Does nibbana exist?

General Theravada topics
1

From the Visuddhimagga Part III, Ch XVI:

“[DISCUSSION ON NIBBÁNA]

  1. [Question 1] Is Nibbána non-existent because it is unapprehendable, like
    the hare’s horn?

[Answer] That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the [right] means. For
it is apprehendable [by some, namely, the nobles ones] by the [right] means, in
other words, by the way that is appropriate to it, [the way of virtue, concentration,
and understanding]; it is like the supramundane consciousness of others, [which
is apprehendable only by certain of the Noble Ones] by means of knowledge of
penetration of others’ minds. Therefore it should not be said that it is non-existent
because unapprehendable; for it should not be said that what the foolish ordinary
man does not apprehend is unapprehendable.

  1. Again, it should not be said that Nibbána does not exist. Why not? Because
    it then follows that the way would be futile. [508] For if Nibbána were nonexistent,
    then it would follow that the right way, which includes the three
    aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by right understanding, would
    be futile. And it is not futile because it does reach Nibbána.”
1 Like
2

The problem is some people looking at words like rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo etc, convert this to English and ask how can a cessation exist.

It is on coming to Nibbana(nibbānaṃ āgamma) depending on Nibbana(nibbānaṃ paṭicca) they cease. Hence, phalūpacāra vasena they are all terms for Nibbana.

The closest English equivalent might be
Agent-Centered Functional Naming.

‘Cure’ is what cures (the sickness)

‘Solution’ is what solves (the problem)

Coming to Nibbana how? In terms of taking as object.

Objects are causes as well, for example paracitta to paracitta vijānana ñāṇa.

yāvatā, bhikkhave, dhammā saṅkhatā vā asaṅkhatā vā, virāgo tesaṃ aggamakkhāyati, yadidaṃ madanimmadano pipāsavinayo ālayasamugghāto vaṭṭupacchedo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānaṃ.
~Iti90

3

Reflection on Nibbana is one of the 40 subjects of meditation. In AN 11.12 & 13, the Buddha advises a layperson and lists the results of recollections, which include “a sense of the goal,” meaning nibbana is a recommended reflection from the earliest stages.

4

Yes. It’s also found as two perceptions in the Girimananda Sutta (AN 10.60):

And what is the perception of fading away?
It’s when a mendicant has gone to a wilderness, or to the root of a tree, or to an empty hut, and reflects like this:
‘This is peaceful; this is sublime—that is, the stilling of all activities, the letting go of all attachments, the ending of craving, fading away, extinguishment.’
This is called the perception of fading away.

And what is the perception of cessation?
It’s when a mendicant has gone to a wilderness, or to the root of a tree, or to an empty hut, and reflects like this:
‘This is peaceful; this is sublime—that is, the stilling of all activities, the letting go of all attachments, the ending of craving, cessation, extinguishment.’
This is called the perception of cessation.

…and as the “recollection of peace” (upasamānussati) at AN 1.305.

5

Thank you. Any idea why the two perceptions in AN 10.60 precede mindfulness of breathing, which also includes dispassion & cessation?

6

Regarding upasamānussati,

This also includes, Nibbana which is also named ‘accantūpasamo’ and lokuttara magga which is also named ‘khayūpasamo’.

Neither has lokuttara magga arisen in a ordinary person nor have they glimpses Nibbana via lokuttara magga to reflect upon.

They can however reflect upon mahānubhāva of magga and Nibbana. And give rise to pītisambojjhaṅga and so forth. Keep in mind ordinary person does not also have experiential confidence in the Blessed One etc.

If a Jhāna lābhi they can also reflect on their vikkhambhita kilesa.

If not for example, let’s say something like jealousy has not arisen in them for a long time they can reflect on that. Etc

7

Another term for this is ‘phalavohāra’

The opposite of this is ‘kāraṇavohāra’. Phala referred to by kāraṇa.

8

Important example of this is regarding ‘bhava’ sound(or word) in dependent origination.

It should be noted that , phalavohārena or phalūpacārena, (bhava upaga) kamma is included.

In short

mukhyatthena, upapattibhava is stated.

phalavohārena, kamma( -kammabhava) is stated.

