Thanks! This is a great book! Considering DN 1 is the quintessential work to refute other beliefs, a good modern commentary, that includes the ancient commentary, on it is essential.
1 Like
Dhammasangani
- What are the dhamma which are not caused by mind? Katame dhammā no cittasamuṭṭhānā?
There is mind and also the Corporeality other than that caused by mind; and there is also the Unconditioned Element (Nibbana).
Cittañca, avasesañca rūpaṃ, asaṅkhatā ca dhātu.These are the dhamma which are not caused by mind. Ime dhammā no cittasamuṭṭhānā.
2 Likes
Awesome quote! What’s it from? Which translation and who’s commentary?
1 Like
Dhammasaṅgaṇī: Enumeration of the Ultimate Realities , tr U Kyaw Khine
No commentary - it is a quote from Tipitaka.
2 Likes
How is mind not generated by mind? What generates it?
1 Like
Nope. Heres a copy paste of the last time I had to clear this up, lightly edited to make it more applicable here. The previous claim was Theravada is phenomenonism (a form of idealism)so Ive added the word “idealism” here and there for clarity and removed references to the user being responded to:
What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38
dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2
This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.
Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, page 146
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 14, 172
Here is Bhikkhu Bodhi summarizing the abhidhamma position on dhammas:
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
…
Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions……
…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).
…
…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.
…
Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
And here is straight from the abhidhamma:
“All form is that which is…
void of idea,
neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis,
disconnected with thought,”
“form exists which is not due to karma having been wrought”-Dhammasangani 2.2.3
And the Kathavatthu:
Points of Controversy
9.3 Of Matter as Subjective
Controverted Point: Whether matter should be termed subjective or objective.Theravādin: If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or body, that it has the mental features of “adverting”, ideating, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating, aiming—things which you would, on the contrary, deny of matter.
All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, immodesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective. But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things may not be affirmed of it.
You deny in the case of matter all those mental features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term “subjective”, which is really applicable to “contact”, sensation, etc. These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
Uttarāpathaka: But is not matter correlated (as an object)? Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right to apply the term “subjective” to matter, etc. since “object” is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations.
Thus, we can clearly see, Karunadasa confirms, as do the suttas, abhidhamma, etc. that Classical Theravada is a realist system, involving direct realism no less, and that dhammas are mind independent. None of these are anything remotely like, nor compatible with phenomenalism, nor any of the other idealism offshoots.
Compare general objections to phenomenalism:
Criticisms of phenomenalism have tended to be technical. Generally speaking, realists have objected to it on the ground that it is counterintuitive to think of physical objects such as tomatoes as being sets of actual or possible perceptual experiences. Realists argue that one does have such experiences, or under certain circumstances would have them, because there is an object out there that exists independently and is their source. Phenomenalism, they contend, implies that if no perceivers existed, then the world would contain no objects, and that is surely inconsistent both with what ordinary persons believe and with the known scientific fact that all sorts of objects existed in the universe long before there were any perceivers.
-Britannica, Avrum Stroll
And the Buddha himself objecting to the very same ideas that idealists present, and confirming their opposite (objects exist independent of perception):
“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and there is the corresponding conscious engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness.” “Now there comes a time when the external water element is disturbed. It carries away villages, towns, cities, districts, and countries.”
-MN 28
“Student, suppose there were a man born blind who could not see dark and light forms, who could not see blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, who could not see what was even and uneven, who could not see the stars or the sun and moon. He might say thus: ‘There are no dark and light forms, and no one who sees dark and light forms; there are no blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, and no one who sees blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms; there is nothing even and uneven, and no one who sees anything even and uneven; there are no stars and no sun and moon, and no one who sees stars and the sun and moon. I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist.’ Speaking thus, student, would he be speaking rightly?”
“No, Master Gotama. There are dark and light forms, and those who see dark and light forms…there are the stars and the sun and moon, and those who see the stars and the sun and moon. Saying, ‘I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist,’ he would not be speaking rightly.”
“So too, student, the brahmin Pokkharasāti is blind and visionless.
-MN 99
“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
-SN 22.94
whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality.
-SN 12.20
. Mind independent matter/form/dhammas cannot be phenomenalism nor idealism.
The dhammas exist even when no one is around to observe them.
