What do you think of those who say there's nothing after the end of namarupa?

Yes.

I am pretty confident that I have the same view as classical Theravada from the post I created some time ago. And from listening to B. Bodhi, he totally is trying to find something after parinibbāna. He knows it cannot be 5 aggregates or 6 sense bases, but still trying to find something which is not totally no experience like what he thinks the atheist version of eternal death is. He said, if parinibbāna is really like the atheist conception of death, then the Christian wins.

So he used Nibbāna element itself as the name for that something which is after parinibbāna. Somehow consciousness transforms into this to give eternal experience of nibbāna or something like that.

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Yes.

If what ven. Bodhi is trying to do is differentiate from the annilhilationists then that is an important distinction though.
I must get time to listen.

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“Bhikkhus, there are some ascetics and brahmins who proclaim supreme purification. Of those who proclaim supreme purification, this is the foremost, namely, by completely surmounting the base of nothingness, one enters and dwells in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. They teach their Dhamma for the direct knowledge and realization of this. There are beings who assert thus. But even for those who assert thus, there is alteration; there is change. Seeing this thus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with it; being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate toward the foremost, not to speak of what is inferior.

“Bhikkhus, there are some ascetics and brahmins who proclaim supreme nibbāna in this very life. Of those who proclaim supreme nibbāna in this very life, this is the foremost, namely, emancipation through non-clinging after one has seen as they really are the origin and passing away, the gratification, danger, and escape in regard to the six bases for contact.

“Bhikkhus, though I assert and declare my teaching in such a way, some ascetics and brahmins untruthfully, baselessly, falsely, and wrongly misrepresent me, by saying: ‘The ascetic Gotama does not proclaim the full understanding of sensual pleasures, the full understanding of forms, or the full understanding of feelings.’ But, bhikkhus, I do proclaim the full understanding of sensual pleasures, the full understanding of forms, and the full understanding of feelings. In this very life, hungerless, quenched, and cooled, I proclaim final nibbāna through non-clinging.

AN 10.29

“Master Gotama is an annihilationist.”
“There is, brahmin, a way in which one could rightly say of me: ‘The ascetic Gotama is an annihilationist.’ For I assert the annihilation of lust, hatred, and delusion; I assert the annihilation of the numerous kinds of bad unwholesome qualities. It is in this way that one could rightly say of me: 'The ascetic Gotama is an annihilationist.”

AN 8.11

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Translation by Nyanaponika

Itivuttaka 44

Nibbānadhātusutta
This was said by the Blessed One, spoken by the Holy One, and thus I have heard:
There are, O monks, two aspects of Nibbána: the Nibbána- element with the groups of existence still remaining (sa- upádisesa-nibbánadhátu), and the Nibbána-element with no groups remaining (anupádisesa-nibbánadhátu).
What now is the Nibbána-element with the groups of
existence still remaining? In that case, O monks, a monk is an Arahat: he is taint-free, has fulfilled the holy life, accomplished his task, thrown off the burden, attained his goal, cast off the fetters of existence and is liberated through right wisdom. But there still remain with him (until his death) the five sense- organs that have not yet disappeared and through which he still experiences what is pleasant and unpleasant, as well as bodily ease and pain. The extinction of greed, hatred and delusion in him, this is called the Nibbána-element with the groups of existence still remaining.
And what is the Nibbána-element with no groups of existence remaining? In that case, O monks, a monk is an Arahat … liberated through right wisdom. In him, all those feelings, no longer relished, will even here (at his death) come to extinction. This is called the Nibbána-element with no groups of existence remaining

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I have heard that on one occasion Ven. Sariputta was staying near Rajagaha in the Bamboo Grove, the Squirrels’ Feeding Sanctuary. There he said to the monks, “This Unbinding is pleasant, friends. This Unbinding is pleasant.”

When this was said, Ven. Udayin said to Ven. Sariputta, “But what is the pleasure here, my friend, where there is no feeling?

“Just that is the pleasure here, my friend: where there is no feeling.

AN 9.34

"‘Right view, right view,’ it is said, Lord. In what way, Lord, is there right view?’

"The world in general, Kaccaayana, inclines to two views, to existence or to non-existence. But for him who, with the highest wisdom, sees the uprising of the world as it really is, ‘non-existence of the world’ does not apply, and for him who, with highest wisdom, sees the passing away of the world as it really is, ‘existence of the world’ does not apply.
[…]
‘Everything exists,’ this is one extreme; ‘nothing exists,’ this is the other extreme. Avoiding both extremes the Tathaagata teaches a doctrine of the middle: Conditioned by ignorance are the formations… … So there comes about the arising of this entire mass of suffering. But from the complete fading away and cessation of ignorance there comes the cessation of the formations, from the cessation of the formations comes the cessation of consciousness… So there comes about the complete cessation of this entire mass of suffering.”

SN 12.15

"Any consciousness by which one describing the Tathagata would describe him: That the Tathagata has abandoned, its root destroyed, made like a palmyra stump, deprived of the conditions of development, not destined for future arising. Freed from the classification of consciousness, great king, the Tathagata is deep, boundless, hard to fathom, like the ocean. ‘The Tathagata exists after death’ doesn’t apply. 'The Tathagata doesn’t exist after death doesn’t apply. ‘The Tathagata both exists and doesn’t exist after death’ doesn’t apply. ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor doesn’t exist after death’ doesn’t apply."
SN 44.1

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the sources by themselves are more useful than any other explanation. :slightly_smiling_face: Because we will arrive to the middle way taught by the Buddha.

