Karunadassa has argued that the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma are strictly phenomenal in nature. He cites the example of the earth element, which is characterised as “hardness”. The sabhāva of the earth element is “hardness” and apart from this, there is no earth element. Based on this he says that the earth element is purely phenomenal in the Abhidhamma. A quality only, rather than something concrete. We see a similar descrpition on Abhidharma (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), where the Abhidhamma is described as “phenomenal realism”. I have heard that Venerable Bodhi was critical of Karunadassa and some of his views/arguments. How accurate is Karunadassa here? Are the dhammas merely phenomena? Is ultimate reality merely the phenomenal, and so the Abhidhamma is a form of phenomenalism?
What else should Dhammas “be” then simple arising and falling phenomenas, good householder? Who ever has gained faith or agrees that the 6 dhatus are not real, no refuge, not under ones control, is incapable to die before seeing for himself, no more subject of downwardly going on.
I don’t think about “phenomenalism” but for sure dhammas like pathavi-dhatu, the earth element are absolutely real.
There is not some earth element separate from the sabhava.
page 38 of Bodhi translation Root of existence Here the word occurs in the sense of things endowed
Commentary" “They bear their
own characteristics, thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkhaóaí
dhárentì ti dhammá).
Sub. Cy. “They bear their own characteristics”: although there
are no dhammas devoid of their own characteristics, this is still
said for the purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas
endowed with their specific natures devoid of such attributions as
that of a “being,” etc. Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasurableness,
and permanence, etc., or nature (pakati), substance
(dabba), soul (jìva), body, etc., which are mere misconstructions
(parikappitákáramatta) due to craving and views, or such entities
as “sky-flowers,” etc., which are mere expressions of conventional
discourse (lokavoháramatta), cannot be discovered as ultimately
real actualities (saccikaþþhaparamatthato), these dhammas (i.e., those
endowed with a specific nature) can. These dhammas are discovered
as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real
distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still,
in order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction
as a mere metaphorical device (upacáramatta).
Seems like you are confusing yourself and possibly others about Karunadasa by taking some of his teachings out of context.
For anyone who is wondering, here is Karunadasa speaking plainly about these issues:
What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38
dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2
This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.
Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, page 146
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 14, 172
Here is Bhikkhu Bodhi summarizing the abhidhamma position on dhammas:
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
…
Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions……
…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).
…
…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.
…
Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
And here is straight from the abhidhamma:
“All form is that which is…
void of idea,
neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis,
disconnected with thought,”
“form exists which is not due to karma having been wrought”-Dhammasangani 2.2.3
And the Kathavatthu:
Points of Controversy
9.3 Of Matter as Subjective
Controverted Point: Whether matter should be termed subjective or objective.Theravādin: If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or body, that it has the mental features of “adverting”, ideating, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating, aiming—things which you would, on the contrary, deny of matter.
All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, immodesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective. But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things may not be affirmed of it.
You deny in the case of matter all those mental features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term “subjective”, which is really applicable to “contact”, sensation, etc. These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
Uttarāpathaka: But is not matter correlated (as an object)? Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right to apply the term “subjective” to matter, etc. since “object” is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations.
Thus, we can clearly see, Karunadasa confirms, as do the suttas, abhidhamma, etc. that Classical Theravada is a realist system, involving direct realism no less, and that dhammas are mind independent. None of these are anything remotely like, nor compatible with phenomenalism, nor any of the other Ceisiwr specific dhamma teachings.
Compare general objections to phenomenalism:
Criticisms of phenomenalism have tended to be technical. Generally speaking, realists have objected to it on the ground that it is counterintuitive to think of physical objects such as tomatoes as being sets of actual or possible perceptual experiences. Realists argue that one does have such experiences, or under certain circumstances would have them, because there is an object out there that exists independently and is their source. Phenomenalism, they contend, implies that if no perceivers existed, then the world would contain no objects, and that is surely inconsistent both with what ordinary persons believe and with the known scientific fact that all sorts of objects existed in the universe long before there were any perceivers.