For example, per the below, even after a person dies, and consciousness has ceased, their corpse remains as temperature born matter, which can generate all by itself:
But at the time of death, kamma-born material phenomena no
longer arise starting with the stage of presence of the seventeenth
consciousness preceding the death consciousness. Kamma-born
material phenomena that arose earlier occur till the death-moment
and then cease. Following that, the consciousness-born and nutriment-born material phenomena come to cessation. Thereafter,
a continuity of material qualities produced by temperature persists
as long as it can be called a corpse.
-Bodhi, ibid, p 257
Tejo is the element of heat. Cold is also a form of tejo.
Both heat and cold are included in tejo because they possess the power of maturing bodies. Tejo, in other words, is
the vitalizing energy. Preservation and decay are also due
to this element. Unlike the other three essentials of matter,
this element has the power to regenerate matter by itself.
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma p 319
Finally, just to put this nonsense to bed, phenomenalism is a form of idealism, and Buddhism is a form of realism. They are NOT compatible.
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism. Weaker phenomenalism states only that the sense perception can be known to exist, and that it is either meaningless or useless to talk of objects outside of perception. Stronger versions deny that anything exists outside of sense perception.
The dhamma makes it abundantly clear that things absolutely do exist outside of sense perception. This is made undeniably apparent in the quotes above. Thus, the dhamma is realism, not idealism, not phenomenalism, and no amount of the idealist treatment to it can turn it into phenomenalism or whatever your thing is.
It’s not quite direct realism. Colour impinges in the eye base then, after a series of cognitive acts, the mind fashions “a tree”. The tree though is not directly perceived, because it doesn’t really exist. All that exists is the colour (and heat etc etc). CT teaches it’s possible to arrive at an awareness of such realities, but for most people they operate in a world of concepts. In not real things like cars, or people or houses. Even with the ultimate realities you are only aware of their reflection in the mind, so it’s a system of indirect realism at best. If you want a more direct realism, that would be Sarvastivada. Their theory of cognition differs from the Theravadin one.
You are an idealist/antirealist/extreme skeptic Madhyamaka-yogacara person who believes that science proves nothing.
Your opinion, by your own logic, is invalid. If we must believe your positions, you don’t exist and nothing can be proven in the first place lol! So, certainly no one should take your opinion over Karunadasa.
What I said is the CT position. Trees don’t really exist. What really exists is colour etc. Colour impinges on the eye base and then a series of mental moments proceed which reproduce the colour mentally. It’s not until we get to the mind that recognition, and so true cognition occurs.
Arahants can see directly the mind independent paramattha dhammas, which exist beyond pannatti. This is direct realism. This is what Karunadasa correctly pointed out.
And, until you agree that you yourself objectively exist outside of my mind Ive no reason to take you seriously.
Yes, but they are only aware of the mental representation of them at the stage of recognition. This is a few mental moments after the initial sense door consciousness, where there is no recognition. Without recognition, it’s not truly cognised.
There is also no need to be so hostile towards me.
From “A Comprehensive Manual of the Abhidhamma”
1 Like
Word games. Dhammas exist mind independently, arahants sense them directly. This is direct realism.
And hostile? No, Im interacting with you on your own terms.
Until you agree that you exist objectively, independent of my own mind, it would do you a disservice to take you seriously. It would be disrespecting your chosen identity as non existent.
The dhammas are mind independent in CT, but you are only ever aware of a mental representation of the dhammas (and concepts). What I think doesn’t matter, since here I discuss the CT position only.
Supernormal powers and senses do not fit into your western sense impression ideology, and they also go beyond the sense door experience of a worldling.
You only are here to subvert the CT with your own anti CT philosophy. You never actually agree with CT, except on practical, non philosophical matters. When it comes to CT ontology, you always seek to undermine it and sow doubt.
All that said, it doesn’t matter where you are posting or what: you don’t believe you exist objectively and independently of my mind, so you only show you don’t really believe that when you try to tell me to be nice to you. Think about it.
But, since you think you really believe it, and I want to support you, I should be respectful and treat you like you dont exist. Anything else would deny your beliefs.
In other words, if you dont exist you always dont exist. Its not that you just dont exist on dhammawheel, and then you exist on classicaltheravada lol!
