

6. *Of inducing [Insight] by saying 'Sorrow!'*

*Controverted Point.*—That induction [of insight] by the word 'sorrow!' is a factor of and included in the Path.

*From the Commentary.*—An opinion of the Pubbaseliyas is that repeating the word 'dukkha!' induced insight (*ñānaṅ*), and was thus a factor and part of the Path [of salvation].<sup>1</sup> They admit it as true for those only who are qualified to win insight (*vipassakā*).

*Th.* Then you must also affirm that all who utter that word are practising<sup>2</sup> the Path, which is absurd.

Or if you do affirm this, notwithstanding, then you must also affirm that the average foolish person, in uttering that word, is practising the Path, and, again, that matricides, parricides, murderers of Arahants, those that shed blood [of Buddhas], those that cause schism in the Order, in uttering the word 'sorrow!' are practising the Path, which is absurd.

7. *Of the Duration of Consciousness.*<sup>3</sup>

*Controverted Point.*—That a single [unit of] consciousness lasts for a day.

*From the Commentary.*—The Theravādin puts this question to correct the belief of the Andhakas, whose secession is narrated above, that, judging by the apparent continuity both of consciousness in *Jhāna* and of sub-consciousness, a single state of consciousness lasted for a length of time.

[1] *Th.*—If your proposition is true, does one-half of the day belong to the 'nascent moment,' and one-half to the

<sup>1</sup> I.e., the Four-staged Path: Stream-Winning, etc., not the Ariyan Eightfold Path. Cf. *Dhamma-saṅgāṇī*, §§ 288-92. (This is incorrectly stated to be the latter path in the translation, p. 84, n. 1.)

<sup>2</sup> *Bhāventi*, making to become, developing.

<sup>3</sup> In the appended title, p. 208, of PTS text, read *cittatṭhiti-kathā*, as in the *Commentary*.

'cessant moment'?<sup>1</sup> You say no; but you have implied it. A similar admission is involved in affirming that a state of consciousness lasts two days, or four days or eight, ten, or twenty days, or a month, or two, four, eight, or ten months, or a year, or any number of years, or any number of æons.

[2] Are there other phenomena beside mind which arise and cease many times during one day? Yes, you say? Then do you contend that they come and go as quickly as mind? If you say no, then your proposition falls. If you say they do, was it not said by the Exalted One: '*I consider, bhikkhus, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so quickly as mind. It is not easy to find a simile to show how quickly mind comes and goes*'?<sup>2</sup>

Again: '*Just as a monkey faring through the dense forest catches one bough, and, letting it go, catches another, and then another, even so, bhikkhus, with what is called thought, or mind, or consciousness, by day as by night, one arises when another perishes*'?<sup>3</sup>

[4] [Take the content of a state of consciousness:] does any visual consciousness or other sense-consciousness last a whole day, or any bad thought, such as consciousness accompanied by passion, hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth, distraction, impudence, or indiscretion? If not, then neither can consciousness be said to last a day.

[5] Does one hear, smell, taste, touch, apprehend mentally by means of the same [unit of] consciousness as one sees? Or see, hear, etc., or touch by means of the same [unit of] consciousness as one apprehends mentally? You

<sup>1</sup> Any citta (unit of consciousness) came to be orthodoxly considered as consisting of *three* 'moments': nascent, static, cessant. This grew apparently out of the older *twofold* division of nascent (uppāda) and cessant (vaya, bhanga), such as is here alone adduced.

<sup>2</sup> *Anguttara-Nik.*, i. 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Saggyutta-Nik.*, ii. 95. Cf. Hume: perceptions 'succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. . . .' (p. 584, Green and Grose ed.).

say 'no.' Then you cannot affirm that one [and the same unit of] consciousness lasts a whole day.

[6] Similarly, if you deny that one moves backward with the same [unit of] consciousness as one moves forward, and *vice versâ*, you cannot affirm your proposition. A similar argument applies to looking backward, looking forward, and to bending, extending by means of the same unit of consciousness.<sup>1</sup>

[7] In the case of the devas who have reached the realm of space-infinity, does any unit of consciousness last their whole lifetime? You affirm it does, yet you deny a similar duration in the case of humanity. You deny it also in the case of all devas of the plane of sense-desires, and of all devas of the higher or Rūpa plane,<sup>2</sup> why not of those of the first-named non-Rūpa plane?

[8] You affirm, I say, this duration of a unit of consciousness during the 20,000 æons of the Arūpa-deva's life, yet you deny an analogous duration in a unit of human consciousness, lasting, say, for 100 years, and you deny it in the case of all those devas of the Kāmaloka and Rūpaloka, whose lifetime varies from 500 years in the Four Great Kings to 16,000 æons of years in the senior<sup>3</sup> devas.

[9] *A.*—Does then the mind of the devas who have reached the plane of space-infinity arise and cease moment by moment?

*Th.*—It does.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. again Hume's unconscious plagiarism: 'Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; . . . nor is there any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment . . . several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations' (p. 534, Green and Grose ed.).

<sup>2</sup> The groups of devas are all enumerated in the text: of the heavens of the Four Kings, of the Thirty-Three, of the Yāmā's, of Delight, etc., of the Brahmās, etc., as enumerated in the accurately preserved tradition recorded in the *Compendium*, pp. 138, 142.

<sup>3</sup> Literally, the non-younger devas. Cf. *Compendium*, pp. 140, 142.

A.—But do these devas themselves de cease, and are they reborn moment by moment ?

Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.

A.—Surely this momentary living and dying is involved in the momentary happening of consciousness ?

[10] Th.—But if you affirm that in the case of these devas a unit of consciousness lasts as long as they live, then you must also admit that they die with the same unit of consciousness as that wherewith they are reborn ; but you are not prepared to admit this. . . .

### 8. Of [the World as only a] Cinderheap.

*Controverted Point.*—That all conditioned things are absolutely<sup>1</sup> cinderheaps.

*From the Commentary.*—The opinion of the Gokulikas, from grasping thoughtlessly the teaching of such Suttas as ‘ All is on fire, bhikkhus ! ’<sup>2</sup> ‘ All conditioned things [involve] ill,’<sup>3</sup> is that all conditioned things are without qualification no better than a welter of embers whence the flames have died out, like an inferno of ashes. To correct this by indicating various forms of happiness, the Theravādin puts the question.

[1] Th.—You affirm this ; but is there not such a thing as pleasurable feeling, bodily pleasure, mental pleasure, celestial happiness, human happiness, the pleasures of gain, of being honoured, of riding-and-driving,<sup>4</sup> of resting, the pleasures of ruling, of administrating, of domestic-and-secular life, of the religious life, pleasures involved in the intoxicants<sup>5</sup> and pleasures that are not, the happiness [of Nibbāna], both while stuff of life remains and when none remains,<sup>6</sup> worldly and spiritual pleasures, happiness with

<sup>1</sup> Anodhikatvā, ‘ not having made a limit, without distinction. —*Comy.*

<sup>2</sup> *Vin. Texts*, i. 134.

<sup>3</sup> *Dialogues*, ii. 175.

<sup>4</sup> Yāna-sukhaṅ, literally, vehicle-pleasure.

<sup>5</sup> Asava’s: sensuality, desire for rebirth, erroneous opinions; ignorance was added as a fourth.

<sup>6</sup> Upadhisukhaṅ nirupadhisukhaṅ.