9

I have read this thread in full, and in the text form of that interview, towards the end, Bhikkhu Bodhi “lays his cards on the table.” The essence of his view is as follows: Nibbāna is something—some kind of reality or eternal element. Since this element is bliss and peace, there is some contour of subjective experience in it. And this contour:

  1. Is not reducible to consciousness or the aggregates—i.e., it is unconditioned, just like Nibbāna itself.

  2. Most likely can be present even now, not only at the moment of enlightenment.

In essence, this view is the same old Tibetan zhentong position, or the Yogācāra view that endows Nirvāṇa or Dharmakāya (as the transcendent nature of mind) with properties or characteristics of self-knowing. They also regard the Nirvāṇa of an Arahant/Tathāgata as “indescribable” and “neither existence nor non-existence.”

In other words, while denying that there is any formed consciousness in Nibbāna, Bhikkhu Bodhi—together with Yogācāra and with all Tibetan Buddhist schools (except Gelug-pa), and possibly with other East Asian traditions—attributes to Nibbāna certain characteristics of citta, thereby making it “not non-existence.”

His rejection of the “nihilism” extreme is not based on the classic anattā reasoning from the Yamaka or Vajira Suttas, where, if there is in reality no living being or Tathāgata/Arahant entity, then there is also no annihilation of them—only dukkha ceases. Far from it. His rejection of nihilism is built on the assertion of an unconditioned essence endowed with eternity, (self-)knowing, being, and bliss.

And what is it that is endowed with the qualities of eternity/being, knowledge, and bliss (sat–cit–ānanda)? Exactly—that is the good old Ātman.

I apologize—I understand your deep respect for Bhikkhu Bodhi—but I think in this case it’s not worth trying to defend him or to see in his words the good old classical position. And if his position is fully consistent with the classical one, then, I’m sorry, there are big problems with that classical position itself.

10

Actually I think he is clear that nibbana has no characteristics of citta. Do you have a quote where he said differently..

But anyway, whether Ven. Bodhi has it correct or not, the orthodox position is that there can be no citta, no cetasika, no rupa in nibbana. All samsara is is an endless continuity of the arising and ceasing of these factors - and they can arise no more upon khandha parinibbana.

There is a lengthy passage in the Visuddhimagga about nibbana that is worth reading.

11

No, he clearly states that there is no citta itself (no conditioned dhammas) in Nibbāna. But he does not say that Nibbāna is not endowed with certain characteristics of citta (an experiential contour) and of being. Moreover, in the given quotations he explicitly affirms this.

And this serves as the basis for his further claims: rejecting the so-called “nihilist position,” asserting something that is beyond both being and non-being, and all the accompanying descriptions of the Arahant’s state.

There is the citation:

“And so with the attainment of nibbāna without residue, the six sense faculties come to an end, and so there’s no more experiencing of pleasure, pain, the agreeable and disagreeable.

There’s no contact anymore, so they cannot be feeling, right? Yeah. So I wouldn’t say that that experience of supreme bliss, supreme peace, is a feeling in the way that feeling is understood as an ordinary conditioned phenomenon. So would then you say that the bliss, associated with nibbāna, or even the experiencing of it, is that conditioned or unconditioned? Like nibbāna is conditioned, that is unconditioned.

Nibbāna is unconditioned. But this description, this adjective describing nibbāna, Yeah. So this is a bliss that is the bliss of something unconditioned.

It would have to be unconditioned, yeah. And therefore also the experience of it would have to be an unconditioned experience. It would be an unconditioned state, yeah.

An unconditioned bliss. Yeah, which is completely different to the experience that we have. Exactly, yeah.

Yeah, yeah, yeah. And nibbāna is right here, right now, yeah? Is it or not? Well, nibbāna is always existing. It’s a little tricky if you say that it’s right here, right now.

Where is it? You get the idea. If I, you know, I can put the direction into my… Yeah, where’s the GPS for nibbāna? If I turn the corner, am I going to run into it? Yeah. But it’s always present in the sense that because it’s unconditioned, it doesn’t have any arising, and it doesn’t undergo any kind of transformation, and you have to you have to realize it individually for yourself.

So you could say it’s almost sort of, maybe you could say it’s always present internally, and when you develop your samādhi and paññā, your wisdom and concentration of wisdom to a certain point, then maybe the inner barriers that are separating the mind from nibbāna break down, and then you see…

Interviewer: That’s beautiful. That’s a beautiful description. But it makes me wonder if the adjective blissful and also the experience side of it is also internally present right now.

Perhaps. But that would be quite different even from, you know, there are very more resulted types of bliss that are present within the jhānic experience, the stages of meditative absorption. So that’s pīti and sukha, elation and bliss.

But nibbāna is, but those are still conditioned phenomena. Same words, it’s a completely different category. Yeah.

You can’t compare a conditioned thing and an unconditioned thing. Exactly. Even if they have the same name.

