

## CHAPTER TWO

### CLASSIFICATION OF THE BASES

(*Āyatanavibhaṅga*)

#### A. SUTTANTA DIVISION

208. [45] Now, in the description of the sense bases next to that, showing firstly the Suttanta Division, he said: **Dvādasāyatanāni: cakkhāyatanam rūpāyatanam** <70.1> (“twelve sense bases: eye base, visible-datum base”) and so on.

#### (a) Definition

209. Herein, firstly according to a method which is not contained in the Pāli:

210. (1) Meaning, (2) character, (3) just so much, (4) order, and (5) in brief and detail, (6) Likewise as to how to be seen — [thus] should be known the definition.

211. 1. Herein, firstly [as to *meaning*] in particular: “It relishes” (*cakkhati*),<sup>1</sup> thus it is an eye (*cakkhu*); the meaning is that it enjoys a visible datum (*rūpa*) and reveals it. “It makes visible” (*rūpayati*),<sup>2</sup> thus it is a visible datum (*rūpa*); the meaning is that by undergoing an alteration of appearance (colour) it evidences what state is in the mind (lit. heart). “It hears” (*suṇāti*), thus it is an ear (*sota*). “It is emitted” (*sappati*),<sup>3</sup> thus it is sound (*sadda*); the meaning is: “it is uttered” (*udāharīyati*).<sup>4</sup> “It smells” (*ghāyati*), thus it is a nose (*ghāna*). “It is smelt” (*gandhayati*),<sup>5</sup> thus it is odour (*gandha*); the meaning is: “it betrays (*sūcayati*)<sup>6</sup> its own basis (*vatthu*)”. “It evokes (*avhayati*) life (*jīvita*)”, thus it is a tongue (*jivhā*). “Beings taste it” (*rasanti*),<sup>7</sup> thus it is taste (*rasa*); “they enjoy it” is the meaning. “It is the origin (*āya*) of vile (*kucchita*) states subject to cankers”, thus it is a body (*kāya*), “origin” being the place of arising. “It is touched” (*phusiyati*), thus it is tangible datum (*phoṭṭhabba*). “It causes to think” (*manayati*),<sup>8</sup> thus it is mind (*mano*). “They bear (*dhārayanti*) their own characteristic”; thus they are mental data (*dhammā*).

212. [As to meaning] in general, however, “base” (*āyatana*) should be understood [as such] (a) because of extending (*āyatanato*),<sup>9</sup> (b)

because of range (*tananato*)<sup>10</sup> of the origins (*āyānaṃ*),<sup>11</sup> and (c) because of the leading on (*nayanato*)<sup>12</sup> of what is extended (*āyatassa*).

213. For (a) the states of consciousness and conscious concomitants (*cetasika*) [which possess doors and objects] extend over (*āyatanti*)<sup>13</sup> each its particular one among such [pairs] as eye and visible datum by means of each one's own function of experiencing, etc.; they are active, exert themselves and strive therein is what is meant.

214. (b) These [pairs] provide the range for (*tanonti*) those states which are origins (*āya*); they give them scope is what is meant.

215. (c) As long as this suffering of the round of rebirths, which has been occurring throughout the beginningless round of rebirths and is extended over (*āyata*) the past,<sup>14</sup> does not recede, so long do they lead on (*nayante*); they cause occurrences of states of consciousness, etc.<sup>15</sup>

216. So all these states are called "bases" (*āyatana*) because of extending, because of the range of the origins and because of the leading on of what is extended.

217. Furthermore, "base" should be understood in the sense of abode, [46] mine,<sup>16</sup> meeting-place, birth-place and reason. For accordingly in the world in [such phrases as] "the Lord's *āyatana*", "Vāsudeva's *āyatana*" and so on, it is an abode that is called an *āyatana*; in [such phrases as] "gold *āyatana*", "silver *āyatana*" and so on, it is a mine. But in the Dispensation, in such passages as:

"[And so] in the delightful realm (*āyatana*)

Those flying in the air attend him" (A iii 43)

it is a meeting place; in such phrases as "the southern land is the *āyatana* of cattle", it is a birth-place; in such passages as: "He acquires ability to be a witness of it whenever there is occasion (*āyatana*)" (M i 494), it is a cause.