-Britannica, Avrum Stroll
And the Buddha himself objecting to the very same ideas that phenomenalists present, and confirming their opposite (objects exist independent of perception):
“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.” “Now there comes a time when the external water element is disturbed. It carries away villages, towns, cities, districts, and countries.”
-MN 28
“Student, suppose there were a man born blind who could not see dark and light forms, who could not see blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, who could not see what was even and uneven, who could not see the stars or the sun and moon. He might say thus: ‘There are no dark and light forms, and no one who sees dark and light forms; there are no blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, and no one who sees blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms; there is nothing even and uneven, and no one who sees anything even and uneven; there are no stars and no sun and moon, and no one who sees stars and the sun and moon. I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist.’ Speaking thus, student, would he be speaking rightly?”
“No, Master Gotama. There are dark and light forms, and those who see dark and light forms…there are the stars and the sun and moon, and those who see the stars and the sun and moon. Saying, ‘I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist,’ he would not be speaking rightly.”
“So too, student, the brahmin Pokkharasāti is blind and visionless.
-MN 99
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
-SN 22.94
whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality.
-SN 12.20
Back to your “question”:
Ceisiwr: Are the dhammas merely phenomena? Is ultimate reality merely the phenomenal, and so the Abhidhamma is a form of phenomenalism?
You already know this is false. I’ve told you many, many times, as have others. And you’ve had many users share authoritative quotes with you that demonstrate these points as well. Why do you persist in trying to promote your own dhamma teachings, even on a Classical Theravada site? It is plainly stated that dhammas exist mind independent, and the suttas are realist, etc. This is not the place for your teachings which always trend toward idealism/anti-realism/phenomenalism. Mind independent matter/form/dhammas cannot be phenomenalism.
The dhammas exist even when no one is around to observe them.
For example, per the below, even after a person dies, and consciousness has ceased, their corpse remains as temperature born matter, which can generate all by itself:
But at the time of death, kamma-born material phenomena no
longer arise starting with the stage of presence of the seventeenth
consciousness preceding the death consciousness. Kamma-born
material phenomena that arose earlier occur till the death-moment
and then cease. Following that, the consciousness-born and nutriment-born material phenomena come to cessation. Thereafter,
a continuity of material qualities produced by temperature persists
as long as it can be called a corpse.
-Bodhi, ibid, p 257
Tejo is the element of heat. Cold is also a form of tejo.
Both heat and cold are included in tejo because they possess the power of maturing bodies. Tejo, in other words, is
the vitalizing energy. Preservation and decay are also due
to this element. Unlike the other three essentials of matter,
this element has the power to regenerate matter by itself.
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma p 319
Finally, just to put this nonsense to bed, phenomenalism is a form of idealism, and Buddhism is a form of realism. They are NOT compatible.
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism. Weaker phenomenalism states only that the sense perception can be known to exist, and that it is either meaningless or useless to talk of objects outside of perception. Stronger versions deny that anything exists outside of sense perception.
The dhamma makes it abundantly clear that things absolutely do exist outside of sense perception. This is made undeniably apparent in the quotes above. Thus, the dhamma is realism, not idealism, not phenomenalism, and no amount of the Ceisiwr treatment to it can turn it into phenomenalism or whatever your thing is.
The commentaries were composed with exactly people like you in mind, and they clarify points from so many angles that they outstrip your speciously clever trojan horse attempts to undercut the dhamma and supplant it with your own teachings. Thus, on a site that considers the commentaries authoritative, you are outmatched before you even start. So, serious question here, again, why do you persist? Seriously?