That isn’t true at all. I’m here to discuss and learn more about CT, which I greatly admire and largely follow. I don’t want to get into discussions about me, since I’m not here to discuss my personal views.
All that said, it doesn’t matter where you are posting or what: you don’t believe you exist objectively and independently of my mind, so you only show you don’t really believe that when you try to tell me to be nice to you. Think about it.
Well you and I don’t really exist. We are concepts. Only mind, matter and mental states really exist in CT (and nibbana).
On the nimitta of realities see here:
for dhammas existing independently see here
Does anyone know where in the commentaries it is stated that dhammas exist "from their own side" (sarupato)?
2 Likes
Hi Zan, good to see you posting again. 
I think in Dhamma people and objects like computer are only concepts. The Dhamma anaylses and breaks down the wholes, like chariot, lute, people so that what is truly existant can be known - and that is conditioned elements, nama and rupa. And these nama and rupa are real but they come into being for an instant and then cease- sunnata.
We have so much attachment to such concepts (like people and self) because we don’t really see this clearly yet.
Of course these concepts are necessary in our lives but we can understand them as being designations.
2 Likes
Well said!
Thanks, it’s good to hear from you How was your trip to Sri Lanka? Did you end up posting pictures?
1 Like
When many quotes from authoritative sources, including the Buddha himself, clearly demonstrate that Theravada is realist, and that objects exist mind independently, and you come just to try to twist things into being only mind, you’ve given up any subterfuge that might trick me into thinking you’re just here to discuss CT from a perspective which respects our beliefs.
I point out that arahants have supernormal senses that allow them to see the objective paramttha dhammas beyond the subjective pannatti and your response is:
This is idealism/phenomenalism. That’s always consistent with you and you are fooling no one, especially because just above our conversation are the quotes mentioned from experts, and the Buddha making abundantly clear that objects exist independent of mind, which is the opposite of idealism. You shoe horn idealism into CT, that’s what you do and have always done. You fooled me a while ago into thinking you’d become legitimately CT, but then you went right back to arguing that CT is phenomenalism lol!
And you’re playing word games and making a false equivalency by claiming we don’t exist in CT just as in your Mahayana beliefs. We exist as ultimately existing paramattha dhammas in CT. In your Mahayana worldview, we ultimately don’t exist at all.
Further, since you believe that nothing exists, your arguments don’t exist. Why in the world do you persist on these points when your foundational position is completely in contradiction to them?
Such a bizarre flaw: nothing exists, BUT my argument is valid and these texts, which also don’t exist, support my position. Seriously, do some thinking and self reflection. This is incredibly irrational. Your position is nonsense.
As I’ve said, roughly, before elsewhere: Myself, I hold that things exist in some way, if nothing else for the sake of argument, because the very idea of having non-existent arguments about non-existent things with a non existent mind, non-existent senses, and a non-existent body is asinine.
However I’m open to being wrong, and can admit, that, sure, maybe my mind and senses have zero access to anything real, nothing is real, or whatever, and I should just be an extreme skeptic and quit philosophy. This is because, unlike you and the Mahayana, and idealists/whatever bizarre philosophy followers in general, I understand that if mind and senses don’t actually get any real, direct data, and nothing is real, nothing exists, or other wild ideas, that is the destruction of all philosophy and authority it is not a foundation to build a philosophy upon, and it certainly wouldn’t allow me to lecture others about it. My credibility would be utterly destroyed, as would the credibility of everything else. The very word “credibility” would be meaningless lol!
If so, whoop dee freak’n doo! I’d find some other way to enjoy my time. As I’ve said before: about half the time I am an extreme skeptic anyway, so this wouldn’t be a big leap.
Point is, if you’re right, that’s the end of philosophy and discussion.
Nonetheless, that’s what you believe, so, again, until you recant and become a realist, or at least a skeptic about ALL positions (especially including your current positions), your positions, arguments, and general existence should not be acknowledged as even possibly being valid. Anything else disrespects your beliefs.
Or, if you can admit, at a minimum, that you may be entirely wrong in your positions, and that things might be completely real and existent, because humans are flawed and perhaps misunderstand things as being unreal, when they are utterly real in some sense that escapes us, then I would take you more seriously. Healthy skepticism, even about our own positions, and acknowledging that things might be other than we believe is a respectable, valid position. If you can admit this, then you also validate yourself and your arguments, at least to a degree of possibly being correct when they’re not self refuting ideas about nothing being real.