218. And these various states of consciousness and conscious concomitants dwell [respectively] in the eye and so on because of their dependence thereon; thus the eye and so on are their *abode*. And they are abundant in the eye and so on because of their dependence thereon and because of having them as objects; thus the eye and so on are their *mine*. And the eye and so on are their *meeting-place* because of meeting in one or other of them as basis, door and object. And the eye and so on are their *birth-place* because they arise just there owing to having them as their support and having

them as object. And the eye and so on are their *cause* because these states are absent in the event of their absence.

219. So for these reasons too, these states are called “bases” (*āyatana*) in the sense of abode, mine, meeting-place, birth-place and cause.

220. Therefore in the sense stated “it is an eye and that is a base”, thus it is “eye-base” ... “they are mental data and those are a base”, thus they are “mental-data base”. Thus in the first place should the definition be known here as to meaning.

221. (2) *Character*: here too the definition should be known as to the characteristics of the eye and so on. But these characteristics of theirs should be understood according to the method stated above in the description of the Materiality Section.<sup>17</sup>

222. (3) *As to just so much*: because of the state of being so much. This is what is said: since the eye and so on are also mental data (*dhamma*), this being so why is “the twelve bases” said instead of just “mental-data base”? Because of defining door-cum-object for the arising of the consciousness groups. For here, it is precisely because of defining the six consciousness groups by the state of door and the state of object that they come to be divided up in this way; thus they are called the twelve. For only the eye base is the door of arising, and only the visible-data base is the object of the consciousness group which is included in a cognitive series (*vīthi*) of eye-consciousness. [47] Likewise the others in the case of the others. But only the part of the mind base called the life-continuum (*bhavaṅga*) mind is the door of arising, and only the mental-data base which is not common to all is the object of the sixth consciousness group. So they are called “the twelve” because of their defining door-cum-object for the arising of the six consciousness groups. Thus should the definition be known here “as to just so much”.

223. (4) *As to order*: here also, from among “order of arising” and so on stated above,<sup>18</sup> only “order of teaching” is appropriate. For among the internal bases the eye base is taught first, being obvious through having as its object what is visible (*sanidassana*) and accompanied by impact (*sappaṭigha*). After that, the ear base, etc. which have as their objects what is invisible and accompanied by impact. Or alternatively the eye base and ear base are taught first among the internal bases because of their great helpfulness as causes for the Incomparable of Seeing and for the Incomparable

of Hearing [respectively] (cf. A iii 325). After that the three beginning with the nose base. And the mind base [is taught] last because of its having the resorts of the [other] five as its object. But because of their being the [respective] resorts of the eye base and so on, the visible-data base and so on, among the external [bases, are taught] each next [to its corresponding internal base].

224. Furthermore, this order of theirs should be understood as defining the reasons for the arising of consciousness; and this is said: “Due to eye and to visible data, eye-consciousness arises ... due to mind and mental data, mind-consciousness arises” (M i 111-2). Thus should the definition be known here “as to order”.

225. (5) *In brief and in detail*: in brief, the twelve bases are simply mentality-materiality because the mind base and one part of the mental-data base are included in mentality and the rest of the bases in materiality.

226. But in detail, firstly as regards the internal [bases], the eye base, as to kind, is simply eye-sensitivity; but when classified according to condition, destiny (*gati*), group (*nikāya*) and person, it is of infinite variety. Likewise the four beginning with the ear base. The mind base is of 81 kinds according to its classification into profitable, unprofitable, resultant and functional consciousness of three planes; but as to the classification according to basis, progress,<sup>19</sup> etc., it is of infinite variety. The visible-data, odour and flavour bases, as to classification according to origination, are fourfold. The sound base is twofold. But as to classification according to similarity and dissimilarity, they are all of infinite variety. The tangible-data base is of three kinds by way of the earth element, fire element and air element; and as to origination it is of four kinds; as to similarity and dissimilarity it is of many kinds. The mental-data base is of many kinds by way of mental data of three planes as object. Thus should the definition be known in brief and in detail.<sup>20</sup> [48]