Edit: On the very, very unlikely chance that you are simply perpetually confused, and you simply do not understand the teachings, and thus, perpetually interpret realism as variations of idealism (yes, including phenomenalism), and, thus, your constant declarations, implications, and otherwise positing that the dhamma is a form of idealism is due purely to confusion, and is not at all deliberate, but is totally just an honest failing on your part to understand: I apologize for speaking as if you were deliberately doing this. That said, I would still strongly suggest that you get a tutor on the English language, or learn the dhamma in your native tongue, or if language isn’t the issue, get a special education teacher to help you work through your learning issues before you continue to post these types of things, because it really, really seems like you are trolling all day every day. To be clear, there is nothing wrong with learning the dhamma in one’s second language! But if it is causing a constant, persistent block in your understanding such as you seem to be experiencing (that or you’re trolling), then it might help to get some dhamma tutoring in your native language just to get over that hurdle, then, by all means continue to discuss in English with proper understanding of the dhamma. But if you don’t get over this hurdle, you will spend who knows how long seeming like a troll. I’ve seen you doing this for years now on dw, and now here, so if it’s just a language or learning issue, please get help.
If you are taking an object, say an apple, and are claiming that all there is to it are its qualities (redness, sweetness and so on) and apart from this no apple-substance can be found then that is a Phenomenalism. There is no substance which bears the qualities (substances having permanent and independent existence). There are only it’s qualities. In Abhihdamma terms, apart from the quality of hardness there is no earth element. There is no earth substance. What I find interesting is that Phenomenalism, in the West, is an anti-realist philosophy. Realism is the view that there are mind independent realities. There are things which bear qualities. If there are only qualities, there is no mind independent thing because “hardness” is something experienced in the mind. That’s how it is in Western Philosophy. The question then revolves around if qualitive experience such as “redness” can be mind independent? Simply quoting texts which just state that it is Realism doesn’t answer my question. There is also no need to react in the way you have. If you can’t argue your position well, or you can’t stand any questions regarding it that you might not like, then you won’t convince many people that it’s worth anything. I’m not trying to argue against the Abhidhamma here. I’m fine with the earth element just being “hardness”, but does that actually entail a Realism or not is my question?
Another approach would be to say that all we ultimately can know directly are the sabhāva-dhammas and concepts, but this is an epistemological claim not an ontological one. For sure in the suttas dhammas exist externally, and in the Abhidhamma tradition that is also the case. How that is the case is what I am asking.
I guess what I’m asking is how can “hardness” exist independently from a mind which experiences it? There is no external substance which has the quality of hardness. There is only hardness, so what does it mean to say that when no one is there cognising, there is still hardness?
LOL! You ask the same “questions” about the dhamma over and over, in different forms, for years on dw, in response to many classical Theravada posts, and other posts, or imply, or state that Theravada is phenomenalism, etc., and now bring them here. You ignore every text quoted which answers your question, or nullifies it. That, or you use textual gymnastics, confirmation bias, and eel wriggling to ostensibly, though never actually, make the texts, even the commentaries, supposedly agree with your Ceisiwr dhamma. I suspect you are disingenuous. You’re playing semantics. Hence my response.
The matter is settled: dhammas are mind independent, thus any word games are also settled on issues about phenomenalism, etc.
A system built on a foundation of mind independent dhammas is not phenomenalism. It doesn’t matter if you go hyper myopic on the word “hardness” or anything else. The dhammas are mind independent, so it makes zero sense to ask if this is a phenomenalist system. And you already know this, unless you have some kind of learning issue, if so, see the edit on my post above.
This would be like asking if Epicurus taught idealism because he described fruit as sweet, which is a subjective descriptor, despite everyone knowing he was an atomist realist, because the teachings make this abundantly clear. The foundation negates your point.
See, yet again, the following quote, I’ve even bolded the points that completely nullify your question and implication that the abhidhamma is a phenomenalist system:
A system built on mind independent dhammas cannot be phenomenalism no matter how you slice it. You are never going to convince Classical Theravadins of your Ceisiwr dhamma, no matter how many “questions” you ask about it.
When we see that the foundation of the system is incompatible with phenomenalism, we have to realize that the word “hardness” or any other word that may seem to support Ceisiwr dhamma, must be interpreted in some other way than the Ceisiwr method. This is because the Ceisiwr method is completely contradictory to the abhidhamma system on a foundational level. Hence, there’s no reason to waste your time, nor anyone else’s time trying to twist the words to be your dhamma. It is fundamentally flawed, and goes nowhere.