Until then, you should respect yourself enough to be consistent and live like your philosophy is correct. Nothing is real or whatever, so you have no position, by definition. Be consistent, and stop cherry picking where you treat things as if they’re real, at least implicitly, when it helps your argument, and tear down reality as unreal whenever it helps your argument.
Also, don’t pay your bills, and cancel any auto pay settings. No one who believes nothing is real would pay bills, as that would be completely absurd. There could not possibly be any consequences for not paying non-existent bills. Report back what happens.
And, no, fallacious logic about two truths where you have to pay bills conventionally, but the bills have absolutely zero existence ultimately is not a way out of your dilemma. See, again from elsewhere, Bhatta:
Mīmāṃsā refutation of Two Truths Doctrine
Chattopadhyaya notes that the eighth-century Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa rejected the Two Truths Doctrine in his Shlokavartika.[60] Bhaṭṭa was highly influential with his defence of the Vedic rituals against medieval Buddhist rejections of these rituals. Some believe that his influence contributed to the decline of Buddhism in India[61] since his lifetime coincides with the period in which Buddhism began to decline.[62] According to Kumarila, the two truths doctrine is an idealist doctrine, which conceals the fact that “the theory of the nothingness of the objective world” is absurd: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:“The idealist talks of some ‘apparent truth’ or ‘provisional truth of practical life’, i.e. in his terminology, of samvriti satya. However, since in his own view, there is really no truth in this ‘apparent truth’, what is the sense of asking us to look at it as some special brand of truth as it were? If there is truth in it, why call it false at all? And, if it is really false, why call it a kind of truth? Truth and falsehood, being mutually exclusive, there cannot be any factor called ‘truth’ as belonging in common to both–no more than there can by any common factor called ‘treeness’ belonging to both the tree and the lion, which are mutually exclusive. On the idealist’s own assumption, this ‘apparent truth’ is nothing but a synonym for the ‘false’. Why, then, does he use this expression? Because it serves for him a very important purpose. It is the purpose of a verbal hoax. It means falsity, though with such a pedantic air about it as to suggest something apparently different, as it were. This is in fact a well known trick. Thus, to create a pedantic air, one can use the word vaktrasava [literally mouth-wine] instead of the simpler word lala, meaning saliva [vancanartha upanyaso lala-vaktrasavadivat]. But why is this pedantic air? Why, instead of simply talking of falsity, is the verbal hoax of an ‘apparent truth’ or samvriti? The purpose of conceiving this samvriti is only to conceal the absurdity of the theory of the nothingness of the objective world, so that it can somehow be explained why things are imagined as actually existing when they are not so. Instead of playing such verbal tricks, therefore, one should speak honestly. This means: one should admit that what does not exist, exists not; and what does exist, exists in the full sense. The latter alone is true, and the former false. But the idealist just cannot afford to do this. He is obliged instead to talk of ‘two truths’, senseless though this be.”
-Wikipedia page on Two Truths Doctrine, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (2001). What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy 5th edition. pp. 370–1.
The two truths doctrine is a mere hoax to conceal the incoherence of the Mahayana over-extension and inappropriate application of dependent origination. The biggest indicator that their universal DO interpretation is incoherent is precisely that it necessitated inventing such a fallacious system as the two truths to explain it. Coherent systems don’t need such things. Self contradicting ones do.
As an aside, the Theravada two truths are very different. They reference human perception, pannatti, and ultimate entities beneath them. Since pannatti are ultimately dependent on ultimately existing paramattha dhammas, they are not wholly false. Hence, the two truths in this usage are not concealing any fallacy, they are merely a teaching tool to help understand the concepts we layer onto ultimate reality.
The two truths are a hoax in Mahayana, because they teach that there are no ultimate existents, which means the conventional doesn’t exist either, so it is nonsense. It is perfectly sound to say that matter ultimately exists, as does consciousness, which is Theravada truth number one, and truth number two is that our consciousnesses sees them as concepts. This is a conceptual truth on top of an ultimate truth, which is that things exist. The Mahayana is a conceptual truth on top of a non existent one, which is incoherent.
The Theravada DO still allows for mind independent dhammas, which means it avoids this incoherence.
1 Like