I believe the issue on an eternalism in the Bhikkhu Bodhi stuff seems to be dragged to this board from a discussion in SuttaCentral, according the link posted by the OP.

I don’t have any intention to open any polemics. I joined that thread (user Puerh) because B.Bodhi rarely falls in wrong views in their works. His public opinions can be polemics but his works shows quite contemption, an intention to become enough orthodox.

And then, into that thread I have found in these critics some peculiar views around the Buddha teaching which I thought were able to explain their critiques of some eternalism. At least in my view it has been an interesting discussion. Some users defended a novel view on nibbana and the Buddha teaching which are (at least in my understanding) characterized by these trends:

  • they don’t accept the Buddha complete eradication of dukkha, despite the words spoken by the same Buddha. It seems in that EBT Buddhism there is no recognition of the difference between body pain and dukkha by means the no-clinging of Buddha and Arhants. They name explicitly “suffering” to the body pain arising in the Buddha and Arhants.

  • no acceptance of the possibility of a true complete nibbana in life, only after death. Logically it means a denying of the transcendent character of the Buddha teaching.

  • no explanation or understanding between the five-clinging aggregates and the five aggregates. They understand the cease of clinging to the aggregates is not possible until the physical death, after leaving the residue. They believe that while there is sense activity caused by the aggregates, the nibbana is not complete and the liberation is only partial and temporary. They understand that the cease of clinging to the five clinging-aggregates is not the same thing than some cease of the clinging to the aggregates in themselves(?). Maybe the bypassing of this difference is intentional or maybe not. I suspect that no; this is just a lack of understanding of the relation.

  • in a general way, they understand the word “Cease” inside the Suttas like the end of existence of whatever related thing. The product of an annihilation because the atta decay or a kamma course, instead being the result of the end of clinging and becoming.

  • they make a novel and interesting D.O. interpretation: they explain the dependent origination only referred to the course of one life: the D.O. only will be finally accomplished after the physical death.

  • there is also an unavoidable kidnapping of the nothingness ambit to supplant nibbana. And this is logical in order to fulfill an annihilationist view of the existence like the complete liberation: death is the true liberation for nibbana because death is very real. This decay of an atta delusion of mind-body is “so real” that surpass the Buddha teaching on anatta, and therefore the true nibbana only can be possible after death.

I believe this is an objective summary of their views and beliefs appearing inside that thread

Some of my answers now appears deleted, despite being centered only in the arguments. Anyway, the discussion has been productive at least to me. Useful to understand better the basics of that new EBT Buddhism.

Need to say, despite the interchange in that thread, I don’t have any special rejection to whatever view around the Buddha teaching. Because in our times whatever belief connected with the Buddha teaching can seem like a blessing, despite the bizarre it can sounds for oneself. Just I think the clarification is always needed to know what we are talking about. And later each person can agree or not according understanding.

If there is interest in these views, the thread is the previously quoted. Also I have added in that board an interesting book explaining the historical and cultural roots in the West for that interpretation of nibbana in annhilationist terms:

“The Cult of Nothingness: the Philosophers and the Buddha”. Roger-Pol Droit, 2003.

it is interesting because maybe that annhilationist interpretation of nibbana can be strange in the rest of the Buddhist World. Although in the West this is something persistent and not new. And there are added causes to be known.

Into that book there is an historical summary from the times of the first receivers of Buddhism in the West. Important names who modelated the nibbana meaning according their own ideas and wishes for their troubled Societies. Their works were very influential in the further Western translators and scholars until our days.

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Dear Zerotime
unfortunately I haven’t had time to listen to the podcast by ven. Bodhi, and I doubt I will have time to work though the mass of ideas in that thead on suttacentral… I think ven @Paññādhammika has been explaining quite well, maybe he will add something.

Anyway we can simplify this deep topic a little:

Visuddhimagga
XIX19
“There is no doer of a deed, or one who reaps the result. Phenomena alone flow on, no other view than this right.
XVIII24
“This is mere mentality-materiality, there is no being, no person

XVIII.31

this mentalitymateriality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
> curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.

Thus upon attaining Khandha parinibbana the long, long process of arising and ceasing is finally ended.
Bodhi note to the Yamaka sutta:

151 His position is not quite the same as that of the common annihilationist,
since he does not hold that all beings are annihilated at death. He seems to hold
an eternalist view in regard to unenlightened beings (since they have a lasting
self which transmigrates) and annihilationism in regard to the arahant (since he
utterly perishes at death).
Spk: If he had thought, “Formations arise and cease; a simple process of
formations reaches nonoccurrence, this would not be a view (diṭṭhigata) but

> knowledge in accordance with the Teaching

.But since he thought, A being is
annihilated and destroyed,” this becomes a view.

Why is this important to get right now even though we may be very far from arahatship?
Because it is closely related to views of self and to the concomitant views of annihilationism or eternalism.

The eternalist thinks nibbana is where some undefined existence can continue.
The annihilationist thinks that a self is extinguished upon attaining nibbana.

Each view can range from very subtle to very gross.

Yamaka had a subtle annilhilationist view - because he still had an idea of self. An extreme case would be that upon death the good, the bad and everyone is equally extinguished.

A subtle eternalist view might be that there is some undefined profound existence for the arahat after death, an extreme case would be that arahats after death live in some blissful nibbanic world and can still communicate somehow.