That said, I’m done with this conversation. You repeat the same deliberate misinterpretation of the dhamma. That’s all you do. For years. I’m tired of it. How are you not?
LOL! You ask the same “questions” about the dhamma over and over, in different forms, for years on dw, in response to many classical Theravada posts, and other posts, or imply, or state that Theravada is phenomenalism, etc., and now bring them here. You ignore every text quoted which answers your question, or nullifies it. That, or you use textual gymnastics, confirmation bias, and eel wriggling to ostensibly, though never actually, make the texts, even the commentaries, supposedly agree with your Ceisiwr dhamma. I suspect you are disingenuous. You’re playing semantics. Hence my response.
It simply is the case that if you say there is no apple apart from its qualities, then that is a phenomenalism. It is exactly the same arguments Phenomenalists like David Hume or Mill used. It doesn’t have to mean Idealism, by the way. This is why the Stanford Philosophy website describes the Abhidhamma as a “Phenomenalist Realism”. The reason why I am still asking this question is because I haven’t as of yet found a satisfactory answer. If we take sitting on a chair, there will be the initial body-conciousness which cognises “hardness”. We can say this is ultimately what we experience, sure, because that is all that can be directly known. This though is epistemological. It doesn’t yet get us to the ontological claim that the “hardness” exists regardless of cognition. In other words, that it is not just the only thing which can be known but that it is also truly real. How to get to that is what vexes me so. As for your slander against me, I trust others here whom I’ve interacted with over a number of years will see through that lie. I’m also not trying to convince people that Classical Theravāda is wrong. I’m trying to better understand Classical Theravāda better, so as to be a better Classical Theravādin. I’m glad I’m not new to Theravāda, because honestly your reaction so far would put any potential new convert off. No need to hurl yourself about the place if people ask these sorts of questions. These are the type of questions Classical Theravādins are going to face, when talking to non-Theravādins.
This is a bit more interesting. I’ve read it before, but it stands out a bit more now. I suppose the Realism is coming from an angle of that which is directly experienced before concepts come into play is a mind-independent (although not independent itself) reality. Something to think over a bit more I think.
As always you dodge the part that totally nullifies your phenomenalism/idealism:
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
This, among other reasons, is why it is realism, and totally incompatible with all forms of idealism, including phenomenalism.
You don’t understand it because you are not an arahant. Arahants can see that there is an objective reality beneath our subjective experience. This is why you are perpetually stuck on this issue. You can only see pannatti, so you think pannatti and dhammas, or ultimate reality, are the same thing. But arahants can see that there are things that exist even when we are not around, entirely independent of experience. For example, the tejo element generates matter even when no one is aware of it. In fact, arahants are able to understand that the Earth, itself, for instance, is not produced by mind, nor kamma, nor nutriment, but is purely produced by tejo. This is not something a phenomenalist, completely stuck on their own pannatti, like you, could understand. I sincerely hope you some day get over your mental blocks and see the truth.
In other words: The Buddha could see atoms, and subatomic particles, you cannot. Hence, your confusion, and obsessive trolling.
See below:
It should be noted that the atomic theory prevailed in
India in the time of the Buddha. Paramàõu was the ancient
term for the modern atom. According to the ancient belief
one rathareõu consists of 16 tajjàris, one tajjàri, 16 aõus;
one aõu, 16 paramàõus. The minute particles of dust seen
dancing in the sunbeam are called rathareõus. One paramàõu is, therefore, 4096th part of a rathareõu. This paramàõu was considered indivisible.
With His supernormal knowledge the Buddha analysed this so-called paramàõu and declared that it consists
of paramatthas—ultimate entities which cannot further be
subdivided.
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, p 318
points of controversy
7.7. Of the Earth and Karma
Controverted Point: That land is a result of action.Theravādin: As well say that the earth belongs to feeling pleasant, painful, or neutral, or is conjoined as mental with feeling or with perception, or volition, or cognition, that the earth has a mental object, that she can advert to, reflect upon, consider, attend, intend, anticipate, aim. Is not just the opposite true of her? Hence your proposition is wrong.
