Nature of Parinibbāna

This looks like demagoguery and attributing to the interlocutor a view that he did not voice.

I have said all that I had to say on this matter. The answers to your last message are in my posts above.

I equate the dhamma of nibbana with its individual characteristic.

Rather its an accurate description of your view, as shown above.

  1. “‘On coming to that (taí ágamma)’: on reaching that Nibbána by making it the object” (Vism-mhþ 533). Ágamma (ger. of ágacchati—to come) is commonly used as an adverb in the sense of “owing to” (e.g. at M I 119). Here, however, it is taken literally by the Commentaries and forms an essential part of the ontological proof of the positive existence of Nibbána. The Sammohavinodanì (commentary on the Áyatana-Vibhaòga Abhidhamma-bhájaniya) refutes the suggestion of a disputant (vitaóðavádin) who asserts that Nibbána is “mere destruction” (khayamatta). The arguments used are merely supplementary to those in §69 here, and so are not quoted. The conclusion of the argument is worth noting, however, because of the emphasis on the words “taí ágamma.” It is this: “It is on coming to Nibbána that greed, etc., are destroyed. It is the same Nibbána that is called ‘destruction of greed, destruction of hate, destruction of delusion.’ These are just three terms for Nibbána When this was said, he asked: You say ‘On coming to’ (ágamma); from where have you got this ‘on coming to’?—It is got from the Suttas—Quote the sutta—‘Thus ignorance and craving, on coming to that, are destroyed in that, are abolished in that, nor does anything anywhere … (evaí avijjá ca taóhá ca taí ágamma tamhi khìóaí tamhi bhaggaí na ca kiñci kadáci … ).’ When this was said, the other was silent.” The quotation has not been traced.

From the notes to the discussed section of the Visuddhimagga. The whole point in nibbāna being an object of the mind is that its not mere cessation. This is partly why CT argues that its on coming to nibbāna that there is cessation. This would make little sense if nibbāna was cessation.

I invite other experts and participants in this chat to speak out. And correct our mistakes, if any. (Based on Theravada texts).

@RobertK, @bksubhuti

Equal in essence and completely synonymous - these are different things. Since coolness and extinction are equal in essence, but one is a positive expression of reality, and the other is a concept.

Sine you keep accusing me of misrepresenting you, can you say here definitively what your view is. Is nibbāna mere cessation or isn’t it. If it isn’t, what on earth are you arguing with me about? If it is, seems I wasn’t misrepresenting you at all and so my previous comments stand.

Yes, because the experience of the unconditioned quality of total peace (in which there is no shadow of arising and cessation, nama and rupa), is the support for the extinction of defilements and aggregates.
On the other hand, the very cessation of defilements and aggregates is endowed with the property of peace and is imbued with it. Therefore, it is impossible to completely separate one from the other.

My idea is in the middle. :slight_smile:

But CT does differentiate them. Cessation occurs on coming to nibbāna. Its not just cessation itself. That is the whole point of the argument regarding “coming to”. Its an object which is cognised, on the basis of which the defilements are eradicated.

Lady Sayadaw writes in his book that nibbana is like health from 10,000 scabs and is the very property of healing from scabs. And he makes strong arguments based on texts. You talk about the dhamma of nibbana, which is different from the moment of cessation of defilements, but you do not clarify what is meant by this dhamma. This leaves room for speculation and expansion, including subtle self-clinging based on the apophatic, vague statement: “something remains and this is not a complete cessation.” If consciousness ceases, then everything ceases for the being in any case. It is the phenomenal experience that matters.

The property of peace belongs to nibbāna, which isn’t mere cessation for it brings about cessation. Cessation and nibbāna are related, but they are two different things. One isn’t in the other.

You talk about the dhamma of nibbana, which is different from the moment of cessation of defilements, but you do not clarify what is meant by this dhamma. This leaves room for speculation and expansion, including subtle self-clinging based on the apophatic, vague statement: “something remains and this is not a complete cessation.” If consciousness ceases, then everything ceases for the being in any case. It is the phenomenal experience that matters.

How can I clarify it, when its beyond word and can’t be pointed out because of its subtlety? Is it an atta? No. Is it consciousness? No. Its beyond all conditioned things, and these terms are bound up with conditioned things.

[Q. 7] Why is it not stated in its own form?

[A.] Because of its extreme subtlety. And its extreme subtlety is established because it inclined the Blessed One to inaction, [that is, to not teaching the Dhamma (see M I 186)] and because a Noble One’s eye is needed to see it (see M I 510).
71. It is not shared by all because it can only be reached by one who is possessed
of the path. And it is uncreated because it has no first beginning.

247. Herein fading away is not mere absence of greed, but rather it is that unformed dhamma which, while given the names “disillusionment of vanity,” etc., in the clause, “that is to say, the disillusionment of vanity, … Nibbána,” is treated basically as fading away.71 It is called disillusionment of vanity because on coming to it all kinds of vanity (intoxication), such as the vanity of conceit, and vanity of manhood, are disillusioned, undone, done away with.72 And it is called elimination of thirst because on coming to it all thirst for sense desires is eliminated and quenched. But it is called abolition of reliance because on coming to its reliance on the five cords of sense desire is abolished. It is called termination of the round because on coming to it the round of the three planes [of existence] is terminated. It is called destruction of craving because on coming to it craving is entirely destroyed, fades away and ceases. It is called Nibbána (extinction) because it has gone away from (nikkhanta), has escaped from (nissaþa), is dissociated from craving, which has acquired in common usage the name “fastening” (vána) because, by ensuring successive becoming, craving serves as a joining together, a binding together, a lacing together, of the four kinds of generation, five destinies, seven stations of consciousness and nine abodes of beings.73 [294]

CHAPTER VIII Other Recollections as Meditation Subjects - Visuddhimagga

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It was originally a link, the forum admin there asked me to not link to anything in this forum as there’s negative critique of the founders of sutta central here.