Yeah. And we can talk like this, but we don’t really know what this is, right? Yeah. And it seems like the other thing is that, you know, for conditioned thing, Buddha would eloquently spoke about dependent origination.

Exactly. And this seems to be how conditioned things operate. Actually, you make some interesting points in the book on dependent origination and how it’s been misunderstood…”

***

I think it’s all quite clear here. First, Bhikkhu Bodhi separates feeling (vedanā, experience) of the six conditioned spheres of contact from Nibbāna. He explicitly and unambiguously states that in the anupādisesa-parinibbāna all of this, of course, ceases — as is shown in the first bold-highlighted passages.

Then he asserts that Nibbāna is still peace and bliss — which means it is somehow experienced. This experience is nothing other than the very citta-characteristic with which he endows the Nibbāna-dhamma; you can see this clearly from the text. This is the “experiencing contour.”

Next, he states that this contour — this bliss and experience — is also unconditioned. This is exactly what I have been pointing out.

Then he goes further and suggests that this Nibbāna-contour, together with Nibbāna itself, internally exists always — even now (the very “layer of the nature of mind” that a yogi must break through to by means of concentration and wisdom).

In short, the position is quite frank and unambiguous: denial of citta (and of conditioned dhammas, aggregates) in Nibbāna, coupled with the affirmation of citta-characteristics and a refined mode of “being” for the Nibbāna element itself.

My question is: does the Abhidhamma tradition also attribute to the Nibbāna-dhamma the characteristics of citta (knowing, experiencing, feeling) and a refined mode of being — or is this a personal invention of Bhikkhu Bodhi (and of the Yogācāra / Tibetan zhentong schools)?

12

Bhikkhu Bodhi says the same. But does this mean that Nibbāna itself has an unconditioned, always-present inner experiencing contour of bliss and peace — an experiential contour? Is Nibbāna itself endowed with the unconditioned characteristic of (self-)knowing, and of a transcendental being?

13

I know this passage from the Visuddhimagga. It is in many ways problematic.

  1. Why add this “fifth wheel” in the cart in the form of a transcendental dhamma — Nibbāna — if the cessation of suffering is achieved simply by the cessation of defilements and khandhas? Especially since in the suttas nirodha and nibbāna are words that linguistically denote cessation, the absence of something conditioned, rather than the presence of something unconditioned.

  2. The presence of this element is used as a way to distance oneself from the idea of “nihilism” and from the notion of Nibbāna as “nothing,” which, in the author’s view, would mean that the path leads to meaninglessness and futility. But what is the difference? What changes if such an unconditioned element exists, since citta still ceases, and experientially this does not differ from the simple cessation of kilesas/khandhas (with a small difference in the form of the experience in the attainment of path and fruit, which has a more solid and reified object)? Only if we endow this element with transcendental properties of consciousness and being does Buddhaghosa’s objection make sense.

Exactly the same question was asked by the interviewer to Bhikkhu Bodhi — and he began to reflect on the topic of the experiential contour of the Nibbāna element.

14

Good lord no!

None of that.. It is utterly void of any nama or rupa.

15

I think so too. I have not found such a meaning anywhere regarding nibbana dhamma. Its characteristic is usually peace. But Bhikkhu Bodhi seems to interpret this characteristic as the presence of an experiencing circuit that unconditionally, eternally experiences this peace and this bliss; and this experience is fundamentally different from the experience of the five aggregates (after all, in theory there is no bliss and peace outside the experience of this bliss and peace). Personally, I am inclined to the interpretation of the Venerable Ledi Sayadaw, who says that peace is the property of the constant cessation of the kilesas/kkhandhas. Peace does not necessarily have to be experienced in order for it to exist. The very absence of experience is already the highest, perfect peace in itself. Thus, Ledi Sayadaw and the following Mahasi Sayadaw connect two interpretative nibbana: as cessation and as ultimate reality.

16

It’s not a matter of adding anything.

It is ñāṇa that has Nibbana as object that can do the pariññā kicca regarding dhukkha and pahāna kicca regarding samudaya.

Hence Nibbana is a necessary kāraṇa for complete eradication of kilesa. With the complete eradication of kilesa, paṭisandhi janaka kamma cannot operate any more…

Intuitions regarding English language does not work here. Linguistically (if that is the right term to use) speaking, without context a word like ‘virāgo’ for example could be denoting, cessation of rāga as you say, or lokuttara magga or Nibbana.

If you are talking about Visuddhimagga. Please share references.

17

Nirvana exists. It is a real thing. The destruction of all causes is Nirvana. If someone destroys all causes, then he gets Nirvana.