Citta without the last moment

Abhidhamma
1

Greetings, dear friends.

I had a number of debates with a representative of Mahayana. He put forward the following thesis. In their view, the sufficient cause of citta is the preceding moment of citta, and the condition of citta is the corresponding cognizable object.

Therefore, the mind will arise endlessly, perceiving either conditioned objects or their cessation (nirvana). Such a flow formally consists of moments (formally - anicca) and does not have a whole essence, a composite of moments and conditioned (formally - sunnyata/anatta). According to their view, if there are no defilements, clinging, then such a flow will not be passive.

I objected that such a property of citta would contradict the idea of ​​impermanence and conditionedness, since the property of citta to generate the next moment in their view should be constant, unchanging and unconditioned by changing causes.

They objected to me that since dharmas are endowed with their own unchanging attribute, then just as these characteristics and individual traits of dharmas are constant, so this property of the citta to generate the next moment is also constant. That is, this is how they circumvent the law of impermanence and conditionedness, using the language of abhidharma.

What can be said purely philosophically against these ideas? How can one separate the constancy of the characteristics of dharmas from the constancy of the ability of the citta to generate the next moment? And why can’t the citta have such an ability in principle?

2

The preceding moment and cognizable object ( arammana paccaya) are crucial conditions.

But they are not the only ones. Thus we see in dependent origination ignorance and craving as key conditions for the continuation of the round.

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3

Which particular Mahayana tradition is this?

At least there appears to be a seemingly correct view on anicca( ahutvā bhavanti, hutvā nirujjhanti).

If troop of vinnana continue after Arahant cuti , thats a new bhava. Ayatana patilabha(manayatana) etc.

It’s not the abhāva of khaṇe khaṇe bhaṅgasaṅkhātassa roga is it? Whatever the object.

4

Such a view does not accord with dependent origination. Avijja and tanha are indeed key conditions.

From Abhidhammatthavibhavini tika

avijjānusayiteyeva santāne saṅkhārānaṃ vipākadhammabhāvena pavattanato avijjāpaccayāsaṅkhārāsambhavanti, viññāṇañca saṅkhārajanitaṃ hutvā bhavantare patiṭṭhāti. na hi janakābhāve tassuppatti siyā, tasmā saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ.

And from Abhidhammatthasangaha

avijjānusayaparikkhittena taṇhānusayamūlakena saṅkhārena janiyamānaṃ sampayuttehi pariggayhamānaṃ sahajātānamadhiṭṭhānabhāvena pubbaṅgamabhūtaṃ bhavantarapaṭisandhānavasena paṭisandhisaṅkhātaṃ mānasaṃ uppajjamānameva patiṭṭhāti bhavantare.

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5

And this describes that avijja and tanha are causes.

Thus if those are removed the fire of samsara must die out.

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6

I don’t think there is such teaching in Theravada. (Similar maybe but subtly different)

Not sure if this will make sense

All namarupa dhammas are unique arisings. But there are, tatha avitatha lakkhana or sabhāva lakkhana that differentiate each. (There are no infinite types of dhammas)

7

This is why it’s possible for example to gather together, internal, external , past, present, future etc viññāṇa rāsi as viññāṇakkhandha and differentiate from saññākkhandha etc.

And it is incorrect to say even of a sukkhavipassaka Arahant, that there are any apariññāta dhammas.

8

It is objected to me that avijja and tanha are the cause of the emergence of polluted consciousness (vijnana).

9

It turns out that the potentials of past sankharas are the key necessary reason for the prolongation of the existence of consciousness after the exhaustion of the 6 spheres of contact and the life force that supports them. But it is difficult for me to prove this philosophically.

10

This is the Gelugpa school and the like.

No, I do not think that this is the correct view of anicca, since it presupposes a certain constancy of the same construction (creation of the next moment of citta) without conditioning of this constructive process from the outside. Their citta is endowed with the unconditional property of generating the next moment.

They interpret bhava again as existence polluted by clinging. By eliminating clinging, bhava (as a form of existence, not existence itself) ceases.

11

Kammas give anurūpa results. So you think past avijja nissita kamma is going to give rise cittas that take Nibbana as object? Not going to happen!

Cuti-patisandhi is an important junction in bhavacakka. What should be said of an Arahant is

appaṭisandhi apātubhāvo parinibbāyati

āyupariyādānā jīvitindriyassa uparodhā idañca dukkhaṃ nirujjhati, aññañca dukkhaṃ na uppajjati

khīṇaṃ purāṇaṃ nava natthi sambhavaṃ, virattacittāyatike bhavasmiṃ,
te khīṇabījā avirūḷhichandā, nibbanti dhīrā yathāyaṃ padīpo

khandhaparinibbānena vā saṅkhārappavattito apagaccheyyāti

anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyati

What you are saying is there is still an upādisesa left, which is not in accordance with suttas(Abhidhamma included).

12

No, I am talking about the continuation of the chitta, which necessarily requires sankhara-nidana, according to the Buddha’s suttas. The opponents do not require sankhara, but simply need a past moment of consciousness, on which they build the entire structure of their theory.