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Well the CT view is that these relate to the Self. Ven. Bodhi’s argument, as far as I understand it, isn’t that there is a Self in final nibbāna but that nibbāna itself is truly existent. In this regard he isn’t saying anything different from the Visuddhimagga. That said he does diverge from Ven. Dhammapāla’s commentary when he argues that nibbāna is a “sphere” or “dimension” since in that particular commentary āyatana is read in terms of nibbāna being a cause of the removal of defilements, rather than being a sphere of experience.

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I have transcribed some of ven Bodhi’s talk, starting from around 20 minutes: Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi: Noble Truths, Noble Path (#179) - The Wisdom Experience

Yeah. You know, I was really wanting to sort of start with the end, which is a little bit unconventional. But, you know, partly we want to know where we’re going.

Interviewer: Yeah. Right. Where’s the Buddha telling us we might be able to go? And what is the highest goal for abodes? And we hear about nibbana nibbana.

Well, I wanted to start there. What is this? What is nibbana.? And is that even a good question? Like, is nibbana a theme? The way I see it, the Buddha has different ways of approaching the question, what is nibbana? So I would maybe divide his way of characterizing the nature of nibbana., maybe put it into three categories, three classes. One would be, I use the word metaphysically or ontologically explicit statements about nibbana…

I know ontology and metaphysics. We think the Buddha avoided metaphysics, avoided ontology. I don’t think that’s the case.

In order to talk about anything, you really need an underlying metaphysics. Okay, so ontological or metaphysical statements about nibbana and statements extolling nibbana as a desirable state, suttas or statements that are intended to inspire in people the wish, desire to attain nibbana… And then the third category would be suttas which describe nibbana or even define nibbana in terms of the task that has to be performed in order to attain nibbana.

Should I elaborate on each of these? Yeah. In my opinion, I’m giving a lecture on nibbana…

Interviewer: This is great.
If that’s what this is, perfect.

Okay, so what I call the ontological and metaphysical perspective. So there are certain words, and I put special emphasis on this because there’s a view within certain circles in the Theravada tradition, particularly emanating maybe from a geographical region where Daniel comes from, where you come from, that nibbana is really just non-existence.

And so the aim of the Buddha’s teaching is to reach that state of non-existence. I have to say with that, I always think in that case the Christian missionaries win. Because they’re saying that this teaching has a very beautiful ethics, but it aims at complete annihilation.

Interviewer: So you think that’s wrong?

Yeah, so I say that there are these terms with an ontological significance that the Buddha uses. Some of the words are dhatu, which we often translate as element, ayatana, base, pada, or state, and even the word dhamma, which has a very broad meaning. And so there are suttas which speak about nibbana as a dhatu.

In fact, in the suttas we have, let’s see if I can get it, amata dhatu, that is the one that is the deathless element. So let us see. Majjhima Nikaya Sutta number 64.

The Buddha says that one contemplates the five aggregates as impermanent, dukkha, non-self, and then he uses a few other descriptive terms. And then one turns one’s mind away from those things and focuses on the amatadhatus. And then with the mind focused on the deathless element, then one attains either the complete destruction of the defilements, or if there’s still some clinging left, the state of non-returning.

We pause here for a sec. So the Buddha is actually saying in this statement something very familiar, that Buddhist practice is often contemplating the five aggregates and understanding their three marks, right? And selflessness being, and permanence being one of them, the suffering …, right? But in this one, the Buddha is saying at a certain point, you turn away from that, and focus of what is, I’m interested in the verb, you turn towards the deathless element. What does that actually mean? What does it mean? Yeah, I don’t think it’s in that book, because it’s in the Majjhima Nikaya.

Let me see if I can find it. So we’re actually turning away from this contemplation on the five aggregates, having these three marks, and we’re focusing, I’m interested in the verb, focusing on a deathless element. So why are we turning away from this? Yeah, I think this is not something that just happens sort of willfully, that you’re contemplating the five aggregates, and then you think, okay, enough of that, I’m going to turn to the deathless element.

But I think this is what sort of naturally happens when insight into the nature of the five aggregates has reached its pinnacle. Then what happens, this is the way that commentarial tradition will explain it, that what arises is the world transcending path, the Lokuttara Magga arises, and that drops the conditioned phenomena as this object, and it focuses on, it actually experiences, sees, and realizes the unconditioned element. And that unconditioned state, that is the deathless element.

Otherwise known as Nibbāna. That is Nibbāna. So it seems like, it’s not just like turning away, it seems like as you get to a certain level of realization on the nature of beings, you automatically enter into this deathless element, otherwise known as Nibbāna.

Interviewer: What we’re trying to discover tonight is what is that being, right? So this Nibbāna comes out of this insight into the nature of beings.

Yeah, yeah. In fact, those three characteristics, you know, the three main characteristics of conditioned phenomena are sometimes said to be called doors to emancipation, vimokamukha, doors to emancipation.

And each one sort of leads the mind to focus upon Nibbāna in a different way, as determined by the opposition between that characteristic and the nature of Nibbāna. So it’s said when you focus on condition phenomena as impermanent, then when you reach that peak, that becomes the door to the perception, the realization of Nibbāna as the signless element, because it’s devoid of the sign or features of conditioned phenomena, of impermanence. If you make the main focus of your contemplation the unsatisfactory or suffering nature of conditioned phenomena, that leads to the realization of Nibbāna as the desireless or wishless element, because Nibbāna is sort of the antidote to craving or desire.

