruction of the five lower fetters, he becomes one of spontaneous birth, due to attain nibbāna there without ever returning from that world.”

The Majjhima Aṭṭhakathā explains:

“He directs [his mind]: He directs the mind of insight to the deathless element, the unconditioned, by way of hearing, by way of praise, by way of learning, by way of concepts, thus: ‘This nibbāna is peaceful.’ The mind of the path does not say, ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime,’ but one directs the mind to it, penetrating it by making nibbāna the object.”

Upasaṃharatī ti vipassanācittaṃ tāva savanavasena thutivasena pariyattivasena paññattivasena ca etaṃ santaṃ nibbānanti evaṃ asaṅkhatāya amatāya dhātuyā upasaṃharati. Maggacittaṃ nibbānaṃ ārammaṇakaraṇavaseneva etaṃ santametaṃ paṇītanti na evaṃ vadati, iminā pana ākārena taṃ paṭivijjhanto tattha cittaṃ upasaṃharatīti attho.

Another passage occurs in a number of suttas in the Anguttara Nikāya, Tens and Elevens. Ven. Ānanda comes to the Buddha and asks whether there can be a type of samādhi in which the monk is not percipient of any worldly phenomena, and yet he is still percipient (so it is not saññāvedayita-nirodha). Here is the version at AN 11:7:

“Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu is percipient thus: ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.’ It is in this way, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu could obtain such a state of concentration that he would not be percipient of earth in relation to earth … he would not be percipient of anything seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, and examined by the mind, but he would still be percipient.”

As I read this text, the meditator is not merely reflecting deeply on nibbāna but is directly perceiving it in a state of meditative absorption. This must be an ariyan’s meditative experience of nibbāna, and I don’t see how this passage would make sense if nibbāna was just total absence of defilements and aggregates and not a real element existent in its own right.

Still another text is a verse in Itivuttaka 51 (Threes, no. 2):

The Taintless One touched with his body
the deathless element, the state without acquisitions.
The Perfectly Enlightened One taught
the sorrowless and dust free state.

Kāyena amataṃ dhātuṃ, phusayitvā nirūpadhiṃ;

Upadhippaṭinissaggaṃ, sacchikatvā anāsavo;

Deseti sammāsambuddho, asokaṃ virajaṃ padan ti.

Here, the amata dhātu is clearly nibbāna. In my understanding the verse is saying that the Taintless One (here the Buddha) has personal experience of nibbāna, an experience so vivid that it is described as “touching it with the body.” This is an almost tactile experience of the deathless element, the state without upadhis (probably the upadhi of the aggregates). If nibbāna were just an absence (of the defilements, of the five aggregates), I don’t see how it could be experienced so viscerally.

The verses of the former courtesan Sirimā, from the Vimānavatthu, provide another illuminating statement about nibbāna. Though this collection is a bit later than the oldest portions of the Nikāyas, it is still worth looking at:

V 143 : The Buddha, the bull among sages, the leader, taught me about the origin (craving), suffering, and impermanence; and he also taught the unconditioned, the cessation of suffering, the eternal (sassataṃ), as well as the straight and peaceful path.

V 144 : Having heard the Buddha’s message, the deathless state, the unconditioned, I became well restrained by the precepts and was established in the Dhamma.

V 145 : Having known the unconditioned, the dust-free state taught by the Buddha, I reached serenity and samādhi in that (tatth’eva). I am fixed in destiny (i.e., bound to reach final liberation).

V 146 : Having gained the excellent boon of the deathless, being certain in the excellent breakthrough (that is, having reached stream-entry), I am without doubt and revered by many people. I now enjoy delight and pleasure (in heaven).

V 147 : I am now a devatā who is a seer of the deathless, a disciple of the Tathāgata, a seer of the Dhamma, one established in the first fruit, a stream-enterer no longer subject to the lower realms.

143. ‘‘Buddho ca me isinisabho vināyako, adesayī samudayadukkhaniccataṃ;

Asaṅkhataṃ dukkhanirodhasassataṃ, maggañcimaṃ akuṭilamañjasaṃ sivaṃ.

144 . ‘‘Sutvānahaṃ amatapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ, tathāgatassanadhivarassa sāsanaṃ;

Sīlesvahaṃ paramasusaṃvutā ahuṃ, dhamme ṭhitā naravarabuddhadesite.

145 . ‘‘Ñatvānahaṃ virajapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ, tathāgatenanadhivarena desitaṃ;

Tatthevahaṃ samathasamādhimāphusiṃ, sāyeva me paramaniyāmatā ahu.

146 . ‘‘Laddhānahaṃ amatavaraṃ visesanaṃ, ekaṃsikā abhisamaye visesiya;

Asaṃsayā bahujanapūjitā ahaṃ, khiḍḍāratiṃ paccanubhomanappakaṃ.

147 . ‘‘Evaṃ ahaṃ amatadasamhi devatā, tathāgatassanadhivarassa sāvikā;

Dhammaddasā paṭhamaphale patiṭṭhitā, sotāpannā na ca pana matthi duggati.

I don’t know of any other text in the Nikāyas that refers to nibbāna as sassata, “eternal,” but I don’t see any reason to reject this description. The eternalist view (sassatavāda) rejected in the Nikāyas is the view that the self and the world are eternal, or the view that some component of the five aggregates is an eternal self. But nibbāna is the world-transcendent state and thus calling it eternal does not mean a fall into the type of eternalist view condemned in the Nikāyas. Certainly, this text makes it clear that the sotāpanna sees the deathless element, nibbāna. Here, Sirimā says she has known the dust-free state, the unconditioned (Ñatvānahaṃ virajapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ). Such expressions would be incomprehensible if nibbāna were merely the extinction of defilements and cessation of the five aggregates. And bear in mind that she has known this as a stream-enterer, not an arahant who has reached the nibbāna with residue remaining.

On Ven. Thanissaro’s interpretation of nibbāna, I agree with him in holding nibbāna to be a transcendent dimension or reality, but I disagree with his view that this reality can be characterized as a type of consciousness. His arguments rest on obscure verses and metaphors, to which he ascribes meanings that are not necessarily entailed by the texts themselves. In contrast, there are many simple, straightforward prose passages in the Nikāyas that speak of the attainment of final nibbāna as the complete cessation of consciousness. I do not know of any texts that qualify such assertions or distinguish between two types of consciousness—phenomenal and transcendental, conditioned and unconditioned. Rather, they assert unequivocally that consciousness arises in dependence on conditions; that it is impermanent, dukkha, and subject to change. And they say that with the attainment of final nibbāna, consciousness ceases without remainder.

As for the condition of one who has attained the nibbāna element without residue, the Suttanipāta tells us that this is indescribable:

  1. “There is no measure of one who has gone out,

(Upasīva,” said the Blessed One).

“There is no means by which they might speak of him.

When all [conditioned] dhammas have been uprooted,

all pathways of speech are also uprooted.”

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Reading Venerable Bodhi’s note we can see that his conclusions are based on Suttanta, Abhidhamma and Commentary. Of course some might feel his emphasis leans to the side of either annihilationism or eternalism but that may be because we have our own bias to either side ( for example do we focus on the fact that Nibbāna does not arise, or are we focused on the fact that Nibbāna does not cease)…

I am closing this thread at this stage but anyone is welcome to start a new thread on a related topic.

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