227. (6) *As to how to be seen*: but here all these<sup>21</sup> bases should be regarded as having no provenance and no destination. For they do not come from anywhere previous to their rise, nor do they go anywhere after their fall; but rather before their rise they had not obtained their intrinsic nature (*sabhāva*) and after their fall their intrinsic nature is completely broken up; in between what is before and after, they occur without power [being exercisable over them] owing to dependence on conditions. Therefore they should be regarded as having no provenance and no destination.

228. Likewise [they should be regarded] as inactive and unoccupied. For it does not occur to the eye and visible-datum and so on: 'Would that consciousness might arise from our concurrence.' And they are not active nor do they occupy themselves as door, basis and object for the purpose of arousing consciousness; but rather it is the rule (*dharmatā*) that eye-consciousness and so on come into being with the concurrence of eye-visible-datum and so on. Therefore they should be regarded as inactive and unoccupied.

229. Furthermore, the internal [bases] should be regarded as an empty village because they are devoid of lastingness, beauty, pleasure and self; and the external [bases] as village-raiding robbers (see S iv 175) because they raid (impinge) on the internal [bases]. For this is said: 'The eye, bhikkhus, is struck by agreeable and disagreeable visible data.' Furthermore, the internal [bases] should be regarded as the six creatures<sup>22</sup> and the external [bases] as their resorts. Thus should the definition be known here "as to how to be seen".

### (b) Impermanence, etc.

230. Now in order to point out their aspect to be seen by insight he said: **Cakkhum aniccaṃ** <70.5> ("Eye is impermanent") and so on. Herein, in the first place the eye should be understood as impermanent in the sense of absence after having become.

231. It is also impermanent for four other reasons, [namely,] because of being possessed of rise and fall, because of change (*vipariṇāma*), because of temporariness (*tāvakālika*) and because of exclusion of permanence (*niccapaṭikkhepa*).

232. In itself it is suffering (*dukkha*) in the sense of oppressing. Or because this being arisen reaches presence (*ṭhiti*) and during presence grows old and worn out and on reaching old age breaks up, therefore it is suffering for these four reasons, [namely,] because of constantly oppressing, because of being borne with difficulty (*dukkhama*), because of having suffering as its basis and because of exclusion of pleasure.

233. But it is no-self (*anattā*) in the sense of powerlessness. Or because there is no exercise of power in these three instances, [namely,] "this being arisen, let it not reach presence; having reached presence, let it not grow old; having grown old, let it not break up"; and it is void of this quality of having power exercised over it (*vasavattana*). Therefore it is no-self for these four reasons,

[namely,] because it is void, because it has no owner, because of not behaving as desired (*akāmakāriya*) [and] because of exclusion of self.

234. [49] It is subject to change because of having non-existence as its destiny, because of successively going by way of the transition from existence to existence and because of abandoning its original nature. This is only a synonym for the impermanent.

235. As regards **rūpā aniccā** <70.6> (“*visible data are impermanent*”) and so on, too, the method is the same.

236. Furthermore here, excepting the eye, the states of the three planes are impermanent, but they are not the eye; but the eye is both eye and impermanent. Likewise the remaining states are painful [but are] not the eye; but the eye is both eye and painful. The remaining states are no-self [but are] not the eye; but the eye is both eye and no-self. Also as regards visible data, etc. the method is the same.

237. But what is taught by the Tathāgata in this Suttanta Division? The characteristic of no-self in the twelve bases. For the Fully Enlightened One, when teaching the characteristic of no-self, teaches it by means of the impermanent, or by means of suffering, or by means of [both] the impermanent and suffering.

238. *Herein, in the following sutta passage:* “Should anyone assert that the eye is self, it would be untenable. The arising and passing away of the eye are obvious. But since its arising and passing away are obvious, he would thus have to conclude that ‘my self arises and passes away’, therefore it is untenable, ... therefore the eye is no-self” (M iii 282), he taught the characteristic of no-self by means of the impermanent.