And then if one focuses, if one’s insight emphasizes the non-self nature of conditioned phenomena, then when you reach the world-transcending plane, then you experience or realize Nibbāna as the sunyata, that’s the door of sunyata, of the empty nature, Nibbāna as emptiness. So contemplating these three natures of beings, and the five aggregates, they’re like doorways to Nibbāna. Exactly.

And it seems like depending on which doorway you take, Nibbāna is described differently. Yeah. Always in the negatively, it seems.

So the wishless, desireless. That’s interesting. Yeah.

But we’re going to say that it’s not just a state of nothingness. Yeah, yeah. I’m going through sort of the different ontological terms.

So we started off with the dot, with the element. And the word element, it always signifies something that positively exists, that definitely exists. For example, the familiar scheme is 18 elements.

Those would be the six sense faculties, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, their corresponding objects, and then six corresponding types of consciousness. So those are 18 elements. Then we have, well, there are other schemes of elements.

Oh, yeah. Of course, the four elements, the four material elements, earth, water, fire, air, and then sometimes space element is added, and consciousness element. So those are things that actually exist that have a nature of their own.

And so nibbana as a dhatu, the nibbanadhatu, or asankhata dhatu, the unconditioned element, is something that exists that has a nature of its own. Okay. Then another term that’s used is ayatana.

And so we have a sutta, I included it in this book, actually. So in this book, chapter six, it’s all on nibbana… And there’s two short suttas here.

I don’t think ayatana occurs here, but in this book. So once we go on this exploration of nibbana., I think we’re going to try. Yeah, there is actually 365.

*Okay. So here the Buddha says there is that base.

So this is ayatana, where there is neither earth nor water, fire nor air. Then he mentions the different planes of existence. And there is neither this world nor another world, neither sun nor moon.

Here I say there is no coming, no going, no standing still, no passing away, and no being reborn. It is not established, not moving without support. This is the end of dukkha, the end of suffering.

And these are your arguments for nibbana being something, not just nothingness, but being something more than that ontologically. Yeah, exactly. And so we’ve talked about two things.

So you’ve talked about this idea of, you know, element, dhatu, or ayatana is face. And so these are two things. And so now I’m sort of wanting to switch gears a little bit, but we can keep going if you want.

Interviewer:And I want to bring in the idea of consciousness. If this is to be experienced, if this is to be perceived, this being nibbana., this thing that exists ontologically more than nothingness or blankness, what’s its relationship to consciousness? And the way I wanted to enter into this conversation is to start with your name, Bhikkhu Bodhi. So this word, Bodhi, could you tell me a little bit about what this word means? What is Bodhi? And when the Buddha was awakening, what’s Bodhi mean, actually? So Bodhi means enlightenment, the enlightenment of the Buddha.
>
So it wasn’t given to me because I’ve reached enlightenment. But I don’t know why teacher just gave it to me. I don’t know.

I wanted a longer name, but he gave me the name Bodhi. I said, how about Bodhinyana? Bodhi is good enough. How about Bodhisattva, Lion of Enlightenment? Bodhi is good enough.

So you were like bargaining with your name, right? His name was Ananda Maitreya. So how about Bodhi Maitreya, Maitreya Bodhi? No, Bodhi is good enough. And so it means enlightenment.

But what does, I guess, what’s the relationship between nibbana.? This deathless state and this moment that the Buddha had, we call awakening or bodhi.

Interviewer: Yeah, okay. So bodhi and nibbana are not the same in early Buddhism.

Bodhi is the experience, the opening of the knowledge, not conceptual knowledge, the experiential knowledge by which one experiences nibbana… And through that experience of nibbana., it eradicates, destroys certain of the bonds or fetters or defilements that keep one in bondage to the cycle of birth and death. If I remember the commentaries, actually they give several explanations of the word bodhi.

So they say bodhi could be the knowledge of the four paths. So the four paths are like the four stages of enlightenment in early Buddhism. The path of stream entry, once returning, not returning, arhatship.

But then they also say that bodhi is the knowledge of the fourth path, only the highest path. And then bodhi is the knowledge of a supreme Buddha. And then they say bodhi is, sometimes they equate bodhi, if I remember, even with the…

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that quote is really proper, because at least in my understanding, it is because a denial of the transcendental character of the Buddha teaching what cause all these wrong views and bizarre ideas around the Buddha teaching.

I think these descriptions of nibbana like “all-round, luminous” arises in a context of restriction of the senses in a contemplation of consciousness as consciousness (ie: seated meditation).

Inside the Suttas, the Buddha defined Consciousnes like cognitions.

"And why do you call it ‘consciousness’? Because it cognizes, thus it is called consciousness. "
SN 22.79

From a Sutta context, the Consciousness are the movements of knowledge under -self delusion because clinging. When we read “Cease of consciousness” this is referred to the cease of all that activity. And then, what remains is stillness instead annihilation. Before the cognition in itself, the nature of knowledge is to enlight the object of clinging. And when these movements of grasping conditioned by the -self delusion ceases, what remains is just the enlightening aspect, “light, all around”. Of course this is not a physical light despite it accomplishes a similar function for the seeing.

However, in a context without restrictions of the senses (ie: walking or whatever) the arising of nibbana while contemplating dhammas will manifest the anatta nature of dhammas. The Cease of Consciousness is the same and also the stillness, happiness and freedom. It is the same nibbana nature.

