I have read this thread in full, and in the text form of that interview, towards the end, Bhikkhu Bodhi “lays his cards on the table.” The essence of his view is as follows: Nibbāna is something—some kind of reality or eternal element. Since this element is bliss and peace, there is some contour of subjective experience in it. And this contour:
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Is not reducible to consciousness or the aggregates—i.e., it is unconditioned, just like Nibbāna itself.
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Most likely can be present even now, not only at the moment of enlightenment.
In essence, this view is the same old Tibetan zhentong position, or the Yogācāra view that endows Nirvāṇa or Dharmakāya (as the transcendent nature of mind) with properties or characteristics of self-knowing. They also regard the Nirvāṇa of an Arahant/Tathāgata as “indescribable” and “neither existence nor non-existence.”
In other words, while denying that there is any formed consciousness in Nibbāna, Bhikkhu Bodhi—together with Yogācāra and with all Tibetan Buddhist schools (except Gelug-pa), and possibly with other East Asian traditions—attributes to Nibbāna certain characteristics of citta, thereby making it “not non-existence.”
His rejection of the “nihilism” extreme is not based on the classic anattā reasoning from the Yamaka or Vajira Suttas, where, if there is in reality no living being or Tathāgata/Arahant entity, then there is also no annihilation of them—only dukkha ceases. Far from it. His rejection of nihilism is built on the assertion of an unconditioned essence endowed with eternity, (self-)knowing, being, and bliss.
And what is it that is endowed with the qualities of eternity/being, knowledge, and bliss (sat–cit–ānanda)? Exactly—that is the good old Ātman.
I apologize—I understand your deep respect for Bhikkhu Bodhi—but I think in this case it’s not worth trying to defend him or to see in his words the good old classical position. And if his position is fully consistent with the classical one, then, I’m sorry, there are big problems with that classical position itself.