239. In the following sutta passage he taught the characteristic of no-self by means of suffering: ‘Materiality, bhikkhus, is not the self. If materiality, bhikkhus, were the self, this materiality would not lead to sickness, and one would say of materiality: “Let my material form be thus; let my material form not be thus.” But because, bhikkhus, materiality is not the self, therefore materiality leads to sickness and one cannot say of materiality: “Let my material form be thus; let my material form not be thus”’ (S iii 67).

240. In such passages as: “Materiality, bhikkhus, is impermanent; what is impermanent is painful; what is painful is not self; what is not self, that is not mine, that am I not, that is not my self” (S iii 82), he taught the characteristic of no-self by means of both the

impermanent and suffering.

241. Why? Because of the obviousness of impermanence and suffering. For when a plate or a saucer or whatever it may be falls from the hand and breaks, they say: 'Ah! Impermanence,' thus impermanence is obvious. But as regards the person (*attabhāva*), when boils and carbuncles and the like have sprung up, or when pierced by splinters and thorns, etc., they say: 'Ah! The pain.' Thus pain is obvious. The characteristic of no-self is unobvious, dark, unclear, difficult to penetrate, difficult to illustrate, [50] difficult to make known.

242. The characteristics of impermanence and pain are made known with or without the arising of the Tathāgatas. The characteristic of no-self is not made known without the arising of the Enlightened Ones; it is made known only on the arising of the Enlightened Ones. For such wanderers and ascetics (*tāpasa*) as the master Sarabhaṅga<sup>23</sup> are mighty and powerful and are able to express "the impermanent and painful": [but] they are unable to express "no-self". For if they were able to express "no-self" in a present assembly there would be penetration of path and fruition in the present assembly. For the making known of the characteristic of no-self is not the province of anyone else; it is the province of the Fully Enlightened Ones only. Thus this characteristic of no-self is unobvious. That is why the Master, when teaching the characteristic of no-self, taught it by means of impermanence or by means of pain or by means of both impermanence and pain. But here it should be understood that he taught it by means of both impermanence and pain.

243. But it is owing to not keeping what in mind, owing to non-penetration of what and owing to concealment by what that these characteristics do not appear? Firstly the characteristic of impermanence does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating rise and fall owing to its being concealed by continuity (*santati*). The characteristic of pain does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating continuous oppression and owing to its being concealed by the postures (*iriyāpatha*). The characteristic of no-self does not appear owing to not keeping in mind, not penetrating the resolution into the various elements (*nānādhātuvinibbhoga*) owing to its being concealed by compactness. But when continuity is dissected by laying hold of rise and fall, the characteristic of impermanence appears in accordance with its true essen-

tial nature. When the postures are exposed (*ugghāṭita*) by keeping in mind continual oppression, the characteristic of pain appears in accordance with its true essential nature. When resolving of the compact (*ghanavinibbhoga*) is effected by resolution into the various elements, the characteristic of no-self appears in accordance with its true essential nature.

244. And here the following difference should be understood: impermanence and the characteristic of impermanence, pain and the characteristic of pain, no-self and the characteristic of no-self.<sup>24</sup>

245. Herein, the five aggregates (*pañcakkhandha*) are impermanent. Why? Because they rise and fall and change, or because of their absence after having been. Rise and fall and change are the characteristic of impermanence, or mode of alteration (*ākāravikāra*) (cf. Vis 590) called absence after having been.

246. But those same five aggregates are painful because of the words “what is impermanent is painful” (S iv 1). Why? Because of continual oppression. The mode of being continually oppressed is the characteristic of pain. [51]

247. But those same five aggregates are no-self because of the words “what is painful is no-self” (S iv 1). Why? Because there is no exercising power over them. The mode of insusceptibility to having power exercised over them is the characteristic of no-self.