Btw: What is really “light”? that’s another complicated issue and Science don’t have a remote idea. I mean that maybe we are forced to do a fundamental distinction because our ignorance. If I’m not wrong, the Abhidhamma makes a distinction between outside and inner light according the origin, although I’m not sure if there an explanation of a fundamental distinction between both.

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I don’t see any problem with what Bodhi is saying. If one thinks there is a self then nibbana must be seen as annihilation . But there is no self.

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I thought this is where he differs from Classical Theravada? Reifying Parinibbāna as something as opposed to nothing.

Directly contradicting this: Help for responding to people who say: Buddha never said there's nothing after parinibbana

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From Abhidhamma: SuttaCentral

Definition of Pain
Herein, what is ‘pain?’

That which is bodily pain, bodily disagreeableness, pain arising from contact with the body, disagreeable feeling, pain and painful feeling that is born in the body.

This is said to be ‘pain’.

Pain is the translation for dukkha here. The word dukkha has many meanings from all suffering including mental and physical suffering to just only physical suffering. Mental suffering ends at attainment of arahanthood while alive.

There’s 2 kinds of nibbāna, with remainder and without remainder.

Your claim for this means arahants has no more mind consciousness is untenable. The Abhidhamma analysis specifically has the just functional citta for arahants. If arahants do not have mind consciousness, there would be no need for abhidhamma to assign this functional thing to arahants. The other 3 possibilities for consciousness are: wholesome, unwholesome and resultant.

Five aggregates which is clung to is 5 clinging aggregates. When clinging ceases, gone, no more, eradicated, destroyed by the arahant, their 5 aggregate are still there, functional for them, but unclung to. The rest of your unquoted paragraph here is a gross misunderstanding which I have no idea how you can even get to.

No. Dependent origination is many lives. That’s why after ignorance ends for the arahants, their consciousness until feelings are still there. The final cessation of consciousness is only at death, parinibbāna of an arahant. If it’s one life model, then it makes more sense to say from cessation of ignorance, consciousness ceases as well in this life. But consciousness for many life model refers to rebirth relinking consciousness. That’s why only future rebirth relinking consciousness is totally ceased while arahant is still alive and not all consciousness.

If you still think in terms of self, you woulf naturally think of cessation of 5 aggregates, 6 sense bases with nothing leftover as annihilation, but when there’s no self, there’s only suffering which arises and ceases, nothing worth clung onto. Annihilation doesn’t apply to cessation. Although to an atheist it looks like the same thing.

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It looks to me like he is being careful with words.
Remember the Udana -

There is, monks, an unborn[1] — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated. If there were not that unborn — unbecome — unmade — unfabricated

I don’t see him suggesting the arahat exists after death?

,

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Perhaps it’s clearer near the end of the talk, from the end, 14:40 mins left to 6:30 mins left.

In it, the interviewer keeps on asking for a method to eternally “experience” (pari)nibbāna. B. Bodhi supported that. Consciousness nirvanaed.

It seems that he is searching for something other than totally blank, to make sense of the highest peace.

Whereas we would already accept that cessation of perception and feeling, having nothing felt is the highest peace itself.

Thanks for pointing that section out.

Yes, the interviewer clearly believes in some continuing experience after khandha parinibbana . Ven Bodhi starts well be refuting that.
Bodhi: > all five aggregates fall away and cease. So there isn’t a mind or consciousness continuing into nibbana.

But he does seem to become ambivalent later on…

Recording (2)

Interviewer: Okay, cool, very cool. So when someone who’s achieved enlightenment and then passes… Passes away. Yeah, and they achieve, again, nibbana, it seems that the mental consciousness, bodhi must continue.> Is that true or not?

Bodhi: **Well, from the perspective of the early suttas, all five aggregates fall away and cease. So there isn’t a mind or consciousness continuing into nibbana.

Interviewer: This seems different to what we just described. The moment of nibbana, it’s important that the subjective side is consciousness, the ambience, there. But then it seems like there’s this nibbana, ongoing nibbana, where there’s no consciousness, but there’s nibbana. This seems to be getting awfully close to an idea of cessation, is what I would say, which is what we wanted to avoid at the start of the conversation.

Yeah, I know that this seems a bit paradoxical, but certainly I would say that the suttas make it very clear that nibbana is, as I said, an unconditioned element, a reality, a state, whatever. And also they speak, without any qualification, about the five aggregates, as coming to an end with the attainment of nibbana. But the way I sometimes try to resolve that paradox, or maybe contradiction to myself, is to think that what happens is that it’s not that consciousness is sort of continuing in nibbana.

Yeah. Because if it’s continuing, it would have to have some thoughts. Yeah.

So what is it thinking? The way I formulate this to myself is that consciousness becomes… Can we create a verb? Nirvanized? Nirvanized, yeah. I like this way of thinking, because normally the consciousness has a base, the mana of ayatana, yeah? Yeah. And so at this point, when the great practitioner passes, this base is no longer there, just like the I sense of consciousness base.

And so I was wondering if nibbana itself could act as a base, and indeed, earlier you said it’s described as a… It’s described as a base, but not in the sense of a base for consciousness. When ayatana is used in that other sense, where we speak about the 12 bases, then those are the bases for consciousness. But it’s an interesting point, I’ve just never thought of it quite… Yeah, because we want there to be… We don’t want there to be consciousness, as in the abacus.

Yeah. We want nibbana to be ongoingly experienced, because it’s not just… Yeah, I say so, definitely. Yeah.