Again, compare her with something mental—with contact. Of contact you could say that it is both (i.) a result of action and also that it (ii.) belongs to feeling, and so on (as in § 1). But you cannot say both these things of earth. Or if you affirm the former (i.) and deny the latter predicate (ii.) of earth, you must be prepared to do no less in the case of contact.
Again, the earth undergoes expansion and contraction, cutting and breaking up. Can you say as much of the mental result of action?
Again, the earth may be bought and sold, located, collected, explored. Can you say as much of the result of action?
Again, the earth is common to everyone else. But is the result of my action common to everyone else? “Yes,” you say. But was it not said by the Exalted One:
“This treasure to none else belongs,
No bandit hence may bear it.
The mortal who would fare aright
Let him work acts of merit”?Hence it is wrong to say that a result of action is experienced by everyone else.
Again, you would admit that first the earth is established and afterwards beings are reborn on it. But does result first come to pass and afterwards people act to insure result? If you deny, you cannot maintain that earth is a result of action.
Again, is the earth a common result of collective action? Yes, you say? Do you mean that all beings enjoy the use of the earth? If you deny, you cannot affirm your proposition. If you assent, I ask whether there are any who pass utterly away without enjoying the use of it? You assent, of course. But are there any who pass utterly away without exhausting the experienced result of their actions? Of course you deny… .
Once more, is the earth a result of the action of a being who is a world-monarch? and do other beings share in the use of the earth? Yes, you reply. Then do other beings make use of the result of his actions? You deny… . I ask again, and you assent. But then, do other beings share also in his contact, feelings, perception, volition, consciousness, faith, energy, mindfulness, samādhi, understanding? Of course you deny… .
Andhaka: But if I am wrong, surely there is action to gain dominion over the earth, action to gain sovereignty on the earth? If so, surely the earth is a result of action.
Grouping of Material Qualities (57)
§ 5. There are twenty-one material groups inasmuch as
they arise together (or have a common genesis), cease
together (or have a common cessation), have a common
dependence, and coexist.
Therein vitality and the (eight) inseparable material
qualities together with the eye are called the ‘eye-decad’.
Similarly the ‘ear-decad’ together with the ear and so
forth, ‘nose-decad’, ‘tongue-decad’, ‘body-decad’, ‘femaledecad,’ male-decad’, ‘base-decad’, should respectively be
formed. Inseparable material qualities, together with
vitality, are called the ‘vital-nonad’. These nine groups are
produced by Kamma.
The inseparable material qualities constitute the
‘pure octad’. They, together with the bodily intimation,
constitute the ‘bodily intimation nonad’; together with the
vocal intimation and sound the ‘vocal intimation decad’;
together with the material qualities of lightness, pliancy,
and adaptability the ‘un-decad of lightness’ and so forth;
the do-decad of bodily intimation, lightness, pliancy, and
adaptability; and the tri-decad of vocal intimation, sound,
lightness, pliancy, and adaptability.
These six material groups are produced by mind.
The pure octad„ the sound-nonad, the un-decad of
lightness, pliancy, and adaptability; the do-decad of
349
sound, lightness, pliancy, and adaptability—these four are
produced by seasonal phenomena.
The pure octad, and the un-decad of lightness, pliancy and adaptability are the two material qualities produced by food.
Of them the two material groups produced by seasonal phenomena—pure octad and the sound nonad—are
found externally too. All the rest are strictly internal.
-Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Narada Thera, page 349
Pañhavi means the element of extension, the substratum of matter. Without it objects cannot occupy space. The
qualities of hardness and softness which are purely relative
are two conditions of this particular element. It may be
stated that this element is present in earth, water, fire and
air. For instance, the water above is supported by water
below. It is this element of extension in conjunction with the
element of motion that produces the upward pressure. Heat
or cold is the tejo element, while fluidity is the àpo element.