248. That is why the impermanent, the painful and the no-self are one thing and the characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self are another. For that which consists of the five aggregates, the twelve bases, the eighteen elements is all impermanent, painful and no-self; the modes of alteration of the kind aforesaid are the characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self.<sup>25</sup>

249. But here in brief ten bases are of the sense sphere; two are of three planes. But the procedure of comprehension (*sammasana-cāro*; cf. Vis 607, 609, 611) should be understood to be expounded in respect of all.

### *End of Suttanta Division*

## **B. ABHIDHAMMA DIVISION**

250. In the Abhidhamma Division, instead of stating the bases in pairs thus: “eye base, visible-data base”, as was done above for the purpose of helpfulness to those employing insight, [here] for the



purpose of showing the nature of the internal and external they are stated, without mixing them together,<sup>26</sup> thus: **cakkhāyatanam sotāyatanam** <70.18> (“eye base, ear base”) according to the method of defining the internal and the external.

251. In the section containing their description, **tattha katamam cakkhāyatanam?** <70.24> (“Herein, which is the eye base?”), etc. should be understood in the way aforesaid.<sup>27</sup> But the meaning of what is said in the description of the mental-data base, [namely:] **Tattha katamā asaṅkhatā dhātu? Rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo** <72.35> (“Herein, which is the unformed element? It is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion”) is this: the unformed element is nibbāna, whose nature (*sabhāva*) is unformed. But because greed and so on are destroyed on coming to this (*etaṃ āgamma*), it is therefore called “the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion”. This is the agreed commentary of the Teachers.

252. But a contraversialist (*vitaṇḍavādin*) said: ‘There is no independent nibbāna; nibbāna is just the destruction of the defilements.’ He said: ‘Quote a sutta.’ The Jambukhādaka-sutta was quoted thus: “Nibbāna” is said, friend Sāriputta; what, friend, is nibbāna? ‘That which is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion—that is called nibbāna’ (S iv 251). [Then] he said: ‘By this sutta it should be understood that there is no independent nibbāna; nibbāna is just the destruction of the defilements.’ He should be asked: ‘But how? Is the meaning according to this sutta [literally] so?’ Surely he will say: [52] ‘Yes, there is no meaning apart from the sutta.’<sup>28</sup>

253. Then he should be told: ‘Now this sutta has been quoted by you; quote the next one to that.’ The sutta next to that [says:] “Arahatship” is said, friend Sāriputta; what, friend, is Arahatship? ‘That which is the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion—that is called Arahatship’ (S iv 251). This is the sutta quoted next to that. But on this being quoted, they said to him: ‘Nibbāna is a mental datum included in the mental-data base; Arahatship is the four [immaterial] aggregates. The General of the Norm [i.e. Sāriputta] who had realised nibbāna and dwelt therein, on being asked about nibbāna and on being asked about Arahatship, said it was just the destruction of the defilements. But how? What, then, are nibbāna and Arahatship, one or multiple? Whether they are one or multiple, what according to you who make

excessively fine distinctions<sup>29</sup> is the meaning here? You do not know what is one and what is multiple. Surely when that is known, it is good?' Being thus questioned again and again, being unable to deceive, he said: 'It is because of its being arisen in one who has destroyed greed, etc. that Arahathship is called the destruction of greed, hate and delusion.'

254. Then they said to him: 'A great work has been done by you! And even one getting you to say that by giving a reward, would have got you to say just that. And just as this [sutta] has been explained by you, so too [you should] discern that. For it is on coming to nibbāna that greed, etc. are destroyed, and so nibbāna is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion. And these are just three terms for nibbāna.'