And so then, there’s a subjective element to this nibbana, as we… Yeah, and of course, there are passages and suttas which speak about, describe nibbana as paramasukham, supreme bliss. Yeah. And what is the other one? I think it’s paramasanti, the perfect peace.

Yeah. So it seems like nibbana is a different type of experience. Yeah.

Completely different to the level we’ve experienced the world. Yeah, like in early Buddhism, what experience is formulated and sort of dissected and analyzed, it’s always analyzed in terms of the five aggregates. And then, the suttas are pretty clear that the five aggregates within conditioned experience cease with the attainment of nibbāda element without residue remaining.

Yeah. In fact, there’s a distinction made in some suttas between nibbāda element with a residue remaining, and that is nibbāda as experienced by the arahant, the liberated one, during life, as long as the body continues, so like faculty functions. And then there’s the anupādiśeṣa-nibbāna-dhatu, the element of nibbana without any residue remaining.

But it would seem that there would have to be some experiential element, it’s difficult to formulate this, in order for the idea of Haramāsuka, supreme bliss, and Haramāsanti, supreme peace, to have any meaning. So even this nibbāna without residue remaining is described as blissful. Is that also described as blissful? Yeah, what’s interesting, I’m trying to think whether there’s any statement, actually what is said about the nibbāna element without residue remaining is only, it’s very, very terse, that all that is felt becomes cool right here.

Interviewer: All that is felt becomes cool, right?

Yeah, cool in the sense of like a fire going out. Uh-huh, interesting. So what do you make of that? Well, it’s referring to what we think of as regular feeling, because it is contrasted with the nibbāna element with residue remaining.

That’s when the residue, the residue that remains is this body with its sense faculties and the mental activity. So in the course of life, the way the explanation goes, the liberated one continues to experience pleasure and pain, what is agreeable and disagreeable, dependent on these six sense faculties. And so with the attainment of nibbāna without residue, the six sense faculties come to an end, and so there’s no more experiencing of pleasure, pain, the agreeable and disagreeable.

There’s no contact anymore, so they cannot be feeling, right? Yeah. So I wouldn’t say that that experience of supreme bliss, supreme peace, is a feeling in the way that feeling is understood as an ordinary conditioned phenomenon. So would then you say that the bliss, associated with nibbāna, or even the experiencing of it, is that conditioned or unconditioned? Like nibbāna is conditioned, that is unconditioned.

Nibbāna is unconditioned. But this description, this adjective describing nibbāna, Yeah. So this is a bliss that is the bliss of something unconditioned.

It would have to be unconditioned, yeah. And therefore also the experience of it would have to be an unconditioned experience. It would be an unconditioned state, yeah.

An unconditioned bliss. Yeah, which is completely different to the experience that we have. Exactly, yeah.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And nibbāna is right here, right now, yeah? Is it or not? Well, nibbāna is always existing. It’s a little tricky if you say that it’s right here, right now.

Where is it? You get the idea. If I, you know, I can put the direction into my… Yeah, where’s the GPS for nibbāna? If I turn the corner, am I going to run into it? Yeah. But it’s always present in the sense that because it’s unconditioned, it doesn’t have any arising, and it doesn’t undergo any kind of transformation, and you have to you have to realize it individually for yourself.

So you could say it’s almost sort of, maybe you could say it’s always present internally, and when you develop your samādhi and paññā, your wisdom and concentration of wisdom to a certain point, then maybe the inner barriers that are separating the mind from nibbāna break down, and then you see…

Interviewer: That’s beautiful. That’s a beautiful description. But it makes me wonder if the adjective blissful and also the experience side of it is also internally present right now.

Perhaps. But that would be quite different even from, you know, there are very more resulted types of bliss that are present within the jhānic experience, the stages of meditative absorption. So that’s pīti and sukha, elation and bliss.

But nibbāna is, but those are still conditioned phenomena. Same words, it’s a completely different category. Yeah.

You can’t compare a conditioned thing and an unconditioned thing. Exactly. Even if they have the same name.

Yeah. And we can talk like this, but we don’t really know what this is, right? Yeah. And it seems like the other thing is that, you know, for conditioned thing, Buddha would eloquently spoke about dependent origination.

Exactly. And this seems to be how conditioned things operate. Actually, you make some interesting points in the book on dependent origination and how it’s been misunderstood.

Yeah. Can you just maybe touch on that about the difference between dependent origination and say simultaneous, mutually… You know, you can talk about these two points. Do you remember? Dependent origination is not a mutual dependence necessarily.

Yeah. You don’t have to go there. You don’t have to go there.

Sorry. I could take it off. I think I know what you’re talking about.

Okay, so there’s a common explanation or a way of interpreting dependent origination as interdependence.

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6 posts were split to a new topic: Arahat and dukkha

Dear All
Venerable Bodhi very kindly replied to a note I sent him about this thread:

Dear Robert,

Thank you for your message. Rather than respond to each point in the discussion, I prepared a “Note on Nibbana” which explains, in brief, my understanding of nibbana according to the Nikayas and the commentaries (which I take to be consistent with each other on this point). I attach it here.

With metta,
Bhikkhu Bodhi

Note on Nibbāna (Bhikkhu Bodhi)

I understand nibbāna to be, in its own nature, an unconditioned reality. This is certainly the position of the mainstream Theravāda tradition as represented by the Abhidhamma, the aṭṭhakathā, and the ṭīkās. I think it is also the position that best conforms with the Nikāyas. The suttas speak of nibbāna as a dhamma, dhātu, āyatana, and pada—all terms that entail some kind of existence. As such, this element is apprehended by the noble ones in a specific type of experience, which in the Abhidhamma is identified as the magga and phala cittas.