âpo is the element of cohesion. Unlike pañhavi it is
intangible. It is this element that makes scattered particles
of matter cohere and gives rise to the idea of ‘body’. When
solid bodies are melted this element becomes more prominent in the resulting fluid. This element is found even in
minute particles when solid bodies are reduced to powder.
The element of extension and cohesion are so closely interrelated that when cohesion ceases extension disappears.
Tejo is the element of heat. Cold is also a form of tejo.
Both heat and cold are included in tejo because they possess the power of maturing bodies. Tejo, in other words, is
the vitalizing energy. Preservation and decay are also due
to this element. Unlike the other three essentials of matter,
this element has the power to regenerate matter by itself.
Inseparably connected with heat is vàyo, the element
of motion. Movements are caused by this element. Motion
is regarded as the force or the generator of heat. “Motion and heat in the material realm correspond respectively to
consciousness and Kamma in the mental.”
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, p 319-320
(1) The earth element (paþhavìdhátu): The great essentials are called
elements (dhátu) in the sense that they bear their own intrinsic natures
(attano sabhávaí dhárenti). The earth element is so called because, like
the earth, it serves as a support or foundation for the coexisting material
phenomena. The word paþhavì comes from a root meaning to expand or spread out, and thus the earth element represents the principle of extension.
The earth element has the characteristic of hardness or softness, the function
of acting as a foundation (for the other primary elements and derived
matter), and manifestation as receiving.3
Its proximate cause is the other
three great essentials. Both hardness and softness are modes in which the
earth element is experienced by the sense of touch.
The water element (ápodhátu): The water element, or fluidity, is
the material factor that makes different particles of matter cohere,
thereby preventing them from being scattered about. Its characteristic
is trickling or oozing, its function is to intensify the coexisting material
states, and it is manifested as the holding together or cohesion of
material phenomena. Its proximate cause is the other three great
essentials. The Abhidhamma holds that unlike the other three great
essentials, the water element cannot be physically sensed but must be
known inferentially from the cohesion of observed matter.
The fire element (tejodhátu) has the characteristic of heat, its
function is to mature or ripen other material phenomena, and it is
manifested as a continuous supply of softness. Both heat and cold are
modes in which the fire element is experienced.
The air element (váyodhátu) is the principle of motion and pressure.
Its characteristic is distension (vitthambana), its function is to cause
motion in the other material phenomena, and it is manifested as
conveyance to other places. Its proximate cause is the other three great
essentials. It is experienced as tangible pressure.
Taken together, the four great essentials are founded upon the earth
element, held together by the water element, maintained by the fire
element, and distended by the air element.
-Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, Bodhi, pages 237-238
The Abhidhamma enumerates twenty-eight types
of material phenomena, which are briefly comprised in two general
categories: the four great essentials and material phenomena derived
from the four great essentials. The four great essentials (mahábhúta)
are the primary material elements—earth, water, fire, and air. These are
the fundamental constituents of matter which are inseparable and which,
in their various combinations, enter into the composition of all material
substances, from the most minute particle to the most massive mountain.
Derived material phenomena (upádáya rúpa) are material phenomena
derived from, or dependent upon, the four great essentials. These are
twenty-four in number. The great essentials may be compared to the
earth, the derivative phenomena to trees and shrubs that grow in
dependence on the earth.
-Bodhi, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, page 235
Material phenomena originating from temperature
…Externally temperature or the fire element also produces inorganic material phenomena, such as climatic and geological transformations.
-Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Bhikkhu Bodhi, IV guide to 12
- Having attributed the three characteristics to that arising from nutriment,
etc., he again attributes the three characteristics to natural materiality. Natural
materiality is a name for external materiality that is not bound up with faculties
→ and arises along with the eon of world expansion, for example, iron, copper, tin,
lead, gold, silver, pearl, gem, beryl, conch shell, marble, coral, ruby, opal, soil,
stone, rock, grass, tree, creeper, and so on (see Vibh 83).
-Vism XX 73.7
But at the time of death, kamma-born material phenomena no
longer arise starting with the stage of presence of the seventeenth
consciousness preceding the death consciousness. Kamma-born
material phenomena that arose earlier occur till the death-moment
and then cease. Following that, the consciousness-born and nutriment-born material phenomena come to cessation. Thereafter,
a continuity of material qualities produced by temperature persists
as long as it can be called a corpse.