255. If even when this is said he is convinced (*saññattim gacchati*), it is well. If not, he should be made to work with a plurality of nibbānas. How? This should firstly be asked: 'Is the destruction of greed the destruction of greed only, or is it that of hate and delusion? Is the destruction of hate the destruction of hate only, or is it that of greed and delusion? Is the destruction of delusion the destruction of delusion only, or is it that of greed and hate?' Surely he will say: 'The destruction of greed is the destruction of greed; the destruction of hate is the destruction of hate; the destruction of delusion is the destruction of delusion.' Thereupon he should be told: 'According to your assertion, destruction of greed is one nibbāna, destruction of hate is another nibbāna and destruction of delusion is another nibbāna. In the destruction of the three roots of the unprofitable, three nibbānas come to be; in the destruction of the four clingings, four [nibbānas]; in the destruction of the five hindrances, five; in the destruction of the six groups of craving, six; in the destruction of the seven inherent tendencies, seven; in the destruction of the eight wrongnesses, eight; in the destruction of the nine things rooted in craving, [53] nine; in the destruction of the ten fetters, ten; in the destruction of the 1500 defilements, there being a special nibbāna for each, many nibbānas come to be. But there is no limit to these nibbānas. But instead of taking it thus, [saying rather:] 'It is on coming to nibbāna that greed, etc. are destroyed,' it is the same one nibbāna that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbāna.'

256. If when this is said he does not discern it, he should be made to work with grossness.<sup>30</sup> How? 'Blind fools and also bears, leopards,

deer, monkeys, etc., being invaded by defilements, fornicate (*vatthum paṭisevanti*). Then, when their fornicating is over, the defilement subsides. According to your assertion, bears, leopards, deer, monkeys, etc. have [then] reached nibbāna. Gross indeed is your nibbāna, and coarse; the only thing is, you cannot adorn your ear with it.<sup>31</sup> But instead of taking it thus, [saying rather:] ‘It is on coming to nibbāna that greed, etc. are destroyed,’ it is the same one nibbāna that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbāna.’

257. But if even when this is said he does not discern it, he should be made to work with change of lineage (*gotrabhū*). How? He should first be questioned thus: ‘Do you assert that change of lineage exists?’ ‘Yes, I do.’ ‘At that moment of change of lineage, have the defilements been destroyed, are they being destroyed or will they be destroyed?’ ‘They have not been destroyed, they are not being destroyed, but rather they will be destroyed.’ ‘But what does change of lineage make its object?’ ‘Nibbāna.’ ‘In your moment of change of lineage the defilements have not been destroyed, are not being destroyed, but rather they will be destroyed; while the defilements are still undestroyed you make known nibbāna which is the destruction of the defilements; while the inherent tendencies are still unabandoned, you make known nibbāna which is the abandoning of the inherent tendencies. This does not agree. But instead of taking it thus, [saying rather:] “It is on coming to nibbāna that greed, etc. are destroyed,” it is the same one nibbāna that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate and the destruction of delusion. Take these three as just three terms for nibbāna.’

258. But if even when this is said he does not discern it, he should be made to work with the path. How? He should first be questioned thus: ‘Do you assert the path?’ ‘Yes, I do.’ ‘At the moment of the path, have the defilements been destroyed, are they being destroyed or will they be destroyed?’ Knowing, he will say: ‘It is not right to say that they have been destroyed or that they will be destroyed; [54] it is right to say that they are being destroyed.’ ‘If this is so of the path, which is the nibbāna that is the destruction of the defilements? Which are the defilements that are destroyed by the path? Which defilements does the path cause to be destroyed by making which nibbāna as destruction of the defilements its object? Therefore do not take it thus. [Saying rather:] “It is on coming to nibbāna that greed, etc. are destroyed,” it is the same one nibbāna

that is called the destruction of greed, the destruction of hate, the destruction of delusion. These three are just three terms for nibbāna.'

259. This being said, he said: 'You say "on coming to";<sup>32</sup> from where have you got this "on coming to"?' 'It is got from the suttas.' 'Quote the sutta.' "'Thus ignorance and craving, on coming to that, are destroyed in that, are abolished in that, nor does anything anywhere ...'" (cf. M iii 220). When this was said, the other speaker became silent (cf. Vis 507 f.).

260. Here also ten bases are of the sense sphere. But two, being of four planes, should be understood as mixed mundane and supra-mundane.

### *End of Abhidhamma Division*

## C. QUESTIONNAIRE

261. Here also in the Questionnaire, after asking about all that which is and which is not applicable, the answers are stated only in accordance with what is applicable. And not only here but in all the questionnaires this is the method [adopted].