I take as testimony from the Nikāyas two familiar suttas from the Udāna chapter 8. One is Udāna 8.1, which says, “There is that base (āyatana) where there is no earth, water, fire, and air, etc…” The other is 8.3, which says “There is an unborn, unmade, unbecome, unconditioned … without which there could be no escape from what is born, made, come to be and conditioned.” I know that some interpreters take “unconditioned” to mean merely the absence of conditioned phenomena, but grammatically this negation points to a subject that it qualifies, something that is not conditioned. Similarly, these interpreters take ajāta and amata to mean simply “the absence of birth” and “the absence of death,” But again, grammatically, the terms signify something that has not been born and that does not die.

Based on this, I understand the nibbāna element without residue to be, not just the ceasing of the five aggregates, but the attainment of that unconditioned state, which had already been realized by the arahant while alive. As for my statement in the Wisdom interview that, with the passing away of the arahants, consciousness becomes “nirvanized,” I meant by this that consciousness “goes out,” the literal meaning of the verbs nibbāti or nibbāyati, not that consciousness continues in nibbāna or that consciousness literally becomes nibbāna.

However, I don’t agree with those who understand the nibbāna attained with the passing of the arahant to be complete and absolute nonexistence, a position that would correspond to the stance that a materialist takes about the post-mortem fate of all beings. To my knowledge, the only school of early Buddhism which held that the nibbāna attained with the passing of an arahant is total and unqualified extinction was the Sautrantikas, and their position was contested by the Pali commentators. Ven. Nyanaponika summarized the arguments in his tract, “Anattā and Nibbāna.”

In my view, what remains with the nirvānizing of consciousness—with the going out of consciousness—is the unconditioned, world-transcendent nibbana element, which is described elsewhere as everlasting (dhuva), not-disintegrating (apalokita), imperishable (accuta), transcendent (accanta), immeasurable (appameyya), and even in somewhat later canonical texts (see below) as sassata, “eternal.”

The passages that speak of the goal as the extinction of craving, the cessation of dependent origination, the abandoning of the five aggregates, the cessation of becoming, etc., may be more numerous than those that hold up the goal as “the unborn … unconditioned,” but the two modes of description have to be taken in balance, and I regard the texts that point to the goal as the unconditioned to be the more authoritative.

Apart from the familiar suttas from the Udāna, there are several other suttas which, in my opinion, show that nibbāna is an actual entity and, as such, a direct object of cognition and realization. One is MN 64, the Mahāmalunkya Sutta (with a part-parallel at AN 9:36). Here is the essential passage:

"When it is said: ‘the destruction of the taints [occurs] in dependence on the first jhāna,’ for what reason is this said? Here, … a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna. He considers whatever is present there pertaining to form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness as impermanent, suffering, an illness, a boil, a dart, misery, affliction, alien, disintegrating, empty, and non-self. He turns his mind away from those dhammas and directs it to the deathless element (so tehi dhammehi cittaṃ paṭivāpetvā amatāya dhātuyā cittaṃ upasaṃharati ) thus: ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna’. If he is firm in this, he attains the destruction of the taints. But if he does not attain the destruction of the taints because of his passion for the Dhamma, his delight in the Dhamma, then, with the utter destruction of the five lower fetters, he becomes one of spontaneous birth, due to attain nibbāna there without ever returning from that world.”

The Majjhima Aṭṭhakathā explains:

“He directs [his mind]: He directs the mind of insight to the deathless element, the unconditioned, by way of hearing, by way of praise, by way of learning, by way of concepts, thus: ‘This nibbāna is peaceful.’ The mind of the path does not say, ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime,’ but one directs the mind to it, penetrating it by making nibbāna the object.”

Upasaṃharatī ti vipassanācittaṃ tāva savanavasena thutivasena pariyattivasena paññattivasena ca etaṃ santaṃ nibbānanti evaṃ asaṅkhatāya amatāya dhātuyā upasaṃharati. Maggacittaṃ nibbānaṃ ārammaṇakaraṇavaseneva etaṃ santametaṃ paṇītanti na evaṃ vadati, iminā pana ākārena taṃ paṭivijjhanto tattha cittaṃ upasaṃharatīti attho.

Another passage occurs in a number of suttas in the Anguttara Nikāya, Tens and Elevens. Ven. Ānanda comes to the Buddha and asks whether there can be a type of samādhi in which the monk is not percipient of any worldly phenomena, and yet he is still percipient (so it is not saññāvedayita-nirodha). Here is the version at AN 11:7:

“Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu is percipient thus: ‘This is peaceful, this is sublime, that is, the stilling of all formations, the relinquishing of all acquisitions, the destruction of craving, dispassion, cessation, nibbāna.’ It is in this way, Ānanda, that a bhikkhu could obtain such a state of concentration that he would not be percipient of earth in relation to earth … he would not be percipient of anything seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, and examined by the mind, but he would still be percipient.”

As I read this text, the meditator is not merely reflecting deeply on nibbāna but is directly perceiving it in a state of meditative absorption. This must be an ariyan’s meditative experience of nibbāna, and I don’t see how this passage would make sense if nibbāna was just total absence of defilements and aggregates and not a real element existent in its own right.

Still another text is a verse in Itivuttaka 51 (Threes, no. 2):

The Taintless One touched with his body
the deathless element, the state without acquisitions.
The Perfectly Enlightened One taught
the sorrowless and dust free state.

