For any who has dealt with the frustration of arguing with Yogacara Buddhists…

I recommend the book “Indian Realism” by Jadunath Sinha.

It was just rereleased in May on kindle for around $20.

The book compiles many devastating arguments that obliterate Yogacara as a wholly untenable, self refuting, and downright absurd position.

All of Mahayana is heavily influenced by Yogacara, except a few extremely rare exceptions, so it is imminently relevant to Buddhist studies.

After reading it you will see how sad and pathetic it is that anyone is swindled by Yogacara ideas. And if, like me, you were once one of the ones swindled, you will laugh at your past self. The Yogacara teachings simply don’t make any sense whatsoever.

It is the most comprehensive collection of very effective refutations of idealism I have ever seen.

In fact, it is so effective, that I went in ready to get some good arguments to use against idealists that I have debated with, and I came out realizing that debating them is like debating someone who believes that hares have horns or some other utter nonsense. They are so confused and believe something so bizarre and unfounded that it’s mindless and pointless to even dignify the position with debate. It is so ludicrous that it’s not even worth the time to debate. I’ll probably just recommend this book as an act of compassion to anyone who challenges me with idealist silliness in the future.

Interesting side note: one of the most well done arguments is by Kumarila Bhatta, a Mimamsa philosopher. The Mimamsa school is said to have been instrumental in Buddhism’s decline in India in ancient times.

Makes me wonder: if Mayahana hadn’t taken over, would Buddhism have been so easy to knock down, and been such a laughably easy target? Was it the sad shift into heretical systems and specifically idealism (and the extreme nihilism of Madhyamaka) that caused its decline, and Bhatta was just there to kick the already rickety structure? Would he have even been able to refute much, or even anything from Theravada (original Buddhism)?

He destroys Mahayana, but only in its basis on flawed, asinine philosophical positions. Theravada’s positions on these points are sound.

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No need to read if you don’t want to get involved with non theravada Buddhists. It is all just a big rabbit hole. Stick with what you know. Discuss what makes you feel connected. Avoid those that leave you disconnected.

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Well said Venerable! Thank you.

This book is being presented only as a way to free your mind if it is currently hung up in any way by Yogacara, so that you may be free and more confident in Theravada.

Myself, I was a Mahayanist and adhered to Yogacara doctrine for a long time. I had almost entirely gotten over those teachings, but still had some vague hang ups that led me to get into debates with Yogacarins and other idealists. I didn’t even realize I still had these hang ups until I read this book. I was subconsciously fighting these doubts still it seems.

This book helped to finally put those doubts to bed and allow me to fully focus solely on Theravada.

In that sense, it is a tool for exactly this purpose. But, as the Venerable pointed out, if you don’t have this issue, then Yogacara is just a rabbit hole, and so this tool to escape it could be superfluous.

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:pray: :pray: :pray:
Sometimes we have to go through these roundabout paths to allay lingering doubts.
I still occasionally browse some writings filled with wrong view. Once one has enough confidence hearing wrong view just becomes a prod where we see the errors and conditions more reflection on what right view is.

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Thank you. Well said!

My understanding is that, when Theravada speaks of Nama and Rupa(rupi and arupi dhammas) it’s not necessarily a philosophical position, it goes deeper than that. There is or there is the possibility of nāmarūpa-pariccheda-ñāṇa for the yogi, where the distinction is said to become clear as separating a sword from it’s sheath.

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I thought it’s a new book, but it’s an old one. Indian Realism : Jadunath Sinha : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

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Thank you Venerable. Yes the original edition was 1938. From what I could see, it was only available from India as an expensive import until it was rereleased in may of this year.

Certainly we may say Buddhism is deeper than any philosophy. It is a religion after all.

Regardless, it has teachings about reality and perception. If we are to define “realist” as its most fundamental form, it is surely fair to say it is the position that external reality is mind independent. Theravada fits this definition.

Here is respected Theravada scholar Karunadasa speaking about this issue:

What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38

dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2

This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.

Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, page 146

"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 14, 172

Some sutta quotes:

“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into its range, and there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range, but there is no corresponding conscious engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness."
-MN 28

“Bhikkhus, consciousness comes to be in dependence on a dyad. And how, bhikkhus, does consciousness come to be in dependence on a dyad? In dependence on the eye and forms there arises eye-consciousness.:
-SN 35.93

A given instance of perceptual consciousness is said to arise only in dependence upon two conditions: the sense organ and its corresponding object-field. This implies that perceptual consciousness arises only in conjunction with an appropriate and existent object; perceptual consciousness of a nonexistent object or without an object is, therefore, impossible.
-Disputed Dharmas
Early Buddhist Theories on Existence
An Annotated Translation
of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought
from Sanghabhadra’s Nyayanusara
Collett Cox
p 136-137

“And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists."
-SN 22.94

Student, suppose there were a man born blind who could not see dark and light forms, who could not see blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, who could not see what was even and uneven, who could not see the stars or the sun and moon. He might say thus: ‘There are no dark and light forms, and no one who sees dark and light forms; there are no blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, and no one who sees blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms; there is nothing even and uneven, and no one who sees anything even and uneven; there are no stars and no sun and moon, and no one who sees stars and the sun and moon. I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist.’ Speaking thus, student, would he be speaking rightly?”

“No, Master Gotama. There are dark and light forms, and those who see dark and light forms…there are the stars and the sun and moon, and those who see the stars and the sun and moon. Saying, ‘I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist,’ he would not be speaking rightly.”

“So too, student, the brahmin Pokkharasāti is blind and visionless.
-MN 99

Here is Bhikkhu Bodhi summarizing the abhidhamma position on dhammas:

It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…

…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).

…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260

And here is straight from the abhidhamma:

“All form is that which is…

void of idea,
neither feeling, nor perception, nor synthesis,
disconnected with thought,”
“form exists which is not due to karma having been wrought”

-Dhammasangani 2.2.3

And the Kathavatthu:

Points of Controversy
9.3 Of Matter as Subjective
Controverted Point: Whether matter should be termed subjective or objective.

Theravādin: If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or body, that it has the mental features of “adverting”, ideating, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing, anticipating, aiming—things which you would, on the contrary, deny of matter.

All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, perception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit, erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, immodesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective. But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things may not be affirmed of it.

You deny in the case of matter all those mental features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term “subjective”, which is really applicable to “contact”, sensation, etc. These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.

Uttarāpathaka: But is not matter correlated (as an object)? Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right to apply the term “subjective” to matter, etc. since “object” is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations.

Thus, we can clearly see, Karunadasa confirms, as do the suttas, abhidhamma, etc. that Classical Theravada is a realist system.

Not only is external reality confirmed as indispensable, but both it and the eye must exist before eye consciousness is even possible.

Per Theravada, if external reality were non existent, as the Yogacara teach, then seeing, hearing, touching, smelling and tasting wouldn’t even be possible. This is, again, because the process of consciousness arising necessarily is preceded by external, existent physical reality.

The sense organ and external reality precede consciousness, and their contact is the precursor to consciousness arising. Thus they are clearly and undeniably mind independent.

(Don’t forget about the most important mind independent reality)

It seems at least the yogacara school believed ‘Vijja’ to be a Samadhi incident(as would any yogic school I think).

In Theravada as well, Vijja or Catu-sacca-abhisamaya is a Samadhi incident. What the Abhidhamma calls Lokuttara Jhana(something outsiders have no knowledge of)
The object of this Jhana is a mind independent reality.

Correct information about the Four Noble truths is only preserved in Theravada.

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Could you please explain in more detail and use only English words?

Sorry, I thought you forgot to mention asaṅkhatadhātu/nirodhasacca/Nibbana as a mind independent reality. But it seems I didn’t read properly.

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I think they were deluded by Appana Samadhi which arise by taking the object strongly, like moving in to the object, like absorbing in to the object as a union of subject and object.

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