I think you have to check your views if it aligns with classical theravada. As far as I can see from learning from them, they are the part of EBT which is of the same view as classical Theravada in terms of the nature of parinibbāna and first Jhāna. Nothing after parinibbāna and first Jhāna is deep, absorption, no 5 physical sense contacts.

As I mentioned above, annihilation should not be used for this 3rd definition or else one is forced to resort to something after parinibbāna.

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Thanks for explaining.
I had a look at their site:

https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/frequently-asked-questions-faq/24/17

it says:

give proper references/links to all material quoted

:cry:

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https://suttacentral.net/sn35.136/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=sidenotes&highlight=false&script=latin

“Sights, sounds, tastes, smells,
touches and ideas, the lot of them—
they’re likable, desirable, and pleasurable
as long as you can say that they exist.

For all the world with its gods,
this is what they deem happiness.
And where they cease
is deemed as suffering for them.

The noble ones have seen that happiness
is the cessation of substantial reality.
This insight by those who see
contradicts the whole world.

What others say is happiness
the noble ones say is suffering.
What others say is suffering
the noble ones know as happiness.

See, this teaching is hard to understand,
it confuses the ignorant.
There is darkness for the shrouded;
blackness for those who don’t see.

But the good are open;
like light for those who see.
Though close, they do not understand,
those fools inexpert in the teaching.

They’re mired in desire to be reborn,
flowing along the stream of lives,
mired in Māra’s sway:
this teaching isn’t easy for them to understand.

Who, apart from the noble ones,
is qualified to understand this state?
Having rightly understood this state,
the undefiled become fully extinguished.”

Rūpā saddā rasā gandhā,phassā dhammā ca kevalā;Iṭṭhā kantā manāpā ca,yāvatatthīti vuccati.

Sadevakassa lokassa,ete vo sukhasammatā;Yattha cete nirujjhanti,taṁ tesaṁ dukkhasammataṁ.

Sukhaṁ diṭṭhamariyebhi sukhaṁ ca sakkāyassa nirodhanaṁ;Paccanīkamidaṁ hoti,sabbalokena passataṁ.

Yaṁ pare sukhato āhu,tadariyā āhu dukkhato;Yaṁ pare dukkhato āhu,tadariyā sukhato vidū.

Passa dhammaṁ durājānaṁ,sammūḷhettha aviddasu;Nivutānaṁ tamo hoti,andhakāro apassataṁ.

Satañca vivaṭaṁ hoti,āloko passatāmiva;Santike na vijānanti,maggā dhammassa akovidā.

Bhavarāgaparetebhi,bhavarāgānusārībhi;V

Ko nu aññatra mariyebhi,Padaṁ sambuddhumarahati;Yaṁ padaṁ sammadaññāya,Parinibbanti anāsavā”ti.

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https://suttacentral.net/an1.328/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=sidenotes&highlight=false&script=latin

  • Numbered Discourses 1.328 Aṅguttara Nikāya 1

“Just as, mendicants, even a tiny bit of fecal matter still stinks,
“Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, appamattakopi gūtho duggandho hoti
;
so too I don’t approve of even a tiny bit of continued existence, not even as long as a finger-snap.”
evamevaṁ kho ahaṁ, bhikkhave, appamattakampi bhavaṁ na vaṇṇemi, antamaso accharāsaṅghātamattampi”

Milindapanha:

"For it has been said, O king, by the Blessed One: “Just, O Bhikkhus, as a very small quantity of excrement is of evil smell, so do I find no beauty in the very smallest degree of future life, not even in such for the time of the snapping of the fingers.”

SuttaCentral

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That’s strange because Sujato is quite critical of DhammaWheel.

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So, I’m trying to understand Parinibbana. Would it be right to say that there is something after parinibbana? Is it the element or property of peace/rest/non-arising?

I’m trying to be careful not to think of someone entering parinibanna as not existing anymore.
Yamaka Sutta

“And so, my friend Yamaka — when you can’t pin down the Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life — is it proper for you to declare, ‘As I understand the Teaching explained by the Blessed One, a monk with no more effluents, on the break-up of the body, is annihilated, perishes, & does not exist after death’?”

The error in the sutta passage you cited is to refer to someone (a monk). When there’s no self, there’s no such thing as annihilation of self.

There’s just the 5 aggregates, 6 sense bases, after parinibbāna, these ceases without arising ever again in any form (corpse doesn’t count). Then that’s it.

To posit anything after parinibbāna is to fall into eternalism view.

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Thank you for the answer, Venerable Sir. So, after parinibanna, there really is nothing? So it’s not like an eternal peacefulness or anything like that?

It’s because there’s no experience that it is peaceful.

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