262. But here the state of indeterminacy (*avyākataṭā*) should be understood as the material state of ten bases. The profitable, etc. state of the two bases should be understood like that of the four [immaterial] aggregates in the Classification of the Aggregates, except that the four aggregates are only accompanied by condition and only formed, but the mental-data base may be without condition and may be unformed; thus it has been handed down.

263. And as regards the object triads, the mental-data base which is without object and called subtle materiality is classed in the portion for those which should not be said [to have such objects]. And this is because of having no object, not because of having as object a mental datum which should not be said to be limited, etc.; this is the difference here. The rest is similar.

264. For here also, like the four aggregates, two bases have limited objects for one who lusts, who hates, who is deluded, who restrains, who comprehends, who reviews on account of the 55 states of the sense sphere; thus all is as stated in respect of the aggregates.

*End of the Description of the Classification of the Sense Bases*

## FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Not in PED.
2. Not in PED; *rūpayati* is merely mentioned under *rūpa*.
3. Not in PED.
4. Not in PED.
5. Not in PED.
6. Not in PED.
7. Not in PED.
8. Not in PED; Vis 481 has *munāti* “measures”.
9. Noun from *āyatati*; see below, note 13.
10. Noun from *tanoti*; not in PED but occurs there under *āyatana* in quotation from KhA 82.
11. Genitive plural of *āya*.
12. *Nayana* in direct sense as noun from *neti* is not in PED.
13. Not in PED.
14. *Atīta-āyatam*; C<sup>e</sup> and Vis 481 have *atīva āyatam*.
15. All these derivations are in fact word plays.
16. *Ākara* means either “store” (deposit) or “mine”. PED gives “pearl-mining” (see entry for *ratanākara*).
17. *Rūpakandañiddesa*. Dhś §583 ff. and Asl 296 ff.; owing to this reference, this sentence is different from Vis.
18. See above §129 and Vis 476.
19. I.e. the four possibilities beginning with painful progress (*paṭipadā*) and sluggish direct knowledge (*abhiññā*).
20. This paragraph differs somewhat from Vis 483–4.
21. *Tāni*; Vis has *saṅkhatāni*.
22. Snake, crocodile, bird, dog, jackal, monkey; see S iv 198.
23. *Sarabhaṅga* (“arrow-breaker”) is probably a proper name referring to the ascetic Sarabhaṅga whose story is told in Jātaka 522 [Ny].
24. The following part of the paragraph is given in brief at Vis 640 f.
25. E<sup>e</sup> and C<sup>e</sup> have *anicca-dukkhānatta-lakkaṇānī ti suttanta-bhājanīyaṃ* as the last words of this paragraph. The translator’s manuscript follows this reading by adding the words “Suttanta Division” at the end of this paragraph, after which there is another short paragraph before the Abhidhamma Division starts. In B<sup>e</sup>, however, this penultimate paragraph ends with ... *lakkaṇānī ti*, while the words *Suttanta-bhājanīya-vannaṇā* appear below the last paragraph, indicating the

conclusion of this division. As that is the usage in all the chapters of this work, the Burmese reading has been adopted here [Ny].

26. Reading *abbokārato* (*a + vokāra + to*) with E<sup>c</sup>; C<sup>c</sup> *sabbākārato*.
27. See Dhs § 596 and As! (or does this refer to the *Suttantabhājanīya* only?).
28. Mṭ: this means that the meaning is explicit (*nīto attho*) in just the words of the sutta [LSC].
29. *Tayā atibahuṃ cuṅṅikaraṇaṃ karontena*.
30. *Olārikatāya kāretabbo: mṭ* has *olārikabhāva-dosāpattiyābodhetabbo, niggahetabbo ...* = “should be made to understand or should be refuted” [Ny].
31. *Kaṅṅehi piḷandituṃ na sakkoti*.
32. *Āgamma* — refers to the repetitions above of “on coming to nibbāna” (*nibbānaṃ āgamma*, etc.).