-Bodhi, ibid, p 257
As an example from the suttas where the Buddha sees something that is impossible for normal senses to see, and which confirms a reality that exists when no one is around whatsoever, here we see him explaining an empty world, with an empty palace, both described before anyone is present to be aware of them. Brahma arises after the empty palace exists. If the Buddha was a phenomenalist, and taught that these things only exist as sense data, such a thing would be impossible, and he would have taught that the palace arises after the Brahma becomes aware of it, or some other idealist/phenomenalist explanation. Instead, he clearly delineates otherwise:
“There comes a time, bhikkhus, when after the lapse of a long period this world contracts (disintegrates). While the world is contracting, beings for the most part are reborn in the Ābhassara Brahma-world. There they dwell, mind-made, feeding on rapture, self-luminous, moving through the air, abiding in glory. And they continue thus for a long, long period of time.
“But sooner or later, bhikkhus, after the lapse of a long period, there comes a time when this world begins to expand once again. While the world is expanding, an empty palace of Brahmā appears. Then a certain being, due to the exhaustion of his life-span or the exhaustion of his merit, passes away from the Ābhassara plane and re-arises in the empty palace of Brahmā.
-DN 1
All of the above make clear that the abhidhamma and sutta system goes well beyond the bounds of anything that could be called phenomenalism. In fact, one of the elements, the water element (see above in the Bodhi quote from page 238) cannot even be sensed, and can only be known inferentially, and so the claim that the four elements are strictly sense qualities is obviously false. Further, while the Buddha did use words like “hardness” or “watery” to describe the four elements, he also made it clear that they go through processes that cause them to create natural disasters. Obviously he did not see the elements as being strictly sensations like “hardness,” “watery,” “fiery,” etc. Sensations and subjective words like “hardness” do not exist externally, and destroy cities in floods, and so on. See below:
“What, friends, is the water element? The water element may be either internal or external. What is the internal water element? Whatever internally, belonging to oneself, is water, watery, and clung-to; that is, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, spittle, snot, oil-of-the-joints, urine, or whatever else internally, belonging to oneself, is water, watery, and clung-to: this is called the internal water element. Now both the internal water element and the external water element are simply water element. And that should be seen as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ When one sees it thus as it actually is with proper wisdom, one becomes disenchanted with the water element and makes the mind dispassionate toward the water element.
“Now there comes a time when the external water element is disturbed. It carries away villages, towns, cities, districts, and countries.
-MN 28
He says similar about the other elements, for example:
What, friends, is the fire element? The fire element may be either internal or external. What is the internal fire element? Whatever internally, belonging to oneself, is fire, fiery, and clung-to; that is, that by which one is warmed, ages, and is consumed, and that by which what is eaten, drunk, consumed, and tasted gets completely digested, or whatever else internally, belonging to oneself, is fire, fiery, and clung-to: this is called the internal fire element. Now both the internal fire element and the external fire element are simply fire element. And that should be seen as it actually is with proper wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self.’ When one sees it thus as it actually is with proper wisdom, one becomes disenchanted with the fire element and makes the mind dispassionate toward the fire element.
“Now there comes a time when the external fire element is disturbed. It burns up villages, towns, cities, districts, and countries. It goes out due to lack of fuel only when it comes to green grass, or to a road, or to a rock, or to water, or to a fair open space.
-MN 28
And here we see the Buddha making clear that form exists even when we are unaware of it:
“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.
-MN 28
@Zans we appreciate your detailed clarification on the issue.
@Ceisiwr Please let’s talk more on proper Classical Theravada issues and give up on this
Phenomenalism
In this forum. Phenomenalism has been discussed as it relates to our texts and this topic is now finished. I see a type of “dragging out issues” with multiple rotations of the same topics with different titles (and sometimes the same title) as a pattern.
The faq will soon expand in a few days .
Topic closed.