Kāyena amataṃ dhātuṃ, phusayitvā nirūpadhiṃ;

Upadhippaṭinissaggaṃ, sacchikatvā anāsavo;

Deseti sammāsambuddho, asokaṃ virajaṃ padan ti.

Here, the amata dhātu is clearly nibbāna. In my understanding the verse is saying that the Taintless One (here the Buddha) has personal experience of nibbāna, an experience so vivid that it is described as “touching it with the body.” This is an almost tactile experience of the deathless element, the state without upadhis (probably the upadhi of the aggregates). If nibbāna were just an absence (of the defilements, of the five aggregates), I don’t see how it could be experienced so viscerally.

The verses of the former courtesan Sirimā, from the Vimānavatthu, provide another illuminating statement about nibbāna. Though this collection is a bit later than the oldest portions of the Nikāyas, it is still worth looking at:

V 143 : The Buddha, the bull among sages, the leader, taught me about the origin (craving), suffering, and impermanence; and he also taught the unconditioned, the cessation of suffering, the eternal (sassataṃ), as well as the straight and peaceful path.

V 144 : Having heard the Buddha’s message, the deathless state, the unconditioned, I became well restrained by the precepts and was established in the Dhamma.

V 145 : Having known the unconditioned, the dust-free state taught by the Buddha, I reached serenity and samādhi in that (tatth’eva). I am fixed in destiny (i.e., bound to reach final liberation).

V 146 : Having gained the excellent boon of the deathless, being certain in the excellent breakthrough (that is, having reached stream-entry), I am without doubt and revered by many people. I now enjoy delight and pleasure (in heaven).

V 147 : I am now a devatā who is a seer of the deathless, a disciple of the Tathāgata, a seer of the Dhamma, one established in the first fruit, a stream-enterer no longer subject to the lower realms.

143. ‘‘Buddho ca me isinisabho vināyako, adesayī samudayadukkhaniccataṃ;

Asaṅkhataṃ dukkhanirodhasassataṃ, maggañcimaṃ akuṭilamañjasaṃ sivaṃ.

144 . ‘‘Sutvānahaṃ amatapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ, tathāgatassanadhivarassa sāsanaṃ;

Sīlesvahaṃ paramasusaṃvutā ahuṃ, dhamme ṭhitā naravarabuddhadesite.

145 . ‘‘Ñatvānahaṃ virajapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ, tathāgatenanadhivarena desitaṃ;

Tatthevahaṃ samathasamādhimāphusiṃ, sāyeva me paramaniyāmatā ahu.

146 . ‘‘Laddhānahaṃ amatavaraṃ visesanaṃ, ekaṃsikā abhisamaye visesiya;

Asaṃsayā bahujanapūjitā ahaṃ, khiḍḍāratiṃ paccanubhomanappakaṃ.

147 . ‘‘Evaṃ ahaṃ amatadasamhi devatā, tathāgatassanadhivarassa sāvikā;

Dhammaddasā paṭhamaphale patiṭṭhitā, sotāpannā na ca pana matthi duggati.

I don’t know of any other text in the Nikāyas that refers to nibbāna as sassata, “eternal,” but I don’t see any reason to reject this description. The eternalist view (sassatavāda) rejected in the Nikāyas is the view that the self and the world are eternal, or the view that some component of the five aggregates is an eternal self. But nibbāna is the world-transcendent state and thus calling it eternal does not mean a fall into the type of eternalist view condemned in the Nikāyas. Certainly, this text makes it clear that the sotāpanna sees the deathless element, nibbāna. Here, Sirimā says she has known the dust-free state, the unconditioned (Ñatvānahaṃ virajapadaṃ asaṅkhataṃ). Such expressions would be incomprehensible if nibbāna were merely the extinction of defilements and cessation of the five aggregates. And bear in mind that she has known this as a stream-enterer, not an arahant who has reached the nibbāna with residue remaining.

On Ven. Thanissaro’s interpretation of nibbāna, I agree with him in holding nibbāna to be a transcendent dimension or reality, but I disagree with his view that this reality can be characterized as a type of consciousness. His arguments rest on obscure verses and metaphors, to which he ascribes meanings that are not necessarily entailed by the texts themselves. In contrast, there are many simple, straightforward prose passages in the Nikāyas that speak of the attainment of final nibbāna as the complete cessation of consciousness. I do not know of any texts that qualify such assertions or distinguish between two types of consciousness—phenomenal and transcendental, conditioned and unconditioned. Rather, they assert unequivocally that consciousness arises in dependence on conditions; that it is impermanent, dukkha, and subject to change. And they say that with the attainment of final nibbāna, consciousness ceases without remainder.

As for the condition of one who has attained the nibbāna element without residue, the Suttanipāta tells us that this is indescribable:

  1. “There is no measure of one who has gone out,

(Upasīva,” said the Blessed One).

“There is no means by which they might speak of him.

When all [conditioned] dhammas have been uprooted,

all pathways of speech are also uprooted.”

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Reading Venerable Bodhi’s note we can see that his conclusions are based on Suttanta, Abhidhamma and Commentary. Of course some might feel his emphasis leans to the side of either annihilationism or eternalism but that may be because we have our own bias to either side ( for example do we focus on the fact that Nibbāna does not arise, or are we focused on the fact that Nibbāna does not cease)…

I am closing this thread at this stage but anyone is welcome to start a new thread on a related topic.

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